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Abstract
We often initiate social relationships with others through revelations of personal information,
or self-disclosure. Self-disclosure is heavily involved in shaping interpersonal liking, but
there are disparate and sometimes contradictory findings in the literature regarding the causal
relationship between them. Moreover, a lack of careful control in experimental designs in
many existing studies failed to eliminate important confounding factors that might provide
alternative explanations for the disclosure-liking relationship. Here, we examined the
relationships between self-disclosure and interpersonal liking during initial social
interactions, while carefully controlling for a potential confounding factor, similarity between
the social partners.
Across the first five experiments, I independently manipulated disclosers’ self-disclosure
depth, i.e., how personal and intimate the disclosures are, and their self-disclosed similarity
with their social partners. High self-disclosed similarity was consistently found to lead to
greater initial liking of a discloser. In comparison, the experiments failed to find support for
the idea that people favor those who self-disclose more deeply, as suggested in the literature.
In Experiment 6, I manipulated initial liking within a set of social partners and successfully
replicated another disclosure-liking relationship identified in the literature, namely, the effect
that people self-disclose to a greater extent to those whom they like. It was also found that,
contrary to the expectation, participants’ risk-taking tendencies negatively predicted their
self-disclosure depth to others. In Experiment 7, I extended the investigation to an emerging
and novel social context and examined how self-disclosed similarity from an Artificially
Intelligent (AI) agent influenced people’s perceptions of and responses to the agent. A
significant interaction between the perceived identity of the partner (i.e., AI versus human)
and level of self-disclosed similarity was found. The results were interpreted in light of the
“uncanny valley effect”, which suggests that a high level of human realism displayed by an
automatic agent could elicit unpleasant or “eerie” feelings.
Through this series of experiments, I iteratively developed the paradigm to more closely
mimic real-world social disclosures. The findings help disentangle the causal relationship
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between self-disclosure and initial liking and provide insights into some of the subtleties and
processes underlying relationship formation.

Keywords
Interpersonal liking, self-disclosure, friendship development, first impression, similarity,
human-AI interaction
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Summary for Lay Audience
Making friends is important. Being able to enjoy good social relationships with other people
is beneficial to both our psychological and physical health. The friend-making process
frequently starts when we tell each other information about ourselves, such as our past,
hobbies, thoughts, and feelings. This act of revealing our own information to another person
is called self-disclosure.
What should we self-disclose in our first interaction with another person to best kindle the
budding friendship? The past literature suggests that self-disclosing deeper, rather than more
superficial, information about yourself might make the other person like you more. However,
there are some methodological problems with the previous studies that render this conclusion
questionable. Specifically, the fact that you self-disclose more deeply to the other person and
that this person likes you more might both have resulted from a greater similarity between
the two of you.
To address this issue, we investigated whether self-disclosing more deeply to a stranger
makes them like oneself more, after experimentally controlling for the level of similarity
between the two people. We consistently found people to like those who self-disclosed a
greater similarity to themselves and not those who self-disclosed more deeply to them. In
other words, revealing to a stranger that you are similar to them would make them like you
more, whereas telling them deeply personal information about yourself would likely not. I
also investigated whether the causal relationship is the other way around, namely, whether
liking the other person more to start with leads one to self-disclose more deeply to them. My
findings supported this account. Finally, we explored whether people like an artificially
intelligent (AI) agent more if the agent self-disclosed greater similarity with themselves.
Findings suggested that people reacted differently to self-disclosed similarity coming from an
AI partner versus a human partner.

iv

Co-Authorship Statement
Dr. Erin Heerey is a co-author for Does Self-Disclosure Depth Really Matter in Developing
Initial Feelings of Liking? Manuscript submitted for publication. (reported in Chapter 2 of
this dissertation). She contributed to the design of the experiments and the editing of the
manuscript.
Dr. Erin Heerey and Dr. Jonathan Gratch are co-authors for Negative Perceptions of a SelfDisclosing AI: the Potential Role of the Uncanny Valley Effect. Manuscript in preparation.
(reported in Chapter 4). Dr. Heerey and Dr. Gratch both contributed to the design of the
experiment and the editing of the manuscript. Dr. Gratch provided the computer software,
equipment, and lab space for data collection. Dr. Gratch also provided funding for subject
recruitment.

v

Acknowledgments
I would like to express my deep gratitude to my PhD supervisor, Dr. Erin Heerey. Thank you
very much for being so responsive, encouraging, supportive, and, when it comes to
experimental design, incredibly meticulous. Thank you for always pushing me to learn more
and do better. I would not have become the researcher I am today if it were not for you.
I would also like to thank Dr. Richard Sorrentino and Dr. Ross Norman for their guidance in
my undergraduate and master programs. Thank you for showing me the entrance to the world
of psychological research. It is a wonderful world and I have had quite some fun in it.
Thank you to my supervisory committee members, Dr. Sam Joel and Dr. Bill Fisher, for all
your helpful suggestions; thank you to my examination committee members, Dr. Paul
Tremblay, Dr. Mike Katchabaw, and Dr. Elizabeth Page-Gould, for your insightful
comments and interesting conversations during my defense.
To all my good friends from and outside of graduate school, I thank you whole-heartedly for
your love and support. My graduate years has been made so much more enjoyable with all
the wine nights, board game nights, dinner hangouts, and fun/nerdy office conversations
(especially on renewable energy).
I would like to thank my family in China. Dad, mom, and my granny, I love you very much
and probably should express that more often. Thank you for teaching me to be curious, openminded, persistent, and resilient.
Lastly, thank you very much, Yixiao. This would have been such a lonely and stressful
journey if I did not have you and our little family of our dog, bunny, and guinea pig by my
side. Thank you for being my charging station whenever my energy is low. You are my
partner in this adventure called life and I am in luck.

vi

Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii
Summary for Lay Audience ............................................................................................... iv
Co-Authorship Statement.................................................................................................... v
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. vi
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. vii
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... xi
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. xiii
List of Appendices ............................................................................................................ xv
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................. 1
1 Theoretical Background and Rationale .......................................................................... 1
1.1 Related theories ....................................................................................................... 2
1.1.1

Social penetration theory ............................................................................ 2

1.1.2

Intimacy as an interpersonal process .......................................................... 3

1.2 Empirical evidence.................................................................................................. 5
1.3 Do deep self-disclosures lead to greater initial liking? ........................................... 8
1.4 Similarity as a confound in the disclosure-liking link .......................................... 10
1.5 The current experiments ....................................................................................... 12
Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................... 14
2 Experiments 1 to 5: Does Disclosure Depth Matter? ................................................... 14
2.1 General methods ................................................................................................... 14
2.1.1

Material preparation .................................................................................. 15

2.1.2

Experimental paradigm ............................................................................. 15

2.1.3

Core dependent measures ......................................................................... 17

2.1.4

General hypotheses ................................................................................... 18
vii

2.1.5

Overview of the experiments .................................................................... 19

2.2 Experiment 1 ......................................................................................................... 20
2.2.1

Participants ................................................................................................ 21

2.2.2

Data analysis ............................................................................................. 21

2.2.3

Results ....................................................................................................... 22

2.2.4

Discussion ................................................................................................. 24

2.3 Experiment 2 ......................................................................................................... 25
2.3.1

Participants ................................................................................................ 25

2.3.2

Results ....................................................................................................... 26

2.3.3

Discussion ................................................................................................. 28

2.4 Experiment 3 ......................................................................................................... 29
2.4.1

Participants ................................................................................................ 30

2.4.2

Results ....................................................................................................... 30

2.4.3

Discussion ................................................................................................. 32

2.5 Experiment 4 ......................................................................................................... 33
2.5.1

Participants ................................................................................................ 35

2.5.2

Hypotheses and data analysis.................................................................... 35

2.5.3

Results ....................................................................................................... 36

2.5.4

Discussion ................................................................................................. 39

2.6 Experiment 5 ......................................................................................................... 40
2.6.1

Participants ................................................................................................ 41

2.6.2

Methods..................................................................................................... 41

2.6.3

Hypotheses and data analysis.................................................................... 43

2.6.4

Results ....................................................................................................... 43

2.6.5

Discussion ................................................................................................. 47

2.7 Meta-analysis on the effects of similarity and disclosure depth ........................... 48
viii

2.8 Experiments 1 to 5 general discussion .................................................................. 50
Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................... 53
3 Experiment 6: Risk-Taking, Liking, and Self-Disclosure............................................ 53
3.1 Rationale ............................................................................................................... 53
3.1.1

Self-disclosure as a risk-taking behaviour ................................................ 53

3.1.2

Individual differences in risk-taking tendency and self-disclosures ......... 55

3.2 Methodology ......................................................................................................... 57
3.2.1

Procedure .................................................................................................. 57

3.2.2

Hypotheses ................................................................................................ 61

3.2.3

Measures ................................................................................................... 61

3.3 Participants ............................................................................................................ 68
3.4 Results ................................................................................................................... 68
3.4.1

Manipulation check ................................................................................... 68

3.4.2

Perceived similarity, perceived knowledge, and liking ............................ 69

3.4.3

Risk-taking measures: scale reliability and factor analysis ...................... 70

3.4.4

Liking, risk-taking, and self-disclosures ................................................... 75

3.5 Discussion ............................................................................................................. 81
Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................................... 84
4 Experiment 7: Negative Perceptions of a Self-Disclosing AI: the Potential Role of the
Uncanny Valley Effect ................................................................................................. 84
4.1 Rationale ............................................................................................................... 85
4.1.1

Similarity-attraction or the uncanny valley effect? ................................... 85

4.1.2

Perceptions, dehumanization, and anthropomorphism ............................. 87

4.2 Overview of the current experiment ..................................................................... 88
4.3 Hypotheses ............................................................................................................ 88
4.4 Method and materials ............................................................................................ 89
ix

4.4.1

Participants ................................................................................................ 89

4.4.2

Procedure .................................................................................................. 89

4.4.3

Measures ................................................................................................... 92

4.5 Results ................................................................................................................... 94
4.5.1

Experimenter bias check ........................................................................... 95

4.5.2

Similarity manipulation check .................................................................. 95

4.5.3

Warmth and competence scale.................................................................. 95

4.5.4

Mind perception scale ............................................................................... 97

4.5.5

Anthropomorphism scale .......................................................................... 99

4.5.6

Liking and rapport scale.......................................................................... 100

4.5.7

Conversation length ................................................................................ 101

4.5.8

Facial action unit activities ..................................................................... 101

4.6 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 104
Chapter 5 ......................................................................................................................... 107
5 General Discussion..................................................................................................... 107
5.1 Does self-disclosure depth really matter in developing interpersonal liking
between strangers? .............................................................................................. 107
5.2 Similarity: The invisible hand of budding friendship ......................................... 108
5.3 Limitations .......................................................................................................... 109
5.4 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 110
References ....................................................................................................................... 112
Appendices ...................................................................................................................... 129
Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................................................ 158

x

List of Tables
Table 1 Brief Descriptions of Experiments 1 to 5 .................................................................. 20
Table 2 Experiment 6 Factor Loadings for the Risk Measures .............................................. 74
Table 3 Experiment 6 Model Comparisons for Number of Self-Disclosures ......................... 77
Table 4 Experiment 6 Model Comparisons for Proportion of Deep Self-Disclosures ........... 79
Table 5 Experiment 6 Model Comparison for Number of Extra Self-Disclosures................. 80
Table 6 Experiment 7 Correlations among dependent variables .......................................... 103
Table 7 Experiment 1 Type III Analysis of Deviance Table with Wald Chi-Square Tests (for
cumulative link models) ........................................................................................................ 136
Table 8 Experiment 1 Cumulative-link Model Summary..................................................... 138
Table 9 Experiment 2 Type III Analysis of Deviance Table with Wald Chi-Square Tests (for
Cumulative-Link Models) ..................................................................................................... 140
Table 10 Experiment 2 Cumulative-Link Model Summary ................................................. 142
Table 11 Experiment 3 Type III Analysis of Deviance Table with Wald Chi-Square Tests (for
Cumulative Link Models) ..................................................................................................... 144
Table 12 Experiment 3 Cumulative-Link Model Summary ................................................. 146
Table 13 Experiment 4 Type III Analysis of Variance table with Satterthwaite’s method (for
Linear-Mixed Models) .......................................................................................................... 148
Table 14 Experiment 4 Linear-Mixed Model Summary....................................................... 149
Table 15 . Experiment 4 Type III Analysis of Deviance Table with Wald Chi-Square Tests
(for Cumulative Link Models) .............................................................................................. 150
Table 16 Experiment 4 Cumulative-Link Model Summary ................................................. 151
xi

Table 17 Experiment 5 Type III Analysis of Variance Table with Satterthwaite’s Method (for
Linear-Mixed Models) .......................................................................................................... 152
Table 18 Experiment 5 Linear-Mixed Model Summary....................................................... 153
Table 19 Experiment 5 Type III Analysis of Deviance Table with Wald Chi-Square Tests (for
Cumulative Link Models) ..................................................................................................... 154
Table 20 Experiment 5 Cumulative-Link Model Summary ................................................. 155
Table 21 Experiment 7 ANOVA Results on All Measures .................................................. 156
Table 22 Experiment 7 Mean and Standard Deviation by Cell and Pair-Wise Comparisons for
Dependent Variables ............................................................................................................. 157

xii

List of Figures
Figure 1-1 Structure for disclosure depth and disclosure breadth proposed in social
penetration theory. Adapted from Altman and Taylor (1973). ................................................. 2
Figure 1-2.Transactional model of intimacy process. Figure adapted from Reis and Shaver
(1988). ....................................................................................................................................... 5
Figure 2-1. Participants were presented with the avatar pictures (1). They were able to click
on any avatar to view a self-disclosure from that avatar (2). After 2 seconds, pressing the
Space key then returned them to the selection screen (3). ...................................................... 17
Figure 2-2 Stacked bar plots for the ranking items in Experiment 1. X-axis: rank place from 1
(“Describes Worst”) to 6 (“Describes Best”). Y-axis: cumulative percentage of participants
who placed each avatar in the corresponding ranking categories. .......................................... 24
Figure 2-3 Stacked bar plots for ranking items in Experiment 2. X-axis: rank place from 1
(“Describes Worst”) to 6 (“Describes Best”). Y-axis: cumulative percentage of participants
who placed each avatar in the corresponding ranking categories. .......................................... 28
Figure 2-4 Stacked bar plots for ranking items in Experiment 3. X-axis: rank place from 1
(“Describes Worst”) to 6 (“Describes Best”). Y-axis: cumulative percentage of participants
who placed each avatar in the corresponding ranking categories. .......................................... 32
Figure 2-5 Stacked bar plots for the ranking question “How much would you like to actually
meet them?” for participants in the high personalistic condition (left) and participants in the
low personalistic condition (right) in Experiment 4. Y-axis: cumulative percentage of
participants who placed each avatar in the corresponding ranking categories. ...................... 38
Figure 2-6 The effects of Similarity and Reciprocity manipulations on (a) perceived
reciprocity rating, (b)social preference ratings, (c) perceived desirability ratings, and (d) the
number of reciprocated self-disclosures to the avatars in Experiment 5. Error bars represent
95% CI. ................................................................................................................................... 46

xiii

Figure 2-7. Meta-analysis of the effects of High Similarity, Low Similarity, and High
Disclosure Depth on participants’ responses on the "how much you’d like to actually meet
them" ranking item in Experiments 1 through 4. Positive beta represents higher likelihood to
be ranked higher on this item. ................................................................................................. 49
Figure 3-1 On each trial of the joint Flanker Task in Experiment 6, participants were
presented with the string at the center of the screen for 100 milliseconds (1). They were them
prompted to press 1 or 2 after the string disappeared (2). The computer then displayed the
result of the trial (3). ............................................................................................................... 59
Figure 3-2 The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) used in Experiment 6. Figure adapted
from Lejuez et al. (2002). ....................................................................................................... 63
Figure 3-3. An illustration of the Columbia Card Task used in Experiment 6. ...................... 65
Figure 4-1 A screen shot of Julie (right) and the “Wizard of Oz” control panel used in
Experiment 7 (left). Julie’s image was adapted from Artstein et al. (2016). .......................... 90
Figure 4-2 Bar plots for participants’ ratings on the partner’s perceived warmth (a) and
perceived competence (b) in Experiment 7. The dots represent the individual data points.
Error bars represent 95% CI. .................................................................................................. 97
Figure 4-3. Box plots for participants’ ratings on the partner’s Mind Perception- Agency
dimension (a) and Mind Perception- Experience dimension (b) in Experiment 7. The dots
represent the individual data points. Error bars represent 95%. ............................................. 99
Figure 4-4. Bar plot for participants’ ratings on their anthropomorphism towards their partner
in Experiment 7. The dots represent the individual data points. Error bars represent 95% CI.
............................................................................................................................................... 100
Figure 4-5. Bar plots for the amount of time (in minutes) that participants spent talking with
their partner in Experiment 7. The dots represent the individual data points. Error bars
represent 95% CI................................................................................................................... 101

xiv

List of Appendices
Appendix A: Multiple-Choice Questions Used in the Experiments ..................................... 129
Appendix B: Experiments 1 to 5 Model Summaries ............................................................ 136
Appendix C: Experiment 7 ANOVA Results and Pair-Wise Comparisons ......................... 156

xv

1

Chapter 1

1

Theoretical Background and Rationale

Forming strong and meaningful interpersonal relationships is a fundamental human need
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Positive social relationships constitute one of the
dimensions that define people’s psychological well-being (e.g., Ryff & Keyes, 1995).
Such relationships also promote physical well-being and have even been shown to
decrease rates of morality by providing people with social support that buffers against
stress and adversity (e.g., Cohen, 2004). In every initial interaction with a stranger lies
the opportunity to cultivate a positive and valuable social relationship. Because people
form first impressions very quickly (Bar et al., 2006; Willis & Todorov, 2006), which in
turn influences both subsequent interactions with others and even long-term social
outcomes (e.g., Human, Sandstrom, Biesanz, & Dunn, 2013; Marek, Wanzer, & Knapp,
2004; Sunnafrank & Ramirez, 2004), it is important to identify factors that contribute to
interpersonal liking during initial interactions and that help kindle relationship
development.
Many of our most rewarding relationships begin when people open up to one another and
share their stories, thoughts, and feelings. Self-disclosure, the act of revealing personal
information to another (Collins & Miller, 1994), has therefore been identified as crucial
to the development and maintenance of interpersonal relationships (Altman & Taylor,
1973; Bauminger et al., 2008; Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Keelan et al., 1998; Kerr et al.,
1999; Reis & Shaver, 1988). Understanding how self-disclosures contribute to initial
liking can guide people’s decisions on what and how to self-disclose when they first meet
another person to best nourish budding interpersonal relationships. The series of
experiments presented in this dissertation thus examined how self-disclosures shape
initial liking of the discloser (Experiments 1-5) and people’s perceptions of a selfdisclosing artificially intelligent (AI) agent (Experiment 7). We also examined how
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people’s liking of another person and their risk-taking tendency influence their own level
of self-disclosure to that person (Experiment 6).

1.1 Related theories
1.1.1

Social penetration theory

One primary theoretical framework for understanding the role of self-disclosures in
interpersonal interactions is social penetration theory (Altman & Taylor, 1973). This
theory distinguishes between the breadth and the depth of self-disclosures. The breadth
of self-disclosures refers to the range of topics that people disclose, whereas disclosure
depth characterizes the degree to which a disclosure is personal or intimate. Using the
metaphor of an “onion”, Altman & Taylor (1973) liken disclosures to a series of nested
layers – with the outer, peripheral layers representing more superficial “surface” level
disclosures and inner, central layers representing more personal, intimate or private
information. In addition, there are different disclosure content categories or major topic
areas, forming “wedge-like” shapes; within each category or wedge there are different
layers of disclosure depth. See Figure 1-1 for a visual illustration of this structure.

Category A
breadth

Category B

central

depth

peripheral

Figure 1-1 Structure for disclosure depth and disclosure breadth proposed in social
penetration theory. Adapted from Altman and Taylor (1973).
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According to social penetration theory, a few patterns characterize the process in which
people change their breath and depth of self-disclosures as a relationship deepens
(Altman & Taylor, 1973; Derlega, 2009). First, people initiate self-disclosure by
revealing superficial information about themselves. As a relationship develops, they
gradually begin to disclose more personal and intimate information. The decision to
increase the intimacy and depth of one’s self-disclosure to another is influenced by
people’s assessment of the reward (e.g., agreement and approval of the receiver) versus
the cost (e.g., possible disagreement and social rejection) ratio of the previous selfdisclosures (Taylor & Altman, 1975). Second, self-disclosures can be organized by
“breadth category”, which refers to different topic areas (e.g., family, hobbies, religion,
etc.). As a relationship develops, people not only move to self-disclose more deeply
within the same breadth category, but also expand disclosure breadth by disclosing
information in categories related to those in which disclosures have been exchanged and
certain level of intimacy has been achieved. Third, once a category or an “inner layer” is
“unlocked” in a conversation and the corresponding self-disclosures are met with
favorable outcomes, these topics can be revisited in future exchanges. People can also
refrain from self-disclosing information in certain topics for reasons such as the topics
being too private or taboo, and therefore “deny access” about these areas of self to
another person.

1.1.2

Intimacy as an interpersonal process

Another theoretical framework on how self-disclosures are involved in relationship
development is the transitional model of intimacy proposed by Reis and Shaver (1988).
In comparison to social penetration theory, Reis and Shaver’s model further focuses on
the dynamic process between the discloser and the receiver. According to this model
(Figure 1-1), the interaction starts with one’s self-disclosure to a social partner, which is
affected by a variety of factors such as the discloser’s motives, needs, and fears. For
example, a desire for affection and understanding would promote self-disclosure whereas
a fear of exposure and abandonment would make someone reluctant to share certain
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information. Next, a receiver interprets and responds to the disclosures; both their
interpretations and responses are influenced by their own motives and needs. Positive
responses to the self-disclosure would help promote a sense of connectedness whereas
negative responses or deliberate nonresponses might keep the interaction from becoming
more intimate. Finally, the initial discloser interprets the receiver’s responses. To
experience the interaction as intimate, the discloser must perceive the receiver’s
responses to their initial self-disclosure as understanding, validating, and caring, which
might, in return, promote further exchange and expressions of feelings between the two
people. Interestingly, the authors asserted that revealing one’s emotions and feelings is
more important to the development of intimacy than sharing “merely facts”, as the former
allows the receiver to respond and validate the “inner self” of the discloser, which
constitutes an affective core that persists across the lifespan. The concept of “inner self”
is comparable to the “inner layers” of personality proposed in social penetration theory.
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Reis and Shaver’s model, therefore, stresses the importance of deep self-disclosures in
relationship development, as does social penetration theory.

Figure 1-2.Transactional model of intimacy process. Figure adapted from Reis and
Shaver (1988).

1.2 Empirical evidence
Collins and Miller (1994) conducted a thorough and systematic literature review on the
empirical studies that examined the link between self-disclosure and interpersonal liking
published between 1955 and 1992. Particularly, they pointed out that the there are three
distinct, although often related, disclosure-liking relationships that were not clearly
distinguished in the literature, which might have contributed the mixed findings in the
literature. The three effects that Collins and Miller investigated included (1) whether
people would like those who self-disclose at a more intimate rather than superficial level
to them , (2) whether people would disclose more to those whom they like, and (3)
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whether the act of self-disclosing to someone would enhance the discloser’s liking of the
receiver). The authors concluded that the evidence supported significant and positive
disclosure-liking relationships regarding all the three effects.
The first effect reviewed in Collins and Miller, “people develop more interpersonal liking
for others who self-disclose more intimately to them”, seemed to receive most research
interest among the three. The authors included 55 studies, reporting a total of 94 effect
sizes, that provided evidence on whether self-disclosures lead to greater interpersonal
liking. Following the logic of social penetration theory, the authors further separated
studies that manipulated or measured disclosure depth versus disclosure breadth. It was
found that studies that operationalized the level of self-disclosure in terms of the intimacy
or depth of the disclosures induced significantly stronger effects on liking than those that
operationalized it as the sheer quantity or breadth of the disclosures. As a result, they
concluded that the empirical evidence is in support for the effect that people like those
who self-disclose more intimately rather than superficially to themselves. The authors
provided a few potential explanations for why more intimate self-disclosures might lead
to greater liking of the discloser. First, deep self-disclosures may signal the discloser’s
liking and desire for a more intimate relationship with the receiver, which can be viewed
as rewarding by the receiver and thus leads to greater liking of the discloser. Second, a
receiver might form positive beliefs about a discloser (e.g., trusting and warm), if the
discloser reveals more intimate and potentially vulnerable information about themselves.
These positive beliefs would then in turn lead to greater liking of the discloser.
Interestingly, despite the general conclusion that deeper self-disclosures lead to greater
liking of the discloser, there was wide variation in not only the magnitude of the effect
but also direction of the effect across studies. The authors suggested that this variation
was partially related to the different study methodologies. Specifically, the correlational
studies generated the strongest positive effects (i.e., Cohen’s d=0.845), lab-based
experiments tended to generate weaker effects (i.e., Cohen’s d ranging from 0.191 to
0.378), and field studies where a confederate interacted and self-disclosed to a stranger
generated a negative effect (i.e., Cohen’s d= -0.308).
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The second effect reviewed in Collins and Miller, “people tend to self-disclose more to
those whom they like more”, received slightly less research interest than the first. The
authors identified 22 studies that reported a total of 31 effect sizes regarding this effect.
However, the mean effect size for this effect (Cohen’s d=.717) was considerably larger
than that for the first effect (that people tend to like those who disclose more to them;
Cohen’s d=.281). As with the first effect, the effect size for the second effect also varied
across studies that used different methods, with the correlational studies generating
stronger effects (Cohen’s d=1.105) compared to the lab-based experiments (Cohen’s d=
.277 to .449). But unlike the first effect, there was mostly a consensus among the
reviewed studies on the positive direction of the effect: 90% of effect sizes (i.e., 28 out of
the 31) included in the review regarding this effect were positive, compared to the 67% of
effect sizes (63 out of the 94) reviewed regarding the first effect that were positive. Thus,
the effect that people self-disclose to a greater extent to those whom they like more seems
to be overly supported by empirical evidence. Social penetration theory (Altman &
Taylor, 1973) and the transactional model of intimacy (Reis & Shaver, 1988) both
suggest that people’s self-disclosures are influenced by the anticipated outcomes of the
disclosure. The anticipated reward, such as approval, understanding, and validation from
a liked other might thus motivate people to engage in greater self-disclosure to a liked
social partner.
Only five empirical studies (and five effect sizes) were included in Collins and Miller that
provided evidence regarding the third effect, namely, the act of self-disclosing increases
the discloser’s liking of the receiver. Again, there was a significant variation across the
studies such that two generated large and positive effect sizes whereas the remaining
three had effect sizes of zero. In addition, as the authors pointed out, research examining
potential mechanisms underlying this effect also generated mixed results: while some
researchers suggested that self-disclosures are personally rewarding and cathartic for the
discloser (Jourard, 1959), especially those with traumatic experiences (Pennebaker,
1985), others suggested that self-disclosures might make people aware of the negative
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discrepancies between ideal and actual self, resulting in negative affect (Archer et al.,
1982). The cumulative evidence regarding this effect thus seems to be weak.
Since the beginning of this century, self-disclosure research has largely focused on
examining the role of self-disclosures in computer-mediated communications and in
online social relationship formation. These studies have generally found similar effects as
in face-to-face social interactions. For example, greater online self-disclosure appears to
increase liking from interaction partners (Kashian, Jang, Shin, Dai, & Walther, 2017; Utz,
2015), enhances perceived online social support (Lee, Noh, & Koo, 2013), and generates
more positive relationship outcomes (Gibbs, Ellison, & Heino, 2006; Yum & Hara,
2005). Similarly, as in face-to-face interactions, receivers’ responses to one’s selfdisclosures contribute to interaction outcomes in computer-mediated communications
(Dai, Shin, Kashian, Jang, & Walther, 2015).

1.3 Do deep self-disclosures lead to greater initial liking?
Previous work highlights the importance of deep or intimate self-disclosures in shaping
interpersonal relationships (Collins & Miller, 1994). As previously discussed, Reis and
Shaver (1988) argued that this may be because deeper self-disclosures, such as those
about emotions, are more important to relationship development than the more superficial
disclosures of self-relevant facts, as the former allow a receiver to understand the
discloser’s “emotional core” and thus allow the interaction to become more intimate. This
echoes the process described in social penetration theory (Altman & Taylor, 1973) in
which two people gradually reveal information pertaining to the “inner layers” of
personality such as core values and fears; here, the increased disclosure-depth may be
viewed as a barometer of closeness. However, the processes described in these theoretical
frameworks might be more readily applied to long-term and ongoing relationships where
two people have a basic understanding of one another and expect repeated interaction.
Interestingly, Collins and Miller found support for the positive effects of deep selfdisclosures on interpersonal liking for studies that used a “get-acquainted” paradigm,
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where participants interacted with another participant or a confederate for the first time.
This suggests that deep self-disclosures might indeed lead to positive social outcomes not
only in ongoing relationships, but also in initial social interactions. There were, however,
a few substantial methodological limitations in these studies reviewed in Collins and
Miller that hinder our confidence in the positive effect of self-disclosure depth on liking
during initial social interactions.
First, many of these studies had very small sample sizes. Among the studies reviewed in
Collins and Miller, many had 10 or fewer participants per condition; some had fewer than
five per condition. Small sample sizes contribute to low statistical power, which in turn
reduces the likelihood that a statistically significant result reflects an actual true effect
(i.e., induces a higher false positive rate) (e.g., Button et al., 2013).
Second, many of the experimental studies reviewed used confederates who changed their
behaviours when interacting with participants depending on the specific manipulation
conditions. As some of these studies acknowledged (e.g., Archer & Berg, 1978), the
confederates were usually aware of the predictions, which might have inadvertently
biased their behaviours, and in turn biased participants’ responses to them (see Holman,
Head, Lanfear, & Jennions, 2015; Wicherts et al., 2016).
Finally, and most importantly, the interactions that take place between participants and
confederates or between pairs of participants are difficult to carefully control (Kuhlen &
Brennan, 2013). As a result, even though the researchers manipulated and/or measured
disclosure depth, these measurements are most likely not independent from other
confounding factors that might provide alternative explanations to the observed results.
For example, when two participants freely interact, one might receive deep selfdisclosures from the other and self-report greater liking of that person, but not because
the former led to the latter. Rather, both these events could have resulted from a positive
interaction experience. Or, when interacting with a confederate who self-disclosed
intimately, a participant might have liked the confederate more not because of the
confederate’s deep disclosures per se but rather because the participant reciprocated the
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confederate’s disclosures and the confederate responded more positively to the
participant in return. Thus, the subtle tone and affect differences participants experience
when confederates are aware of task conditions might inadvertently cultivate a friendlier
environment. Without the independent manipulation of self-disclosure depth while
carefully controlling potential confounding factors, a causal relationship between selfdisclosures and liking for the discloser cannot be established.

1.4 Similarity as a confound in the disclosure-liking link
One alternate factor that could greatly influence the experience of initial interactions, and
thus confound the effects of self-disclosure on initial liking, is the level of similarity
between interaction partners. This similarity-attraction effect (Byrne, 1971) exerts that
people tend to like those whom they perceive as more similar to themselves. This effect
has received widespread empirical support (e.g., Montoya & Horton, 2013; Montoya,
Horton, & Kirchner, 2008; Tidwell, Eastwick, & Finkel, 2013). For example, in an
extensive meta-analysis that included over 300 empirical studies involving more than
35,000 participants, Montoya et al. (2008) found moderate-to-large effects of both actual
similarity (r=.47) and perceived similarity (r=.39) on interpersonal attraction.
Why does similarity lead to attraction? One explanation for the similarity-attraction effect
was built on the information processing approach to interpersonal attraction (Ajzen,
1977), which asserts that people form their impressions of and attraction to another based
on the information they have about the other person. Positive and favorable information
about the other person leads to attraction to that person. As we tend to view our own
characteristics positively, we also view others who share these characteristics positively,
which leads to greater attraction to them (Ajzen, 1974; Montoya & Horton, 2013).
Moreover, people perceive similar others as socially warmer and more intellectual
(Lydon et al., 1988), which would also lead to greater attraction to them. Other
researchers have suggested that similarity attracts because we expect the similar other to
like us, which in turn leads to our greater attraction to them (Aronson & Worchel, 1966;
Condon & Crano, 1988; Insko & et al, 1973).
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Byrne and colleagues suggested a reinforcement-affect model of interpersonal attraction
(Byrne, 1971, 1997; Clore & Byrne, 1974), which is an overarching theoretical account
that can potentially incorporate all the aforementioned explanations for the similarityattraction effect. This model asserts that one’s attraction to another is proportionally
reinforced by their positive affect, relative to negative affect, associated with the target
person. Similarity is an example of the stimuli that can elicit one’s positive affective
responses and thus reinforce their attraction to another. Similarity may induce such
positive affect because similar others validate people’s attitudes and world-views, which
satisfy their need to understand, evaluate, and predict their environment (Byrne & Clore,
1967). It may also induce positive affect through other routes as previously described,
such as by contributing to a more positive evaluation of the other person (e.g., Ajzen,
1974) or by allowing us to infer positive evaluations of us by others (e.g., Condon &
Crano, 1988).
Similarity might seriously confound the positive effect of self-disclosure depth on
interpersonal liking. As reviewed and supported in Collins and Miller (1994), people do
not only like those who self-disclose more (the first effect), but also themselves disclose
more to those whom they like (the second effect). It is therefore quite likely that if there
is a high level of similarity between the discloser and the receiver, they will like each
other more, resulting in greater exchange of self-disclosures with each other. The effects
of deep self-disclosures on interpersonal liking might therefore be, at least in part, byproducts of perceived similarity between interaction partners. This might be especially
true in studies where participants were given some time to engage in free conversation
with other participants or the confederate.
Another possibility is that similarity may be a potential enabling factor for the effects of
disclosure depth on liking. As previously mentioned, deep self-disclosures might lead to
greater liking of the discloser because they signal the discloser’s interest in a more
intimate social relationship with the receiver. It is likely that the receiver would welcome
such attention more if they also like the discloser. Therefore, deeper self-disclosures
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might only lead to greater liking when the receiver likes the discloser to start with,
possibly as a result of the greater perceived similarity with the discloser.
As previously mentioned, Collins and Miller (1994) found considerate variations in the
magnitude and directions among studies that examined the effect that people like those
who self-disclose more intimately to them more. Similarity between social partners might
help explain such variations. Specifically, the authors found that the correlational studies
generated the strongest positive effect, followed by lab-based experiments, whereas the
field studies generated a negative effect. Considering the likely pre-existing similarity
between the social partners in the different types of studies, the similarity-attraction effect
predicts exactly this pattern of variation. Specifically, it is likely that people in existing
and ongoing social relationships are more similar, or at least perceive each other to be
more similar, than those randomly paired in experiments. Likewise, most lab-based
studies used university student samples while participants in the field studies were
members of the general public, with arguably less in common than university students
living in the same geographic region. Participants in the lab-based experiments might
thus perceive greater similarity with each other or with a student confederate, compared
to the participants in the field studies. The greater similarity or perceived similarity
between social partners in the correlational studies and lab-based experiments might
therefore lead to greater initial liking for disclosers, enabling the positive effects of selfdisclosure depth on liking. In comparison, a lack of perceived similarity might limit the
degree to which the receiver liked and welcomed deep self-disclosures from the
confederate in the field studies, resulting in a negative effect of disclosure depth on liking
of the discloser.

1.5 The current experiments
Without carefully controlling similarity between the two partners, one cannot confidently
predict the role of self-disclosure depth in shaping initial social outcomes. The current
experiments thus examined how self-disclosure depth is linked to interpersonal liking in
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initial interactions, independent of the effect of similarity between the social partners.
Specifically, in Experiments 1 to 5 presented in Chapter 2, we independently manipulated
self-disclosure depth and similarity and examined their effects on liking of the discloser
in initial social interactions. In Experiment 6, presented in Chapter 3, I tried to replicate
Collins and Miller’s (1994) assertion that liking of a partner predicts the extent to which
participants decide to self-disclose to the partner. I also examined how individual
differences in factors such as risk-taking tendencies influence people’s self-disclosure
decisions. In Experiment 7, which was present in Chapter 4, we extended our
investigation to an emerging social context, the interactions between a social AI agent
and its human user. Specifically, we examined how self-disclosed similarity from an AI
influences the user’s perceptions of and preferences for it.
The experiments were designed such that the methodological limitations as previously
discussed could be adequately addressed. First, most of the experiments used a withinsubject design. This within-subject design allows each participant to experience all our
manipulation conditions, which reduced noise and increased our statistical power. As a
result, we were more confident in both our ability to detect the proposed effect as well as
the validity of any significant effects that we did find. Second, to address the concerns
associated with using a confederate, participants completed the entire experiment on a
computer and interacted with computerized avatars whom they believed were other
participants in all our experiments except for Experiment 7. This effectively eliminated
experimenter bias and the possibility that participants’ behaviours might have been
influenced by certain characteristics of confederate behaviour. In Experiment 7, although
the nature of the task did not allow a within-subject design, careful randomization was
used to reduce potential confounds. Measures were also taken to record and assess
experimenter bias. Finally, a priori power analyses helped to ensure that we recruited
adequate participant samples to enhance replicability.
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Chapter 2

2

Experiments 1 to 5: Does Disclosure Depth Matter?

In Experiments 1 to 3, we independently manipulated the levels of disclosure depth and
similarity between disclosers and receivers to examine the unique effects of disclosure
depth on interaction outcomes. In Experiment 4, in addition to similarity and disclosure
depth, we manipulated the level of “personalistic” attribution, or the extent to which
participants believed that another’s self-disclosures were selectively made to them.
Finally, in Experiment 5, we examined how similarity and the reciprocity of disclosure
depth influenced interpersonal liking in initial interactions. Except for the first
experiment, we pre-registered the methods and hypotheses of all the experiments1; all the
datasets and R scripts for data analyses reported in this paper are publicly available2. We
used the same general experimental paradigm throughout all the experiments, with slight
modifications in each.

2.1 General methods
Analogous to animals’ foraging behaviours in search of food, people seek out and gather
information available in the environment that helps reduce uncertainty and allows them to
obtain greater rewards (Abram et al., 2016; Manohar & Husain, 2013). In a similar
manner, people might seek out others’ self-disclosures to reduce uncertainty within the
social environment and achieve social rewards, such as affiliation with liked others. We
therefore devised an experimental paradigm in which participants were free to explore
and seek out others’ self-disclosures while allowing us to systematically manipulate the
information to which participants were exposed.

1

Pre-registrations: Experiment 2: https://osf.io/fqz62; Experiment 3: https://osf.io/d6ce8 ; Experiment 4:
https://osf.io/xdreb; Experiment5: https://osf.io/e6xcg.
2

Data and R scripts storage: Experiment 1- 2: https://osf.io/utuvp/; Experiment 3-5: https://osf.io/pc2bn/.
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2.1.1

Material preparation

During the stimulus development phase of this work, we generated 40 multiple-choice
questions on topics that varied in the degree to which they represented deep-level
disclosures. These 40 multiple-choice questions and answers were subsequently used as
self-disclosure items in our experimental paradigm, allowing us to manipulate both
similarity and disclosure depth independently. One-hundred thirty-nine university
students (37 male, 102 female) aged from 17 to 35 (M=18.9, SD=2.1) answered 70 openended get-to-know-you questions (e.g., “What do you like to do in your free time?”;
“What do you want to change the most about yourself?”). For each of these questions,
participants also rated how personal they felt the question was on scale of 1 (“not at all
personal”) to 7 (“very personal”). We selected 20 questions that were rated as relatively
low in how personal they were (M=2.24, SD=0.35) as low disclosure-depth topics and
another 20 that were rated as relatively highly personal (M=4.02, SD=0.43) as high
disclosure-depth topics. We deliberately chose topics that were considered appropriate in
their level of intimacy for initial social interactions among university students, as
evidence suggests that overly intimate self-disclosures from strangers can elicit negative
responses (e.g., Caltabiano & Smithson, 1983; Chaikin & Derlega, 1974). For each of the
40 disclosure topics, we generated four multiple-choice answers based on the most
common themes in participants’ open-ended answers (Appendix A).

2.1.2

Experimental paradigm

In all the studies, participants arrived at the lab in groups, even though they completed
the task in individual lab rooms on a computer. The computer task began by first
allowing participants to select an avatar picture that they believed would represent them
during the task. Participants then gave their own responses to each of the 40 multiplechoice questions. Next, participants were allowed to “get to know” the other participants
in a virtual “social environment” where six avatars, each representing one participant,
were displayed on the computer screen. To gain information about the other players, they
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clicked on another player’s avatar. The computer then provided them with a disclosure
from that avatar. Each click on an avatar earned participants access to one piece of
information about that avatar. Each avatar provided 20 unique disclosures that met the
restrictions specific to the relevant manipulations (described below) in a random order. If
participants clicked an avatar more than 20 times, the computer re-randomized the
disclosure deck and participants viewed repeated information. See Figure 2-1 for an
illustration of the process3. Participants had 6 minutes to learn about the avatars and were
instructed to get to know the other players as well as possible during that time.
Participants sampled the social environment freely and click-order was not enforced
during that time.
In Experiments 1 to 3, the computer manipulated the six avatars’ disclosures depending
on (1) similarity to participants’ responses to the initial 40 questions and (2) on the prerated disclosure depth. Using a factorial design, three levels of similarity (high, medium,
and low) were fully crossed with two levels of disclosure depth (high and low). That is,
each avatar represented one of the six manipulation conditions, reflected in the 3X2
within-subjects design. We manipulated similarity by changing the frequency with which
each avatar disclosed information that matched the participant’s own disclosure.
Specifically, 80% of the 20 possible disclosures from the high-similarity avatars were the
same as the participant’s own choices, while the remaining 20% were different. In
comparison, 50% and 20%, respectively, of the disclosures from medium- and lowsimilarity avatars were the same as the participant’s own answers. To manipulate
disclosure depth, 80% of the disclosures from high-depth avatars were high-depth items
and the remaining 20% were low-depth items. In comparison, 80% of the disclosures
from low-disclosure-depth avatars were low-depth items and the remaining 20% were
high-depth items. In Experiments 4 and 5, the manipulations were slightly different, and

3

The avatar pictures used in Experiment 1were anonymous cartoon headshots. For all the remaining
experiments, animal pictures as shown in Figure 1 were used to avoid conveying any information regarding
gender or ethnicity that might bias participants’ responses.
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are described in later sections. After the disclosure phase, the computer automatically
advanced to the dependent measures. Upon completing the dependent measures,
participants were debriefed, probed for any suspicion about the manipulation and
deception, and thanked for their participation.

(1)
Mouse Click

(2)
Press Space Key

(3)
Figure 2-1. Participants were presented with the avatar pictures (1). They were able to click
on any avatar to view a self-disclosure from that avatar (2). After 2 seconds, pressing the
Space key then returned them to the selection screen (3).

2.1.3

Core dependent measures

The core dependent measures in the current experiments were a list of questions
assessing participants’ perceived similarity with the avatars (“The degree to which they
are similar to you”), their knowledge of the avatars (“How well you think you’ve gotten
to know them”), preferences for the avatars ( “How comfortable you’d feel asking them
for advice”, “How much you’d like to admit them to your circle of friends”, “How much
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you’d like to actually meet them”), and trait perceptions of the avatars (“How trustworthy
you think they are”, “How friendly you think they are”). The preference questions were
partly adapted from items use in Coyne (1976) that measure people’s willingness to
engage in future interactions with a target person. In Experiments 1 to 3, these items were
presented to the participants in the format of ranking questions, in which participants
ranked all the avatars in relation to each other on each item. We used ranking questions to
measure participants’ experiences of the avatars because the force-choice format of the
ranking items allowed us to examine relative preferences for the avatars in terms of
avatar characteristics. In Experiments 4 and 5, participants rated each avatar on each item
using 7-point Likert scales, allowing us to aggregate the items to examine how our
manipulations influenced participants’ overall preferences for the avatars instead of
looking at each item individually. Additional dependent measures in several studies are
described in their corresponding sections.
In each of these experiments, participants consented to the experiment procedures before
beginning the experiment and, because of the deception involved, documented their fully
informed consent during debriefing. The University’s Nonmedical Research Ethics Board
approved all experimental procedures.

2.1.4

General hypotheses

The main hypotheses were the same in most of these experiments.
H1. We expected a main effect of similarity, such that higher levels of similarity
would lead to greater perceived similarity, higher social preferences, and more positive
trait perceptions of the avatars.
H2. We expected a main effect of self-disclosure depth, such that higher levels of
disclosure depth would lead to greater perceived knowledge, higher social preferences,
and more positive trait perceptions of the avatars.
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H3. Following the argument that deeper self-disclosures provide information
regarding one’s “inner layers of personality” that are important to their self-concept
(Altman & Taylor, 1973), the recipient of the disclosures might thus like the discloser
even more when their similarity was perceived to be at a deeper rather than more
superficial level. As a result, we expected similarity and self-disclosure depth to interact
with each other in influencing initial liking of the discloser, such that participants would
show greater social preference and more positive trait perceptions of the high-disclosuredepth avatars than the low-disclosure-depth avatars to a greater degree when those
avatars displayed higher rather than lower similarity to themselves.
Additional hypotheses in Experiments 4 and 5 are described in their
corresponding sections.

2.1.5

Overview of the experiments

To make the procedure more closely mimic real social interactions, we made slight
modifications to the experimental paradigm in each iteration of the experiment. See Table
for a brief description of each experiment. The detailed changes are described in the
corresponding sections.
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Table 1 Brief Descriptions of Experiments 1 to 5
Experiment

Brief Description
Participants were instructed that the self-disclosures that they read

1

came from previous participants.
Participants were instructed that the self-disclosures that they read were

2

from the other participants from the same session, and they expected to
engage in face-to-face interactions with some of those others later in
the experiment.
In addition to the set up in Experiment 2, participants were told to

3

choose which of their own answers to share with each avatar. This
propagated the belief that the self-disclosures they read were
intentionally shared with them by others.
In addition to the set up in Experiment 3, participants were randomly

4

assigned to one of two between-subject conditions that varied in the
proportion of self-disclosures that were said to have been made to them
only and not to other participants (i.e., personalistic attribution: high vs.
low).
Participants engaged in “back-and-forth” exchanges of self-disclosures

5

with each avatar. These exchanges varied in disclosure similarity (high
vs. low) and how frequently avatars reciprocated a participant’s selfdisclosure depth (i.e., reciprocity of depth: high vs. medium vs. low).

2.2 Experiment 1
The goal of Experiment 1 was to examine baseline effects of similarity and disclosure
depth in a relatively asocial context to learn whether there are intrinsic effects associated
with discovering interpersonal similarity or receiving relatively high-depth personal
information. For this reason, participants learned that the “people” they would get to
know about in the disclosure phase were previous participants in the experiment, whose
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self-disclosures were randomly chosen by the computer when participants clicked on
their profile pictures. Because this experiment was highly exploratory, we did not
preregister any predictions. Instead, we wanted to simply determine whether similarity
and disclosure depth would shape participants’ responses to the avatars.

2.2.1

Participants

A total of 168 university students took part in the experiment in exchange for partial
course credit. We excluded seven participants for inattentive responding, as their total
number of clicks on the avatars was below two standard deviation of the mean number of
clicks across all participants (M=69.82, SD=15.17). The remaining 161 participants (75
male, 84 female, 2 not specified) aged from 17 to 23 years (M=18.69, SD=0.95).
Seventy-eight (48%) were Caucasian, 47 (29%) were Asian, 12 (7%) were Middle
Eastern, 5 (3%) were people of African descent, 14 (9%) were of other or mixed
ethnicities, and the rest 5 (3%) did not respond to the item requesting this information.

2.2.2

Data analysis

Due to their ordinal nature, the ranking responses for our dependent measures were
analyzed using cumulative link models (i.e., ordinal regression models) with the ordinal
package (Christensen, 2015) in R (version 3.6.3). A cumulative link model is a model for
ordinal-scale observations. It links, or transforms, the cumulative probabilities of a
response falling in an ordered category or below to a linear function of the predictors,
thus allowing us to estimate effects of the predictors on the transformed cumulative
probabilities (Christensen, 2019).
To test our hypotheses, we used the clm function in the ordinal package to fit the
cumulative link model to the ranking responses for each question. We included similarity,
disclosure depth, and their interaction as the predictors in the models. A global sum-tozero contrast was set to compare different manipulation levels to the grand mean.
Because we expected a linear effect of our similarity manipulations, the mediumsimilarity level was coded as -1 to provide coefficients for the high- and low-similarity
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levels. Here, we first report the results of Type III Analysis of Deviance (ANODE) based
on Wald χ2- tests for any significant overall effects of similarity, disclosure depth, and
their interaction (Christensen, 2019). ANODE tests the significance of an effect by
examining the change in deviance (i.e., the goodness-of-fit chi-square value) when the
effect is added to the model. We then report the specific coefficients associated with the
predictors, which reflect the direction and magnitude of the effects. For brevity, we only
report statistics for the significant effects in the text. The full details of the models and
coefficients are reported in Appendix B.
In addition to similarity and disclosure depth, we also included the number of times that a
participant clicked on each avatar as an additional predictor in the models. This allowed
us to control for any confounding effects of participants’ knowledge of a specific avatar
on their liking of that avatar. The number of clicks was significantly and positively
associated with greater preferences for an avatar across all the ranking questions. For
brevity, we do not report these effects in the text as they are not of primary interest.
Again, we report full details of all models and their estimated effects in Appendix B.

2.2.3

Results

Consistent effects were observed across all our ranking items. We found a significant
effect of similarity but no effect of disclosure depth or any interactions on all dependent
measures. The Analysis of Deviance using Type III Wald chi-square tests suggested that
similarity significantly predicted participants’ perceived similarity, χ2(2)=26.82, p <.001,
and perceived knowledge of the avatars, χ2(2)=17.61, p <.001. Specifically, participants
were more likely to rank the high-similarity avatars as being more similar to them,
b=0.536, SE=0.082, p<.001, and the ones that they had gotten to know better, b=0.423,
SE=0.083, p<.001. These coefficients correspond to odds ratios of 1.71 and 1.53,
respectively. That is, the odds of the high-similarity avatars being ranked higher on
perceived similarity were 1.71 times, and on perceived knowledge 1.53 times, that of an
“average” avatar. Conversely, the low-similarity avatars were less likely to be ranked
higher on either perceived similarity, b= -0.471, SE=0.081, p<.001, or perceived
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knowledge, b= -0.269, SE=0.081, p<.001. These coefficients correspond to odds ratios of
0.62 and 0.76, respectively. That is, the odds of the low-similarity avatars being ranked
higher on perceived similarity were 0.62 times, and on perceived knowledge 0.76 times,
that of an “average” avatar. No significant effects of disclosure depth or any interaction
were found on either perceived similarity or perceived knowledge. See Figure 2-2 for the
proportions of participants that placed each of the avatar at each rank place for each of
the ranking measures. For brevity, we report the corresponding odds ratios for the
coefficients from here onwards in Appendix B instead of in the text.
Similar effects were observed for the preferences items. There was a significant effect of
similarity on how much the participants felt comfortable asking the avatars for advice,
χ2(2)=21.74, p<.001, how much they’d like to admit the avatars to their circle of friends,
χ2(2)=29.57, p<.001, and how much they’d like to actually meet the avatars, χ2(2)=25.29,
p<.001. The high-similarity avatars were more likely to be ranked higher on all the three
items (b=0.360, SE=0.081, p<.001; b=0.551, SE=0.081, p<.001; and b= 0.610,
SE=0.083, p<.001, respectively in the order of the questions) and the low avatars were
less likely to be ranked higher on any of the three items (b=-0.432, SE=0.081, p<.001;
b=-0.444, SE=0.081, p<.001; b=-0.499, SE=0.081, p<.001, respectively in the order of
the questions). Again, no effects of disclosure depth or an interaction were found on any
of the social preferences items.
Finally, a significant effect of similarity was observed in participants’ rankings of
perceived trustworthiness, χ2(2)=10.54, p=.005, as well as avatar friendliness,
χ2(2)=14.85, p<.001. As above, the high-similarity avatars were more likely to be ranked
higher on both perceived trustworthiness, b=0.278, SE=0.081, p<.001, and friendliness,
b=0.369, SE=0.082, p<.001. The low-similarity avatars, on the contrary, were less likely
to be ranked higher on either trustworthiness, b=-0.176, SE=0.080, p=.028, or
friendliness, b=-0.290, SE=0.080, p<.001. We found no effects of disclosure depth or an
interaction on any of these items.
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Figure 2-2 Stacked bar plots for the ranking items in Experiment 1. X-axis: rank place from 1
(“Describes Worst”) to 6 (“Describes Best”). Y-axis: cumulative percentage of participants
who placed each avatar in the corresponding ranking categories.

2.2.4

Discussion

In this experiment, we found a highly consistent and significant effect of similarity on all
dependent measures and no effect of disclosure depth or any interaction between the two
factors. Participants showed greater preferences for avatars whose self-disclosures
indicated greater similarity to themselves, but not for those whose self-disclosures were
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of greater depth. Interestingly, participants not only perceived the high-similarity avatars
as more similar to themselves, but also as the ones that they had gotten to know better,
even after controlling for the actual number of statements that they had read about the
avatars. This might suggest that similarity contributes to a sense of familiarity (Moreland
& Zajonc, 1982), which in return contributes at least partially to the increased liking of
more similar others (Reis et al., 2011).

2.3 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 attempts to increase the robustness of our disclosure depth manipulation by
emphasizing the real social consequences of participants’ choices. To achieve this,
participants were invited to the lab in groups of seven to promote the deception that they
would be working together. As before, participants began the task by getting to know
each other on the computer. Here, however, they believed that they would be allowed to
interact with some of the people they met in the task at the end of the study session.
Specifically, they were told that the computer would match them with some other
participants for face-to-face interactions based on their responses on the ranking
measures. In reality, there was no interaction. We expected that this set-up would induce
stronger effects and potentially enhance the effect of disclosure depth, which was not
significant in the previous study. Other than this change, there were no changes to the
study methods. The data analysis and report strategies were the same as used in
Experiment 1.

2.3.1

Participants

A total of 103 participants completed this experiment. Eleven participants were excluded
for being inattentive (N=3, based on the same criterion as used in the previous
experiment) or expressing suspicion about the deception during debriefing (N=8). The
remaining 92 participants (33 male, 58 female, 1 not specified) were aged 17 to 27
(M=18.40, SD=1.27) and consisted of 39 Asian (41.9%), 35 Caucasian (37.6%), 6
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Middle Eastern (6.5%), 2 Hispanic (2.2%), 5 mixed or other ethnicities (5.4%), and the
rest 5 (5.4%) did not provide this information.

2.3.2

Results

Results from this sample replicated findings from Experiment 1. Specifically, we found a
significant effect of similarity across all the ranking items but there were no effects of
disclosure depth or any interaction. Similarity significantly predicted participants’
ranking responses on both perceived similarity, χ2(2)=41.00, p<.001, and perceived
knowledge of the avatars, χ2(2)=10.87, p=.004. As in the previous experiment,
participants were more likely to rank the high-similarity avatars, b=1.031, SE=0.118,
p<.001, and less likely to rank the low similarity higher on perceived similarity, b=0.721, SE=0.112, p<.001. Participants were also more likely to rank the high-similarity
avatars, b=0.601, SE=0.115, p<.001, and less likely to rank the low-similarity avatars as
ones that they had gotten to know better, b=-0.373, SE=0.109, p<.001. Figure 2-3 shows
the proportions of participants that placed each avatar in each ranking position for each of
the measures.
As above, similarity also had a significant effect on participants’ rankings on how
comfortable they would feel asking the avatars for advice, χ2(2)=23.14, p<.001, how
much they’d like to admit the avatars to their circle of friends, χ2(2)=33.09, p<.001, and
how much they’d like to actually meet them χ2(2)=21.70, p<.001. Participants were more
likely to rank the high-similarity avatars as the ones from whom they would feel more
comfortable asking advice, b=0.703, SE=0.114, p<.001, whom they would most like to
admit to their circle of friends, b=0.819, SE=0.115, p<.001, and whom they would more
like to meet in person, b=0.773, SE=0.117, p<.001. Low-similarity avatars, on the
contrary, were less likely to be ranked higher on any of these three items (b=-0.516,
SE=0.111, p<.001; b=-0.647, SE=0.112, p<.001; b=-0.568, SE=0.111, p<.001,
respectively in the order of questions).
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Finally, we observed a significant effect of similarity on participants’ ranking of avatars’
perceived trustworthiness, χ2(2)=22.03, p<.001, and friendliness, χ2(2)=15.086, p<.001.
Participants were more likely to rank the high-similarity avatars higher on both
trustworthiness, b=0.456, SE=0.111, p<.001, and friendliness, b=0.564, SE=0.112,
p<.001. The low-similarity avatars were less likely to be ranked higher on either
trustworthiness, b=-0.499, SE=0.110, p<.001, or friendliness, b=-0.491, SE=0.111,
p<.001.
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Figure 2-3 Stacked bar plots for ranking items in Experiment 2. X-axis: rank place from 1
(“Describes Worst”) to 6 (“Describes Best”). Y-axis: cumulative percentage of
participants who placed each avatar in the corresponding ranking categories.

2.3.3

Discussion

Experiment 2’s results replicated our previous findings. Higher similarity was associated
with greater preferences and more positive impressions across all the ranking items,
whereas we found no effects of disclosure depth or an interaction between these factors.
Interestingly, the Experiment 2 effects were somewhat larger in magnitude compared to
the ones in Experiment 1. This suggested that, as expected, engaging participants by
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promoting the belief that they were actually interacting with other people did lead to a
more robust manipulation than in the previous impression formation study. Regardless,
the anticipated effect of disclosure depth failed to materialize. Together, these findings
suggest that although similarity seems to be an important element in self-disclosure, the
depth of a disclosure alone is not a critical element of disclosure outcomes.
However, one aspect of self-disclosure that may be important is its signaling function.
That is, a higher-depth disclosure may signal liking, trust or another prosocial intention
on the part of the sender. In this experiment, participants knew that the computer had
randomly selected the disclosures from a list of possible items. Thus, even though the
statements that participants read were first-person statements (e.g., “I am always
procrastinating and would like to change that.”), participants might not have perceived
any intention to disclose this information. This might be especially relevant to our
disclosure depth manipulation. For example, previous research has suggested that people
might like deeper disclosures more because such disclosures communicate greater liking
and affiliative intentions (Taylor, 1979). Our next experiment addresses this idea.

2.4 Experiment 3
In this experiment, we made the explicit selection of disclosures a feature of the
experimental design. This allowed us to ask whether the intention to disclose information
makes disclosure depth an important feature of the disclosure process. The study design
was exactly the same as in Experiment 2, with one critical modification. Specifically, just
before the disclosure phase, participants viewed five randomly selected statements from
each “fellow participant”. After reading these statements, participants chose 15 of their
own statements to share with that avatar. Consequently, they believed that most of the
statements that they saw in the information seeking stage of the session were
intentionally selected for them by the other participants. To examine whether participants
would indeed perceive the high-disclosure-depth avatars as expressing greater affiliative
intentions, we added one item to the ranking measures. Participants were asked to rank
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the avatars based on “How much you think they’d like to be your friend” in addition to
the other ranking questions. The data analysis and report strategies were the same as used
in Experiment 1 and 2.

2.4.1

Participants

A total of 95 university students took part in Experiment 3. We excluded 13 participants
for being inattentive (N=5, based on the same criterion as used in the previous
experiment) or expressing suspicions about the manipulation during debriefing (N=8),
as in the previous studies. The remaining 82 participants (38 male and 44 female) were
aged 18 to 38 (M=19.11, SD=2.51) and consisted of 33 Caucasian (40.24%), 27 Asian
(32.92%), 7 Middle-Eastern (8.53%), 5 Hispanic (6.10%), 6 Mixed or Other Ethnicity
(7.31%), and 4 people (4.88%) who did not respond to this item.

2.4.2

Results

These results replicated the findings in our previous studies. We found a significant
similarity effect across all of our ranking measures but no effects of disclosure depth or
any interactions. Similarity significantly predicted participants’ ranking responses for
both their perceived similarity, χ2(2)=29.81, p<.001, and their perceived knowledge of
the avatars, χ2(2)=7.22, p=.027. Participants were more likely to rank the high-similarity
avatars, b=0.819, SE=0.120, p<.001, and less likely to rank the low-similarity avatars as
being more similar to themselves, b=-0.602, SE=0.117, p<.001. They were also more
likely to rank the high-similarity avatars, b=0.542, SE=0.119, p<.001, and less likely to
rank the low-similarity avatars as the ones that they had gotten to know better, b=-0.394,
SE=0.114, p<.00,. See Figure 2-4 for the proportion of participants who placed each
avatar at each rank place for the ranking items.
For the preferences items, we again found that similarity significantly predicted
participants’ rankings on how comfortable they’d feel asking the avatars for advice,
χ2(2)=18.39, p<.001, how much they’d like to admit the avatars to their circle of friends,
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χ2(2)=22.89, p<.001, and how much they’d like to meet the avatars, χ2(2)=17.29, p<.001.
The high-similarity avatars were more likely to be ranked highly on all these three items
(b=0.569, SE=0.117, p<.001; b=0.601, SE=0.117, p<.001; and b=0.613, SE=0.118,
p<.001, respectively in the order of the questions), and the low-similarity avatars were
less likely to be ranked higher on either of the three items (b=-0.451, SE=0.115, p<.001;
b=-0.426, SE=0.115, p<.001; and b=-0.400, SE=0.115, p<.001, respectively in the order
of the questions).
Similarity marginally predicted participants’ rankings of how trustworthy the avatars
were, χ2(2)=5.926, p=.052, and significantly predicted their rankings of how friendly the
avatars were, χ2(2)=7.621, p=.022. The high-similarity avatars were more likely to be
ranked higher on both perceived trustworthiness, b=0.260, SE=0.113, p=.021, and
perceived friendliness, b=0.329, SE=0.115, p=.004. Conversely, the low-similarity
avatars were less likely to be ranked higher on trustworthiness, b=-0.337, SE=0.115,
p=.003, or friendliness, b=-0.391, SE=0.115, p<.001.
Interestingly, participants did not perceive the high-disclosure-depth avatars as showing
greater affiliative intentions than the low-disclosure-depth avatars as we expected.
Instead, there was a significant similarity effect on participants’ rating of each avatars’
friendship intentions, χ2(2)=27.34, p<.001. Again, participants were more likely to rank
the high-similarity avatars, b=0.599, SE=0.118, p<.001, and less likely to rank the lowsimilarity avatars, b=-0.511, SE=0.116, p<.001, as the ones that would more like to be
their friends. Thus, self-disclosed similarity appears to signal affiliation intention to a
greater degree than does disclosure depth.
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Figure 2-4 Stacked bar plots for ranking items in Experiment 3. X-axis: rank place from 1
(“Describes Worst”) to 6 (“Describes Best”). Y-axis: cumulative percentage of
participants who placed each avatar in the corresponding ranking categories.

2.4.3

Discussion

As above, we continued to find significant similarity effects and no effect of disclosure
depth or any interaction between these factors across our measures. Specifically,
participants ranked the high-similarity avatars more positively, and low-similarity avatars
less positively on all measures, compared to an “average” avatar. In addition, participants
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perceived stronger friendship intentions from avatars that self-disclosed greater similarity
rather than those who chose to self-disclose more intimately to themselves.
Once again, these findings seem to suggest that similarity, rather than disclosure depth,
accounts for the effects of self-disclosure on liking in the previous literature (e.g., Collins
& Miller, 1994). Nonetheless, we would like to consider two alternative explanations for
our consistently null effect of self-disclosure depth. First, we selected the high disclosuredepth questions and low disclosure-depth questions based on ratings from the 139
participants recruited in a preparatory phase. One explanation for our failure to uncover
disclosure depth as a factor in our results may be that the specific participant samples
used in Experiments 1 to 3 did not perceive differences in the depth of our high- and lowdepth statements. A second issue may be that despite the advantages of the ranking
measures (e.g., reducing inattentive or careless responding; the ability to examine relative
differences between avatars), it was possible that this forced ordering format might have
biased participants’ responses. Specifically, participants believed that their ranking
responses would be used to decide whom they would meet in later in-person interactions.
They therefore might have put more thought into placing their most and least favorite
avatars in the corresponding rank positions and less thought into placing the middleranged avatars (McCarty & Shrum, 2000). This might have inadvertently led to an
overweighed influence of the similarity effect and obscured the more subtle effect of
disclosure depth. We further addressed these two potential issues in the next two
experiments.

2.5 Experiment 4
Experiment 4 used the same procedure as in Experiment 3 to ensure that participants
believed that the statements that they viewed during the information seeking stage were
intentionally selected for them by the other participants. To address potential biases of the
ranking measures, we converted the ranking items into 7-point Likert scale items. As in
Experiment 3, we again asked participants to indicate how much they thought the avatars

34

would like to be their friend. For each of these questions, participants rated each avatar
from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly Agree”). We retained one ranking item
“How much you’d like to meet them” to allow direct comparison of the results with the
previous studies. The number of clicks on each avatar were recorded as in the previous
studies. Additionally, to verify that our high and low disclosure-depth questions were
indeed perceived as such by the participants, they also rated each of the 40 multiplechoice questions on the degree to which they perceived these items to be personal on a
scale from 1 (“Not at all personal”) to 7 (“Extremely personal”).
In addition to addressing these potential methodological issues, we implemented one
extra manipulation in this experiment. The literature suggests people might like a
discloser even more when they make a personalistic attribution of the self-disclosure
(Collins & Miller, 1994). That is, when a receiver makes an internal attribution about
others’ self-disclosing behaviour and interprets the disclosure to the special qualities that
they themselves possess (e.g., likeable, trustworthy, understanding, etc.), they might
respond especially positively to the discloser. It is possible that a high level of
personalistic attribution would facilitate the effect of deep self-disclosures on liking
because people assume a stronger friendship intention from someone who selectively
discloses personal information to them and not to others.
To test this idea, we retained the similarity and disclosure-depth manipulations from
Experiment 3 but incorporated an additional manipulation. Specifically, participants were
told which pieces of information each avatar had shared with them alone (i.e., highly
personalistic disclosures), versus with “other participants” as well (i.e., low-personalistic
disclosures). Due to a concern that increasing the number of avatars would reduce the
believability of the manipulation and induce additional difficulty for participants in
remembering information, we applied this manipulation on a between-subjects basis. The
computer randomly assigned half of the participants to the high personalistic condition,
and the rest the low personalistic condition using a double-blind design to minimize the
potential for experimenter effects.
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To achieve this manipulation, participants were told that the statements that they would
view in the disclosure phase were colour-coded such that statements appearing in one
colour had been made to them and “no other participant”. Statements appearing in
another colour were those that had been shared with “at least one other participant”. For
participants in the high personalistic condition, 50% of the statements that they read from
each avatar were coloured as having been made only to them and no one else. In contrast,
for those in the low personalistic condition only 25% of the statements they viewed were
coloured as having been made only made to them.

2.5.1

Participants

A total of 166 participants took part in Experiment 4. In addition to the exclusion criteria
used in the previous experiment, we also excluded “inattentive” participants who spent
less than 250 milliseconds on each of 10 or more of the rating questions. We thus
excluded a total of 28 participants for expressing suspicions during debriefing (N=8),
clicking on the avatar pictures too few times (N=7), or being inattentive based on the
reaction time criterion just described (N=13). The remaining 140 participants (44 male,
96 female) aged from 17 to 30 (M=18.60, SD=1.54) consisted of 69 Asian (48.3%), 45
Caucasian (32.1%), 8 Middle Eastern (5.7%), 2 people of African descent (1.5%), 2 of
Hispanic descent (1.5%), 7 mixed or other ethnicity (5.0%), and 7 (5.0%) who did not
report this information.

2.5.2

Hypotheses and data analysis

We hypothesized main effects of similarity, disclosure depth, and personalistic
attribution, as well as a similarity * disclosure depth interaction and a disclosure depth *
personalistic attribution interaction on participants social preferences and impressions of
the avatars. These terms were used as the predictors in all our models. Again, the number
of clicks was also included in the models to control for any confounding effects of
knowledge on liking.
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For the rating data, we aggregated participants’ ratings across the social preference items
and the perceived traits items, respectively. We then fit linear-mixed models, with the
aforementioned predictors, to the aggregated ratings using the lmer function in the lme4
package (Bates et al., 2015) in R (version 3.6.3). We used linear-mixed models to capture
the hierarchical nature of the data: as ratings of the avatars were nested within each
participant, we allowed the intercept to vary across subject. Again, a global sum-to-zero
contrast was set to compare different manipulation levels to the grand mean. Here we
first report the Type III Analysis of Variances (ANOVA) results for any significant
overall effects of similarity, disclosure depth, personalistic attribution, or either of the
interaction terms. The coefficients associated with any significant predictors are then
reported to show the magnitude and direction of the effects.
For the ranking responses, the same data analysis and report strategies were used as in the
previous experiments. Full details of all models and their estimated effects in Appendix
B.

2.5.3

Results

2.5.3.1

Disclosure depth verification

We calculated participants’ ratings of the degree to which the items constituted personal
information across the 20 low-disclosure-depth items and the 20 high-disclosure-depth
items, respectively, for each participant. A paired-samples t-test found that participants
indeed considered the high-disclosure-depth items (M=3.20, SD=0.97) as significantly
more personal than the low-disclosure-depth items (M=1.74, SD=0.70), t(139)= 23.44,
p<.001. This suggests that our manipulation of disclosure depth had not fail simply due to
idiosyncratic differences across participant samples or a failure to select reasonable highdepth items.
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2.5.3.2

Rating measures

We failed to find any significant effects of similarity, disclosure depth, or personalistic
disclosure on most of our rating measures. No significant effects were found on perceived
similarity or perceived knowledge4. We calculated the mean ratings across the preference
items and the perceived friendship intention item as the aggregated social preference
scores5. We aggregated the trait perception items by calculating the mean ratings across
the two trait perception items. Mixed-linear models with the previously described
predictors were fit to the data. We failed to find any effects of the predictors on the
aggregated preference scores. We found a significant effect of similarity on the
aggregated trait perception scores, F(2, 701)=3.87, p=.021, in which high-similarityavatars were associated with lower ratings on this item, b=-0.073, SE=0.035, t(701)=2.10, p=.036. No significant effects of disclosure depth, personalistic attribution, or any
interactions were found on this item. See Appendix B for full statistical details.

2.5.3.3

Ranking measure

We included a ranking measure for the question “How much you’d like to actually meet
them” to allow for direct comparison with the previous studies. However, due to a
technical failure, only 79 participants completed the ranking item. Readers must therefore
be cautious of the following results, as were obtained with data from these 79 participants
instead of the full sample.
Here, we found a significant effect of similarity, χ2(2)=6.62, p=.037, qualified by a
marginally significant interaction between similarity and disclosure depth, χ2(2)=5.15,

4

Responses on these two items were not aggregated values and thus analyzed individually as ordinal data
with cumulative link models using the ordinal R package.
5

Due to a technical failure, ratings on the “How much you’d like to actually meet them” item were not
measured for most of the sample. We therefore removed this item when calculating the aggregated social
preference scores.
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p=.076. In particular, the high-similarity avatars were more likely to be ranked higher on
this item, b=0.627, SE=0.121, p<.001, and the low-similarity avatars less likely to be so
ranked, b=-0.434, SE=0.116, p<.001. However, the effect of the low similarity was
mitigated in the high disclosure-depth condition, b=0.248, SE=0.114, p=.031.
Specifically, participants’ decreased interest in meeting the low-similarity avatars was
stronger among the low rather than the high-disclosure-depth avatars. See Appendix B
for the estimates of all the predictors included in the model. Figure 2-5 shows the
distribution of participants responses on the ranking measure.

Figure 2-5 Stacked bar plots for the ranking question “How much would you like to
actually meet them?” for participants in the high personalistic condition (left) and
participants in the low personalistic condition (right) in Experiment 4. Y-axis: cumulative
percentage of participants who placed each avatar in the corresponding ranking
categories.
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2.5.4

Discussion

In this experiment, which used rating, rather than ranking measures, we only found a
significant similarity effect on the aggregated trait perception items, but the direction of
the similarity effect was inconsistent with any of the previous findings. We found no
other significant effects of similarity, disclosure depth, personalistic attribution, or their
interactions on any of the other rating measures. We are therefore hesitant to draw any
conclusions based on the surprising negative effect of similarity found with the trait
perceptions, considering that it was not found on any other rating measures, nor was it
consistent with the cumulative evidence in the previous studies.
One likely possibility for the largely null effects found in the rating measures might be
that participants were overwhelmed with the amount of information available. The
statements that they read in the information seeking stage not only varied in their levels
of similarity and disclosure depth, but also were coded in three different colors (i.e., the
ones were made only to them; made to them and “other participants”; and the ones
randomly selected by the computer). This might have made it difficult for the participants
to form clear overall impressions of the avatars as they were able to do in the previous
studies. This was partly reflected in the fact that they failed to perceive the different
levels of similarity across the avatars.
Interestingly, participants’ ranking responses on the item “how much you’d like to meet
them” showed both a significant effect of similarity, as found in the previous studies, and
a marginally significant similarity x disclosure-depth interaction effect. Specifically,
participants seemed to show more interest in meeting the high-similarity avatars and less
interest in meeting the low-similarity-avatars. Moreover, the unfavorable responses to the
low-similarity-avatars were observed especially among the low-disclosure-depth avatars,
rather than the high-disclosure-depth avatars. This interaction suggests the possibility that
higher levels of disclosure depth, though not an independent influence on social
preferences, may act as a “buffer” to the negative effects of low similarity between two
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interaction partners. However, as only a subgroup of participants completed this measure,
results should be interpreted with caution.
Finally, participants did rate the 20 high-disclosure-depth questions as being higher in
“personalness” than the 20 low-disclosure-depth questions. This suggests that participants
did indeed experience the disclosures as differing in depth.

2.6 Experiment 5
In real-world social interactions, self-disclosure is the process by which two people
mutually exchange information about themselves in a dynamic interaction. Although the
previous studies offered tightly controlled experimental manipulations of similarity and
disclosure depth, none of these experimental paradigms allowed for this mutual exchange
of information. Thus, it is possible that it is the mutual deepening of disclosure depth,
rather than a disclosure’s absolute depth that may be important to forming positive first
impressions and developing interpersonal liking after controlling similarity.
Given that the self-disclosures are often exchanged in the development of interpersonal
relationships (Altman & Taylor, 1973), it is reasonable to expect that the norm of
reciprocity (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Gouldner, 1960; Laursen & Hartup, 2002)
also applies to self-disclosures. That is, self-disclosure depth may matter not because of
the information value that it carries, but because it can be exchanged, coordinated, and
reciprocated in a social exchange process. Thus, it might not be the depth of the selfdisclosures per se, but the reciprocity of disclosure depth that leads to greater liking of a
discloser. In our previous experiments, participants simply viewed their social partners’
self-disclosures, excluding this element of reciprocity. In this study, we modified our
experimental paradigm to allow participants to engage in back-and-forth disclosure
exchanges with the avatars and manipulated the avatars’ level of reciprocity for
participants’ own disclosure depth.
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2.6.1

Participants

A total of 109 participants completed the experiment. We excluded 5 participants from
the analysis: 2 for expressing suspicion during debriefing, 2 for being inattentive (i.e.,
spent fewer than 250 milliseconds on each of 10 or more rating questions, as in
Experiment 4), and 1 for being both inattentive and suspicious. The remaining 104
participants (30 male, 74 female) were aged 17 to 24 (M=18.13, SD=0.95) and consisted
of 54 Asian (51.9%), 35 Caucasian (33.7%), 6 Middle Eastern (5.8%), 3 people of
African descent (2.9%), 2 Hispanic (1.9%), 2 mixed ethnicity (1.9%), and 2 who did not
provide this information (1.9%).

2.6.2

Methods

As in the previous studies, participants were invited to the lab in groups of seven and
completed the task in individual lab rooms, believing that they would meet a few of their
fellow participants at the end of the task. As above, the task began with the 40 multiplechoice disclosure questions. Participants then engaged in 10 rounds of self-disclosure
exchanges with each of the six avatars, one avatar at a time. The six avatars represented
six manipulation conditions in which two within-subject factors, similarity (high vs. low)
and reciprocity (high vs. medium vs. low) were fully crossed. The similarity
manipulation was implemented similarly to the previous studies. Here, however, the
high-similarity avatars self-disclosed information that was the same as participants’ own
70% of time and the low-similarity avatars self-disclosed information that was the same
as participants’ own only 30% of the time.
The reciprocity manipulation was implemented by matching the depth of the avatars’ and
the participants’ own disclosures to different degrees. The high-reciprocity avatars
reciprocated the depth of participant’s disclosure 80% of time. That is, 80% of the time, if
the participant disclosed on one of the twenty high depth questions, the avatars would
also disclose on a high depth question; if the participant disclosed on a low depth
question, the avatars would also disclose on a low depth question. For the medium- and
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low-reciprocity avatars, the avatars matched the participants’ disclosure depth 50% and
20% of the time, respectively. It is worth noting that the avatars were programmed to
only reciprocate the depth of the disclosure, but not topics (which were presented in
randomized order). That is, they would not reciprocate participants’ self-disclosure by
revealing their answer to the same question. Overall, the high-, medium-, and lowreciprocity avatars reciprocated participants’ self-disclosure depth 8, 5, and 2 times,
respectively, throughout the 10 rounds of disclosure exchanges.
The participant started with the first disclosure of each set of disclosure exchanges and
thereafter alternated the order of exchange for the remaining nine rounds to make the
process seem more natural and believable. When it was the participant’s turn to make a
disclosure, they were presented with four pseudo-randomly chosen statements from
amongst their answers to the 40 multiple-choice questions. Two of these possible
statements came from the high-depth questions and two from the low-depth questions and
the computer ensured that a statement that a participant had selected for disclosure to a
particular avatar was never repeated with that avatar again (although it might be repeated
with another avatar). The computer prompted participants to choose one item from the set
of four to disclose to the avatar on that turn. The participant then waited for a random
time interval, during which the screen displayed a message that the other participant was
choosing their own disclosure to the participant. The avatar’s disclosure, as restricted by
the previously described manipulations, then appeared on the computer screen for the
participant.
After participants finished their exchanges with each avatar, they completed the same
social preferences, trait perceptions, and perceived friendship intention rating questions
as used in Experiment 4 for that avatar. In addition to perceived similarity, participants
also rated the avatar for how much they felt the avatar (1) listened to and (2) responded to
what they told them, to measure the perceived reciprocity of the avatar. For all these
rating questions, participants responded on 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly
Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly Agree”). They completed these individual ratings after each
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exchange, before continuing to the next avatar. After completing exchanges with all the
avatars, participants ranked all the avatars on how much they’d like to meet them in
person. Finally, participants again rated each of the 40 multiple-choice questions based
on how personal the question was to verify that the high versus low disclosure depth
questions were indeed perceived as different in their overall disclosure depths. In addition
to the self-report measures, we recorded the number of disclosures that participants made
to the avatars that reciprocated the depth of the avatar’s last disclosure to them. These
data allowed us to explore whether our manipulation influenced how much participants
reciprocated the avatars’ disclosures.

2.6.3

Hypotheses and data analysis

We anticipated that higher similarity would lead to greater perceived similarity and
higher reciprocity would lead to greater perceived reciprocity of the avatars. We also
expected higher similarity and higher reciprocity to both lead to greater preference for
and more positive perceptions of the avatars. In addition to these hypotheses, we explored
whether the manipulation conditions affected participants’ own reciprocity to the avatars.
To test these hypotheses, we included similarity, reciprocity, and their interaction as the
predictors in our models. As in the previous experiment, we fit linear-mixed models to
the continuous dependent variables (e.g., aggregated rating responses; number of
reciprocal disclosures to the avatars) and fit a cumulative-link model to the ranking and
ordinal responses. The same data analysis and report strategies as in the Experiment 4
were used.

2.6.4
2.6.4.1

Results
Disclosure depth verification

As in Experiment 4, we calculated each participant’s mean ratings for how personal the
questions were for the high disclosure-depth questions and the low disclosure-depth
questions, respectively. A paired-samples t-test again revealed that participants
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considered the 20 high disclosure-depth questions (M=3.07, SD=1.00) as generally more
personal than the low disclosure-depth questions (M=1.53, SD=0.54), t(103)=22.04,
p<.001.

2.6.4.2

Rating measures

Responses on the perceived similarity item were treated as ordinal data and analyzed
using the cumulative link model. Similarity, reciprocity, and their interaction were
included as the predictors. A significant effect of similarity was found, χ2(1)=13.49,
p<.001. Specifically, participants were more likely to rate the high-similarity avatars as
higher on perceived similarity, b=0.454, SE=0.074, p<.001. No effects of reciprocity or
the interaction were found. We averaged responses on the two perceived reciprocity
items: how much participants felt that the avatar listened to them, and how much they felt
that the avatar responded to them. The aggregated scores were fit to a mixed linear
model, with similarity, reciprocity, and their interaction as predictors, while allowing the
intercept to vary across participants. Both similarity, F(1, 520)=6.73, p=.010, and
reciprocity, F(2, 520)=7.06, p<.001, significantly predicted participants’ averaged scores
on these two items. Specifically, participants perceived the high-similarity avatars,
b=0.103, SE=0.040, p=.010, and the high reciprocity avatars, b=0.212, SE=0.056,
p<.001, both as higher on how much they listened and responded to the participants. No
interaction effect was found. Figure 2-6(a) shows these effects.
We averaged the ratings across all the social preferences items and the friendship
intention item for each participant to determine their aggregated social preference score.
We also averaged across the two perceived traits (friendliness and trustworthiness) to
obtain aggregated trait perceptions scores. We fit both these aggregated measures using
the same linear mixed model as above. We found a significant effect of similarity on the
aggregated social preference ratings, F(1,520)= 30.27, p<.001, such that participants
significantly preferred the high-similarity avatars, b=0.171, SE=0.032, p<.001.
Interestingly, even though the overall effect of reciprocity was not significant, the
coefficient for the high-reciprocity avatars was significant and suggested higher
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preferences of the high-reciprocity avatars, b=0.087, SE=0.044, p=.047. For trait
perceptions, we found marginally significant effects of similarity, F(1,520)= 3.09,
p=.080, as well as reciprocity, F(1,520)= 2.52, p=.082. The direction of the effects were
aligned with our expectations: high-similarity avatars, b=0.038, SE=0.022, p=.079 and
high-reciprocity avatars, b=0.060, SE=0.031, p=.050, were rated more favorably,
whereas low-reciprocity avatars were rated less favorably, b=-0.59, SE=0.031, p=.056.
Figure 2-6(b) and 2-6(c) show the effects on the aggregated preferences and aggregated
trait perceptions.

2.6.4.3

Ranking measure

We fit the cumulative link model to the participants’ ranking responses on how much
they’d like to actually meet the avatars, which they completed after interacting with all
the avatars, with Similarity, Reciprocity, and their interaction entered as predictors. We
failed to find any significant effect of Similarity, χ2(1)=0.94, p=.330, Reciprocity,
χ2(2)=0.24, p=.889, or their interaction, χ2(2)=1.21, p=.545.
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2.6.4.4

Reciprocity to avatars

Finally, we fit the same mixed linear model used on the aggregated measures to the
number of reciprocated disclosures that participants made to the avatars. Here, we found
a marginally significant effect of reciprocity, F(2,520)=2.93, p=0.055. Specifically,
participants reciprocated the disclosure depth of the low reciprocity avatars significantly
less often, b= -0.168, SE=0.079, p=0.034. We found no effects of similarity,
F(1,520)=0.16, p=0.689, or any interaction, F(2,520)=0.31, p=0.737. Figure 2-6(d) shows
these effects.

Figure 2-6 The effects of Similarity and Reciprocity manipulations on (a) perceived
reciprocity rating, (b)social preference ratings, (c) perceived desirability ratings, and (d)
the number of reciprocated self-disclosures to the avatars in Experiment 5. Error bars
represent 95% CI.
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2.6.5

Discussion

In this experiment, we replicated the significant effect of similarity on participants’
impressions and preferences of the avatars as found in Experiments 1-3. Participants
rated the high-similarity avatars as higher on perceived similarity, perceived reciprocity,
social preference for, and marginally higher on positive perceptions. We found a
significant effect of reciprocity on perceived reciprocity of the avatars, such that
participants did perceive that the high-reciprocity avatars as being more attentive and
responsive. In addition, the effects of reciprocity on participants’ preferences and
perceptions of the avatars also tended towards statistical significance in the expected
direction.
Notably, we used rating measures instead of ranking measures in assessing participants’
responses and found similar effects to most of our previous research. Thus, the previous
findings were not likely biased by the force-choice format of ranking questions. As in
Experiment 4, participants also rated the high disclosure-depth questions as more
personal than the low-disclosure depth questions, which increased our confidence in the
validity of our disclosure depth manipulation in the previous studies. However, we did
not replicate the previously found effect on the ranking item implemented in this study.
We suspect that the was partially due to the fact that participants were asked to respond to
the ranking item after they completed exchanges with all the avatars, which was an
extensive process. Because of the considerable time between the first round of social
exchanges and the ranking item, participant might have forgotten the exchanges they had
with the earlier avatars. This would help explain why we observed the similarity effect on
the rating items, which were completed right after their interactions with each avatar, but
not on the ranking item, completed at the end.
Participants rated the avatars who reciprocated their disclosure depth more frequently as
both more socially attentive and responsive, indicating that they might have developed
more positive impressions of avatars who reciprocated more frequently. The high
reciprocity avatars were also associated with higher ratings on preferences and desirable
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trait perceptions, even though the overall reciprocity effect did not quite reach statistical
significance. In addition, participants were also less likely to reciprocate the disclosure
depth of the low-reciprocity avatars. These findings suggested that, compared to the
previous manipulations of absolute disclosure depth, the manipulation of depth
reciprocity might more closely mimic how self-disclosure depth influences interpersonal
liking.

2.7 Meta-analysis on the effects of similarity and disclosure
depth
To consolidate our findings across experiments regarding the effects of similarity and
disclosure depth, we conducted a fixed-effect meta-analysis on the unstandardized
logistic regression coefficients for participants’ ranking responses on the item “how much
you’d like to actually meet them” in Experiments 1 through 4, using the metaviz package
(Version 0.3.1) in R. We believe that participants’ responses on this item most genuinely
reflected their impressions and preferences of the avatars, because participants believed
that they would be matched with the others for face-to-face interactions based on their
responses on this item. Experiment 5 was not included in the meta-analysis because we
manipulated the reciprocity of disclosure depth rather than disclosure depth itself; the
results were thus not directly comparable to findings from Experiments 1 through 4.
As can be seen in Figure 2-7, the meta-analysis suggested that participants consistently
showed greater interest in meeting the avatars who appeared to be highly similar to
themselves. The summary coefficient for the high-similarity avatars across Experiments 1
to 4 was b=0.65 (95% CI= 0.55 to 0.75), which corresponds to an odds ratio of 1.92. In
other words, participants were about two times more likely to rank the high-similarity
avatars higher as the ones they would like to meet in person compared to an “average”
avatar across our experiments. In comparison, the summary coefficient for the lowsimilarity avatars across the four experiments was b=-0.48 (95% CI= -0.58 to -0.38),
corresponding to the odds ratio of 0.62, which suggested that participants were about
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40% less likely to rank the low-similarity avatars higher as the ones that they would like
to meet in person compared to an “average” avatar. In contrast, participants’ interest in
meeting the avatars was not swayed by avatars’ self-disclosure depth, as revealed by the
near-zero summary coefficient across the four experiments.

Figure 2-7. Meta-analysis of the effects of High Similarity, Low Similarity, and High
Disclosure Depth on participants’ responses on the "how much you’d like to actually meet
them" ranking item in Experiments 1 through 4. Positive beta represents higher likelihood
to be ranked higher on this item.
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2.8 Experiments 1 to 5 general discussion
In a series of experiments, we independently manipulated the disclosure depth and
similarity communicated through self-disclosures and examined how these two factors
influenced liking for a discloser during an initial social interaction. Overall, findings
suggested that, a high level of similarity communicated via self-disclosures leads to more
positive impressions and greater social preferences for the discloser; whereas a low level
of similarity negatively affects these outcomes. Disclosure depth, however, did not seem
to influence people’s first impressions and social preferences in these initial social
interactions. Specifically, in Experiments 1 to 4, we found consistent and robust effects of
similarity on participants’ ranking responses of the item “how much you’d like to
actually meet them”. In Experiment 5, we continued to find that similarity is important in
shaping initial liking. However, participants also showed a marginal preference for the
avatars who were most likely to reciprocate their own disclosure depth, but the overall
effect of reciprocity did not reach statistical significance.
Taken together, we did not find evidence to suggest that absolute disclosure depth
enhances liking for a discloser, independent of the similarity between the two interaction
partners. In fact, the strong effects of similarity suggest that identifying aspects of
similarity with another person might well be one of the main functions of self-disclosure
exchange. Thus, it is likely that disclosure similarity underlies the positive relationship
between self-disclosure and interpersonal liking found in the literature. Interestingly and
contrary to expectations, people did not believe that they got to know the avatars who
self-disclosed more deeply to a greater extent. Similarly, they did not perceive stronger
friendship intention from the deeply disclosing avatars. Rather, similarity predicted
participants’ feelings of avatars’ friendship intentions. Collins and Miller (1994)
suggested that receivers might like those who self-disclose deeply because such
disclosures communicate the discloser’s liking of the receiver and their desire to enhance
the relationship with the receiver. Our findings suggest that these processes are more
likely a result of a high perceived similarity, rather than the depth of their disclosures.
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Findings from Experiment 5 pointed to the possibility that, compared to the other
person’s self-disclosure depth per se, people might more readily perceive another’s
reciprocity of their own disclosure depth, and may subsequently incorporate such
perceptions into their impressions of and interactions with the other person. In other
words, interpersonal liking might be less a function of absolute disclosure depth than of
the feeling that another is matching one’s own depth. Nonetheless, it is possible that
effects of disclosure depth on interpersonal liking during initial social interactions are
masked by the strong effect of perceived similarity between interaction partners.
Despite these interesting findings, there are a few limitations to the current studies. First,
the self-disclosure statements used in all the studies were generated by university
students. Though these topics were considered common topics that university students
would talk about when getting to know others for the first time, they are inherently more
applicable to this specific population. In addition, even though we verified in
Experiments 4 and 5 that participants did perceive the high self-disclosure depth topics as
more personal than the low self-disclosure depth topics, the high depth topics were not
overly personal (with mean ratings around 3.2 on a 7-point scale). Although in a first
interaction, overly personal disclosures are often considered inappropriate and shown to
lead to negative social outcomes (e.g., Caltabiano & Smithson, 1983; Chaikin & Derlega,
1974), the relatively narrow range of topics might have limited the robustness of our
disclosure depth manipulation. Future studies might want to explore broader topics that
vary more in their disclosure depth and to test the effects in other populations.
Second, although the computerized interaction set-up used in all the studies allowed us to
manipulate the key variables in a well-controlled manner, it lacked many of the important
elements that occur in face-to-face interactions. It is possible that people differ in their
non-verbal behaviours such as eye contact, gestures, and facial expressions when
disclosing something deeper, in comparison to more superficial information about
themselves. Because non-verbal behaviours heavily influence interpersonal liking (Boone
& Buck, 2003; McGinley et al., 1978; Scherwitz & Helmreich, 1973), deep disclosure-
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depth might lead to greater liking, not because of its intimate verbal content but via the
non-verbal behaviours that accompany it. Future research should seek to investigate this
idea.
Finally, our findings and conclusions pertain to short initial interactions with strangers.
We suspect that disclosure depth matters, probably to a great extent, in ongoing
relationships where there is a lasting, dynamic exchange of responses between two
interaction partners. In such relationships, people not only receive self-disclosures, but
also respond to such disclosures and receive feedback about their responses. The
development of interpersonal relationships likely relies more on dynamic exchanges of
responses rather than solely on the content of one party’s self-disclosures (Reis & Shaver,
1988), as the Experiment 5 results suggest. Deeper self-disclosures might thus lead to
greater interpersonal liking in such long-term relationships by facilitating deeper
responses from the other people, thereby encouraging future exchanges between
interaction partners.
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Chapter 3

3

Experiment 6: Risk-Taking, Liking, and Self-Disclosure

In this experiment, I examined the second effect reviewed and supported in Collins and
Miller (1994): the finding that people self-disclose more to those whom they like more.
In addition, I examined how individual differences in risk taking play a role in this
process. Using a paradigm modified from the one used in Experiments 1 to 5, I
manipulated participants’ liking of three avatars, whom they believed were other
participants interacting with them in real-time via computer. Participants were then given
a chance to engage in self-disclosure to these avatars and measured on their risk-taking
tendencies. Participants’ perceptions of the avatars and risk-taking tendencies were
subsequently used to predict their self-disclosures to the avatars, after controlling
variables such as their perceived similarity and demographic characteristics such as
gender and age.

3.1 Rationale
3.1.1

Self-disclosure as a risk-taking behaviour

Self-disclosure can essentially be viewed in a risk-taking framework when one considers
the parallels between the mechanisms underlying self-disclosure decisions and those
underlying risk-taking decisions. First, when self-disclosing one’s beliefs, thoughts, and
feelings to another person, there are both potential benefits, such as approval and
affiliation, and potential costs, such as interpersonal rejection, associated with personal
revelations. It is therefore reasonable to expect people to weigh the potential benefits
against costs when they are making decisions regarding whether and what to self-disclose
to a particular receiver. Indeed, Taylor and Altman (1975) found that, when randomly
assigning participants to interact with a confederate, the amount of time that the sailors
spent self-disclosing to the confederate varied as a function of the confederate’s
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responses to them. Those who interacted with a disagreeable and disapproving
confederate (i.e., higher costs of disclosing) spent significantly less time self-disclosing
compared to those who interacted with an agreeable and approving confederate (i.e.
higher rewards of disclosing). Such cost-benefit calculation also lies at the core of
decision making involving risks (Bernoulli, 1954/1783; Harless & Camerer, 1994;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). For example, in his pioneering work on risk measurement,
Daniel Bernoulli (1954/1783) suggested the importance of “utility”, one’s subjective
evaluation of an item’s value. People’s risk-taking decisions are a direct product of item
utility and risk. Specifically, one should be willing to take a risk that has a “mean utility”
that equals the utility of the item. That is, the balance between the potential costs and
rewards of the risk, after taking in account of their respective probability of occurrence,
should be the same as the subjective value of the item.
The second parallel between self-disclosure and general risky decision making is that
they both reflect a learning process whereby an individual adjusts their behaviours based
on the feedback from the environment. For example, in Taylor and Altman (1995), when
the confederate changed their responses to be more negative or more positive later in the
same session, the researchers observed a corresponding change in participants’ selfdisclosing behaviour, reflecting participants’ sensitivity to the changes in the cost-reward
ratio. Similarly, Reis and Shaver (1988) explicitly theorized that a receiver’s responses to
one’s self-disclosures would influence whether the discloser feels that they are
understood, validated, and cared for by the receiver, which in turn either facilitates or
inhibits further disclosures. This process also underlies people’s general decision making
under risk. For example, Cook et al. (2005) found that participants who played with the
same partner repeatedly in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game gradually entrusted more money
to their partner, whereas those who played with a random partner in each round did not
show such a pattern. Their results suggested that repeatedly interacting with the same
partner allowed the participants to learn about the environment (i.e., whether this partner
would corporate) and adjust their subsequent risk-taking behaviours accordingly.
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The third parallel between self-disclosure and risky decision making is that they are both
influenced by affect and fluency. Self-disclosures have been shown to be facilitated by
positive mood (Cunningham, 1988; Forgas, 2011) and greater processing fluency (Alter
& Oppenheimer, 2009b), which is the ease with which people process information (Alter
& Oppenheimer, 2009a). For example, Forgas (2011) found that participants selfdisclosed more information and with more intimate details after watching a short comedy
film or writing about a positive life episode, compared to those who watched a sad short
film or wrote about a negative life episode. In an interesting field study, Alter and
Oppenheimer (2009a) examined how processing fluency could influence self-disclosures
by comparing anonymous confessions on an online confession site two weeks before and
two weeks after the website was reformatted, which made it easier to read and thus
increased its processing fluency. A group of independent raters rated each confession
based on how embarrassed they would be if asked to disclose that information.
Confessions after the website reformatting were found to be more embarrassing than
those before, indicating that fluency may facilitate deeper levels of self-disclosure.
Similarly, positive affect and greater fluency encourage people’s risk taking. The risk-asfeelings hypothesis, for example, was raised to address how affect experienced at the time
of a decision can influence or even override cognitive evaluations of its risk
(Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2005). It suggests that positive mood facilitates
optimistic judgments and decreases risk perceptions, which might in turn lead to greater
risk-taking behaviours, whereas negative affect promotes risk perception and thus
discourages risk taking behaviours (Loewenstein et al., 2001).

3.1.2

Individual differences in risk-taking tendency and self-disclosures

People vary in how much they are prone to take risks. This variation in risk-taking
tendency can be attributed to individual differences in factors such as gender (Byrnes et
al., 1999), age (Deakin et al., 2004), and personality traits such as impulsive sensation
seeking, aggression-hostility, and sociability (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). Taken
together with the previous argument that self-disclosing behaviours can be understood in

56

a risk-taking framework, individual differences in risk taking might also be reflected in
whether and how much people choose self-disclose to their social partners (i.e., to take a
social risk). Specially, people higher in general risk-taking tendency might be more
willing to self-disclose than those with a lower risk-taking tendency.
Moreover, individual differences in how much people weight potential rewards versus
potential costs associated with self-disclosing behaviours might influence how much they
self-disclose to a given partner. The Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS)/ Behavioural
Activation System (BAS) (Fowles, 1980; J. A. Gray, 1981, 1982) is a theoretical
framework thought to represent how individuals differ in the extent to which punishment
and reward, respectively, motivate their behaviours. The BIS was conceptualized as the
motivational system responsible for inhibiting behaviours that might lead to negative
outcomes. It is responsive to threatening stimuli such as punishment, frustrative nonreward, and novelty. A higher sensitivity in the BIS is associated with higher anxiety and
greater avoidance behaviours when an individual is faced with possible punishment. The
BAS, in contrast, is responsible for promoting approach behaviours and is sensitive to
signals of reward and non-punishment. A higher sensitivity in the BAS should thus be
associated with greater positive affect and greater goal-pursuit when an individual is
presented with incentives. The BIS and the BAS have been conceptualized as
independent systems, such that individuals could be high or low on either of these two
dimensions respectively (Carver & White, 1994; J. A. Gray, 1981; Torrubia et al., 2001).
Empirical studies using self-report measures developed based on the BIS/BAS theoretical
framework have linked higher BAS sensitivity with increased impulsivity (Braddock et
al., 2011), risky health behaviours such as substance use and unprotected sexual practices
(Braddock et al., 2011; O’Connor et al., 2009), and increased risk for gambling (Gaher et
al., 2015; Kim & Lee, 2011; O’Connor et al., 2009), whereas higher BIS sensitivity was
generally found to link with decreased impulsivity and risk-taking behaviours (e.g.
Braddock et al., 2011; O’Connor et al., 2009).
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Such individual differences on BIS/BAS sensitivity should theoretically influence
participants’ motivation to avoid the potential punishment and approach the potential
reward associated with self-disclosing behaviour in social interactions. As previously
discussed, self-disclosing to a social partner might lead to both potential rewards and
costs. A person higher on BIS sensitivity should inhibit their self-disclosing behaviour
more as they are more motivated to avoid the potential costs, compared to those lower on
BIS sensitivity. In contrast, individuals higher on BAS sensitivity should be more
motivated by the potential rewards and thus engage in greater self-disclosing behaviour.
Furthermore, these relationships between BIS/BAS sensitivity and self-disclosing
behaviour might be exacerbated when the discloser likes the receiver: greater liking for a
receiver might make their approval more rewarding and the potential rejection from them
more dreadful. It is therefore reasonable to expect those high on BIS sensitivity to further
inhibit self-disclosing behaviours when interacting with a liked social partner, whereas
the same situation would motivate those high on BAS sensitivity to engage in even
greater self-disclosing behaviours, compared to interactions with a less liked partner.

3.2 Methodology
3.2.1

Procedure

Participants were invited to the lab in groups of four and were told that they would be
interacting with each other first on the computer, followed by potential face-to-face
interactions later in the study. As in the previous studies, participants in fact interacted
with pre-programed avatars on the computer and no face-to-face interactions took place
in the study. To further incentivize attentive behaviours and engagement in the study
tasks, participants were informed that they could earn up to $5 bonus money based on
their performance in the tasks. Participants were paid accordingly based on their
accumulated points at the end of the study, in addition to any compensation that all
participants earned by taking part of the study.
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As in the previous studies, participants completed the entire study on a computer in
individual lab rooms. Participants first chose an animal picture as their profile picture and
completed 20 multiple-choice questions. Half of these questions were of high disclosuredepth and the rest were of low disclosure-depth. These questions were randomly chosen,
with the restrictions on the depth, from the 40 questions used in the previous experiments.
Participants were then told that, for the first task, the computer would randomly pair them
up with two of the three other participants and they would play a joint game with each of
these two participants. The game was a modified joint Flanker task (Atmaca et al., 2011),
which aimed at eliciting different levels of liking toward the “other participants”.
Participants were told that their joint performance with each partner would contribute to
the number of points they won and thus the amount of bonus cash that they would earn
by the end of the study. They completed the task with two avatars. Unbeknownst to the
participants, one avatar was programed to perform better and contribute more points to
the joint score than the other. The third avatar, with whom participants did not play the
game, served as a “neutral” partner for whom liking was not manipulated.
In our joint Flanker task, the participant and their avatar partner were each assigned two
letters that were randomly selected from a list (e.g., participant--“H”, “K”; partner – “S”,
“C”). On each trial, participants viewed a string of five stimulus letters for 100ms (e.g.,
“HHHHH”, “HHSHH”. After the stimulus disappeared, participants pressed one of two
keys to indicate whether the central letter in the string was their own letter or belonged to
their partner. If they pressed the correct key, they earned points. If the press was slow
(i.e., RT>400ms), they earned 1 point; if they pressed the correct key quickly (i.e., RT≤
400ms), they earned 2 points; if they pressed the incorrect key, they lost 1 point. The
computer provided feedback on both the participant’s and their avatar partner’s
performance (e.g., how many points they each earned) as well as the joint points they
earned each trail. The better-performing avatar (i.e., the “good” avatar) reacted faster to
its target letters and made fewer mistakes throughout the trials than the worse-performing
avatar (i.e., the “bad” avatar). See Figure 3-1 for an illustration of the task. The
expectation was that participants would develop a stronger liking for the better-
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performing avatar, as a result of the better task outcome. To verify the effect of our liking
manipulation, participants reported their mood using the PANAS scales (Watson et al.,
1988) both at the beginning of the study and right after they completed the joint Flanker
task with each of the two avatars.
Next, participants were told that they would get to know more about the other
participants by reading some statements that the others chosen on the 20 multiple-choice
questions at the beginning of the study. For all the avatars, half of their statements were
the same as the participant’s own choices. In addition, all avatars’ statements consisted of

Figure 3-1 On each trial of the joint Flanker Task in Experiment 6, participants were
presented with the string at the center of the screen for 100 milliseconds (1). They were
them prompted to press 1 or 2 after the string disappeared (2). The computer then
displayed the result of the trial (3).
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50% low-depth disclosures and 50% high-depth disclosures. This served to equalize
avatars actual similarity and disclosure depth, to avoid confounding the effect of our
liking manipulation on the dependent variables. After viewing each avatar’s statements,
participants completed self-report questions assessing perceived similarity, perceived
knowledge, and liking of that avatar.
Upon completing all the self-report liking questions, participants were told that they had a
chance to share some more information with each of the other participants. They were
told that they would later view each other participant’s self-disclosures to decide whom
they’d like to meet in person. They then complete the remaining 20 multiple-choice
questions from the list of 40 questions about themselves and chose which ones to share
with each avatar. They were also given the chance to freely disclose any additional
information that they wanted to share with each avatar. The number of disclosures that
they chose to share from the 20 questions, the proportion of deep disclosures they
selected, and the number of additional self-disclosures they typed were used as
indications of their self-disclosure level to each avatar (i.e., the dependent variables).
Next, participants were told they would complete some measures of personality before
viewing the other participants’ self-disclosures. They then completed two behavioural
risk-taking measures, the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002)) and
the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009) and a
few self-report questionnaires measuring individual differences in risk-related tendencies.
Again, to encourage attentive behaviours and genuine responses, their performances in
the BART and CCT were converted into points that they earned at the end of the study.
The order in which participants completed the two behavioural risk-taking tasks and the
questionnaires were randomized. Lastly, participants completed a funnel debriefing as in
the previous studies, paid their bonus earnings, thanked and dismissed.
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3.2.2

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. Greater liking of an avatar would predict greater self-disclosure to the
avatar (i.e., higher number of self-disclosures, higher proportion of deep self-disclosures,
and greater number of extra self-disclosures typed in the optional text box).
Hypothesis 2. Greater general risk-taking tendency would predict greater overall selfdisclosure across avatars.
Hypothesis 3. Participants’ individual BIS/BAS sensitivity would interact with liking of
an avatar to predict self-disclosures to the avatar. Specifically, the positive relationship
between liking and self-disclosure would be strengthened for individuals with a higher
BAS sensitivity and reduced for individuals with a higher BIS sensitivity.

3.2.3
3.2.3.1

Measures
PANAS

The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) is a 20-item self-report scale
developed by Watson et al. (1988), which consists of 10 items that assess positive affect
and 10 items that assess negative affect. The PANAS has been shown to have good
construct validity (e.g., Crawford & Henry, 2004) and test-retest reliability (e.g., Ostir,
Smith, Smith, & Ottenbacher, 2005). Participants rated each item in random order on a
visual analogue scale (e.g., “interested”, “distressed”, “excited”, etc.) by clicking on a
straight line with “very slight or not at all” (0) on the one end and “extremely” (100) on
the other end to indicate their current mood. Ratings on the items assessing positive affect
and those assessing negative affect were averaged, respectively, to generate participants’
Positive Affect and Negative Affect scores.
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3.2.3.2

Perceived similarity, knowledge, and liking measure

The same items used in Experiments 1-5 were used to assess participants’ perceived
similarity, perceived knowledge, social preferences, and trait perceptions for each of the
three avatars. Participants rated the avatars on scales ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 7
(“very much so”) for each question.

3.2.3.3
3.2.3.3.1

Risk taking measures
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART)

The BART is a laboratory-based behavioural measure that was developed by Lejuez et al.
(2002). It has been shown to have good construct validity. For example, higher scores on
the BART predicted higher self-reported risk-taking behaviours (Lejuez et al., 2002),
alcohol consumption and problems (Fernie et al., 2010), and drug use (Hopko et al.,
2006). An fMRI study also showed that when participants played the BART, there was
activation in the dopamine rich mesolimbic structures, the brain regions that are
consistently activated when risk and reward are involved (Rao et al., 2008).
In this task, participants were presented with a balloon on the computer screen. They
could pump air into the balloon by pressing a button on the screen; with each successful
pump, participants could earn 1 point. However, each balloon could only take a certain
number of pumps, at which point the balloon would “pop” and the participant would lose
all the money that they had earned on this balloon. Participants experienced 30 trials (i.e.,
30 balloons) in the task. The “break point” of each balloon varied and was randomly
selected by the computer to range from 1 to 128 pumps, with a mean of 64. The break
point for each balloon was unknown to participants. Participants could choose to stop
pumping a balloon at any point and collect the money that they had earned on a given
balloon by clicking on a “Collect” sign on the screen, which would store their trial
earnings to a “permanent bank”. A trial immediately ended when the balloon popped or
when the participant banked the money, and a new balloon appeared on the screen. The
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number of times that the participant pumped each balloon was averaged across all the
trials, excluding trials in which the balloon popped, and used as an index of general risk
taking. See Figure 3-2 for an illustration of the task.

Figure 3-2 The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) used in Experiment 6. Figure
adapted from Lejuez et al. (2002).

3.2.3.3.2

The Columbia Card Task (CCT)

The CCT is a more recently developed laboratory-based behavioural measure of risk
taking. Figner et al. (2009) developed two versions of CCT—the “hot” version that was
designed to assess affective decision making under uncertainty and the “cold” version
that was designed to assess more deliberative decision making. Empirical evidence has
suggested that the “hot” and “cold” CCT indeed capture different aspects of risk taking
(Buelow & Blaine, 2015; Markiewicz & Kubińska, 2015). Interestingly, one study found
that, when measured using the “hot” but not the “cold” CCT, those who were highly
responsive to rewards showed greater risk taking compared to those with less sensitivity
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to rewards (Penolazzi et al., 2012). We therefore opted to use the “hot” version of CCT in
the current study.
In this task, 32 cards were displayed face-down on the computer screen in each trial.
Some of the cards were “gain cards” and some were “loss cards”. A participant could turn
over as many cards in a trial as they wished by clicking on them. With each gain card
turned over, the participant would gain a certain amount of points for the trial. If a loss
card was turned over, the value of the loss on that trial would be subtracted from the
participant’s score. Trials ended when either the participant chose to stop turning over
cards or when they encountered a loss card.
Participants experienced a total 28 CCT trials. The trials differed in three parameters.
First, the gain amount varied. For each trial, the amount of gain per card was either 10
points or 30 points. Second, the probability of loss varied across trials. Either 1 or 3 cards
out of the 32 cards were “loss cards” in a trial. Third, the loss amount varied with two
possible levels, 250 points or 750 points, across the trials. With two different levels for
each of the three parameters, there were 8 possible combinations. The entire task
therefore contained 24 trials in which each combination of parameters was presented on 3
trials in a random order. Participants were always informed of these parameters by an
information display for each trial. See Figure 3-3 for an illustration of the task.
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Figure 3-3. An illustration of the Columbia Card Task used in Experiment 6.

As in Figner et al. (2009), we implemented 4 “fake trials” to facilitate believability of the
task. These fake trials were programed such that participants would turn over a “loss”
card very early in the trial. In comparison, in the other 24 “true trials” previously
described, the task was programed such that it was unlikely that participants would turn
over a loss card before they voluntarily chose to bank their points and end the trial. This
was made possible by programming the trials such that the loss cards were the very last
possible cards to be turned over (e.g., in a trial with 3 loss cards, the loss card would not
appear until the participant chose to turn over for the 30th time in the same trial).
Participants’ risk-taking tendency was calculated by averaging the number of cards that
they chose to turn over in the 24 “true trials”.
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3.2.3.3.3

The Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral Activation Scales
(BIS/BAS Scales)

Building on the BIS/BAS theoretical framework, Carver and White (1994) developed the
BIS/BAS Scale, which is a 20-item self-report questionnaire that assess people’s BIS and
BAS sensitivity. The BIS/BAS Scale consists of four subscales: the BIS subscale assesses
how much one is sensitive to punishment and would experience negative affect when
experiencing or anticipating punishment (e.g., “If I think something unpleasant is going
to happen I usually get pretty “worked up”.”); the BAS Reward Responsiveness subscale
captures one’s positive affect when obtaining or anticipating reward (e.g., “When I get
something I want, I feel excited and energized.”); the BAS Drive subscale assesses one’s
persistent pursuit of a reward or goal (e.g., “When I want something, I usually go all-out
to get it.”); and the BAS Fun Seeking subscale assesses one’s desire for new rewards and
willingness to act on the spur of the moment (e.g., “I crave excitement and new
sensations”). In the current study, participants rated each question on a scale of 1
(“strongly agree”) to 4 (“strongly disagree”). Participants’ ratings were subsequently
reversed and then averaged across items for each of the four subscales. Higher scores
thus represented higher sensitivity of the BIS and the three aspects of BAS.

3.2.3.3.4

The Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward
Questionnaire (SPSRQ)

The SPSRQ is another self-report questionnaire developed by Torrubia et al. (2000)
based on Gray’s (1981) BIS/BAS theoretical framework. The scale contains 48 yes-no
questions, half assessing individuals’ sensitivity to punishment (e.g., “Do you often
refrain from doing something because you are afraid of being illegal”) (i.e., the SP scale)
and the rest half assessing their sensitivity to reward (e.g., “Does the good prospect of
obtaining money motivate you strongly to do something?”) (i.e., the SR scale). Whereas
the BIS subscale in the BIS/BAS scales developed by Carver and White (1994) focused
on the negative affect associated with anticipated or current punishment, the SP scale
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captures both the negative affect and behavioural inhibition/avoidance when potential
aversive consequences are involved (e.g., “Do you prefer not to ask for something when
you are not sure you will obtain it”). The psychometric properties of the scale were
supported in other empirical studies (e.g., Beck, Smits, Claes, Vandereycken, &
Bijttebier, 2009; O’Connor, Colder, & Hawk, 2004). In the current study, the number of
endorsed items on the SP scale were summed up as participants’ sensitivity to
punishment scores and the number of endorsed items on the SR scale were summed up as
participants sensitivity to reward scores. Higher scores on SP and SR scales thus
indicated higher BIS sensitivity and higher BAS sensitivity, respectively.

3.2.3.3.5

The Experience in Close Relationship Scale- Short (ECR-S)

Lastly, we included a measure that specifically captures the approach and avoidance
behaviours in social relationships, as it might uniquely predict people’s self-disclosures to
others (e.g., Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991). The Experiences in Close Relationship Scale
(ECR) was originally developed in Brennan, Clark, and Shaver (1998), in which the
authors presented items from the then-available scales on adult attachment to over 1,000
undergraduate and found two relatively orthogonal dimensions, Anxiety and Avoidance.
Whereas attachment anxiety captures a fear of rejection or abandonment from others,
attachment avoidance refers to a fear of dependence and interpersonal intimacy
(Mikulincer et al., 2003). Individuals who are low on both attachment anxiety and
attachment avoidance are considered as having a secure adult attachment orientation,
which manifests as being comfortable with closeness without being overly worried about
being rejected or abandoned (e.g., Mikulincer et al., 2003; Wei et al., 2007). In the
current study, we chose to use a short version of the ECR (ECR-S) developed by Wei et
al. (2007), which is a 12-item scale that captures both Attachment Anxiety (“I want to get
close to my partner, but I keep pulling back.”) and Attachment Avoidance (“I try to avoid
getting too close to my partner.”). The authors reported adequate reliability (alpha=.78
for Anxiety subscale and .84 for Avoidance subscale) for the ECR-S; the short version of
the scale also performed similarly to the original ECR in its test-retest reliability (>.80)

68

and its predictability to relevant criteria such as excessive reassurance seeking, fear of
intimacy, depression, and anxiety. Participants rated each item on a scale of 1 (“Agree
Strongly”) to 7 (“Disagree Strongly”). Their ECR scores were calculated by averaging
their ratings across all the items. Higher scores indicate a more secured attachment
orientation.

3.3 Participants
I pre-registered the study and aimed to collect data 100-125 participants after exclusion6.
However, data collection ended prematurely due to COVID-19. A total of 82 participants
therefore took part in the current study in exchange of partial course credit for an
introductory Psychology course or a compensation of $10. As previously mentioned,
participants also earned bonus cash based on their performance in the study tasks. I
excluded 5 suspicious participants and 3 inattentive participants (1 for spending less than
250 milliseconds on multiple rating questions for an avatar; 2 for not choosing the
required minimum number of 7 self-disclosures to reveal to the avatars). The remaining
74 participants (28 male, 44 female, and 2 non-specified) aged from 18 to 29 (M=19.42,
SD=2.54) and consisted of 29 Asian (39.2%), 25 Caucasian (33.8%), 5 Middle Eastern
(6.8%), 5 people of African descent (6.8%), and 10 (13.5%) mixed or other ethnicities.

3.4 Results
3.4.1

Manipulation check

To check whether our manipulation of participants’ experiences with the avatars’ in the
Joint Flanker task effectively differentiated the “good” versus “bad” avatar, I first
checked whether participants earned more points when playing with the good than the
bad avatar. I fit a linear-mixed model to the total number of points that participants

6

https://osf.io/axvd5/

69

earned for Joint Flanker Task, with the partner condition as the predictor, and allowed the
intercept to vary across participants. The lmer package in R (version 3.6.3) was used.
Participants earned significantly more points when playing with the good partner
(M=136, SD=13.7) than with the bad partner (M=103, SD=15.2), F(1, 73)= 402.21,
p<.001. Moreover, the a linear-mixed model was fit on participants’ mood measured by
the PANAS after playing with each of the avatars. After controlling for their baseline
positive mood measured at the beginning of the experiment, participants reported
significantly higher positive affect after playing with the good partner (M=60.8,
SD=21.7) than the bad partner (M=56.3, SD=22.9), F(1, 73)=14.34, p<.001. In
comparison, their negative affect did not differ as a function of playing with the good
(M=15.8, SD=12.5) versus the bad partner (M=16.9, SD=12.5), F(1,73)=1.50, p=.225,
after controlling for their baseline negative mood. These findings thus suggested that
participants had more positive experiences when playing with the good partner than the
bad partner as we intended.

3.4.2

Perceived similarity, perceived knowledge, and liking

To assess participants’ perceived similarity and perceived knowledge of the three avatars,
a cumulative-link model was fit to the responses on each of these two items using the
ordinal package in R (version 3.6.3), with partner condition as the predictor, while
allowing the intercept to vary across participants. As intended, participants did not
perceive significantly different level of similarity among the good (M=4.22, SD=1.39),
bad (M=4.10, SD=1.35), and neutral avatar (M=4.18, SD=1.33), χ2(2)=0.521, p=.771.
Participants’ perceived knowledge of the avatars did vary significantly as a function of
our manipulation, χ2(2)=8.642, p=.013. Compared to the neutral partner (M=2.50,
SD=1.21), participants reported knowing the good partner better (M=2.92, SD=1.41),
b=0.964, SE=0.332, z=2.905, p=.004, but not the bad partner (M=2.68, SD=1.16),
b=0.461, SE=0.322, z=2.9051.432, p=.152.
Next, participants’ liking of the avatars was assessed by fitting a linear-mixed model to
their aggregated social preferences and trait perceptions of the avatars, which were
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calculated by averaging the ratings across the corresponding items as in the previous
studies. Again, the partner condition was entered as the predictor and the intercept was
allowed to vary across participants. Participants showed significantly different social
preferences of the avatars, F(2, 146)=3.20, p=.044. Specifically, participants preferred the
good avatar (M=3.84, SD=1.09) over the neutral avatar (M=3.57, SD=1.11), b=0.270,
SE=0.117, t(146)=2.31, p=.022 , whereas preference for the bad avatar (M=3.60,
SD=0.95) did not differ significantly from that of the neutral avatar, b=0.030, SE=0.117,
t(146)=0.26, p=.795. Participants’ trait perceptions of the good (M=4.31, SD=1.03), bad
(M=4.28, SD=0.94), and neutral avatars (M=4.32, SD=.95) did not significantly differ
from each other, F(2, 146)=0.76, p=.927. These findings suggest that our manipulation
was successful in inducing different levels of liking towards the different avatars, as
measured by the social preferences items.

3.4.3

Risk-taking measures: scale reliability and factor analysis

Several different measures of risk-taking were included in this study. Some of these
measures evaluate different aspects of risk taking (e.g., behavioural measures versus the
self-reported BIS/BAS sensitivity) whereas others assess theoretically similar or
overlapped concepts (e.g., the BIS/BAS scales and the SPSRQ). We therefore decided to
use the common factors extracted from these measures, instead of all the individual
measures, as indicators of participants’ risk taking. We first examined the reliability of
the self-reported scales and any subscales. A factor analysis was then conducted to
extract common factors of the different measures. Lastly, factor scores were stored to
represent the distinct aspects of participants’ risk taking, which were subsequently used
in models that test our hypotheses as described in the next section.
Among the 74 participants included for data analysis, 3 failed the attention check item
imbedded in the BIS/BAS scales7, 1 failed the attention check item imbedded in the

7

“Please select "Somewhat agree" for this item.”
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ECR-S scale8. These participants’ responses on the specific scale for which they failed
attention check were coded as missing. No one failed the attention check item in the
SPSRQ scale9.
For the BIS/BAS scales, the BIS subscale (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.76) demonstrated
adequate internal consistency. In comparison, only one of the three BAS-related
subscales, BAS Drive (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.77), showed good internal consistency
whereas the other two, BAS Reward (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.63) and BAS Fun Seeking
(Cronbach’s Alpha=0.68), showed inadequate consistency. Further examination on the
scale items using an Exploratory Factor Analysis with promax rotation revealed that the
items on the BIS subscale, the BAS Drive subscale, and the BAS Fun Seeking subscale
all loaded on their respective scales. Items on the BAS Reward Responsiveness subscale,
however, split between BAS Drive subscale and BAS Fun Seeking subscale10. As a
result, we grouped these items into the BAS Drive and BAS Fun Seeking items,
respectively, instead of treating them as a separate subscale. The revised BAS Drive
subscale (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.78) and BAS Fun seeking subscale (Cronbach’s
Alpha=0.72) showed adequate internal consistency. Finally, we calculated participants
scores on the BIS subscale, BAS Drive subscale, and BAS Fun Seeking subscale by
averaging their ratings cross the corresponding items.
Both the Sensitivity to Punishment (SP) subscale (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.83) and the
Sensitivity to Reward (SR) subscale (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.76) on the SPSRQ achieved
adequate-to-good internal consistency; participants ratings on the SP and SR subscales
were thus summed, respectively, to obtain their Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity

8

“Please respond to this item by selecting "4" (Neither agree nor disagree).”

9

“The University of Western Ontario is located in Canada. Yes=1, No=0”

10

Items “when I get something I want, I feel excited and energized” and “when I see an opportunity for
something I like, I get excited right away” loaded on the BAS Drive factor; items “when I’m doing well at
something, I love to keep at it”, “when good things happen to me, it affects me strongly”, and “it would
excite me to win a contest” loaded on the BAS Fun Seeking factor.
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to Reward scores. The ECR-S scale also achieved an acceptable level of internal
consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.70); participants ratings on the ECR-S scale were thus
averaged to obtain their ECR scores.
We then proceeded to extract common factors from the different risk measures, including
BART, CCT, BIS subscale, BAS- Drive subscale, BAS- Fun seeking subscale, SP
subscale, SR subscale, and the ECR-S scale. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin factor adequacy
(KMO=0.53) suggested that these measures meet the minimal standard for acceptable
sampling adequacy (Dziuban & Shirkey, 1974). To extract common factors from the
measures, a parallel analysis using principal axis method was carried to determine the
number of factors to extract. The parallel analysis suggested three factors, which were
consistent with the number of factors with eigen values greater than 1.0. A factor analysis
was subsequently conducted to extract three factors. Promax rotation was used to allow
the factors to correlate with each other, as all the measures are assessing aspects of the
same umbrella term – risk taking. Table 1 presents the factor loadings and correlations
among the extracted factors. Together, the three factors explained 49.8% of the variance
in the data.
The factor loadings were consistent with the theoretical reasoning behind the measures.
The BIS subscale and the SP subscale both loaded positively on the first factor, whereas
the ECR-S loaded negatively on this factor. Higher SP and BIS scores reflected
individuals’ greater motivation to avoid potential punishment, whereas higher ECR-S
scores reflect a more secure attachment style and thus lower motivation to avoid
interpersonal rejection. The first factor was thus named Punishment Avoidance. The BAS
Drive and the SR subscale both assess participants’ motivation to seek out and approach
potential reward and loaded on the second factor, which was named Reward Approach.
The two behavioural measures loaded on the third factor, which was named Behavioral
Risk. Interestingly, the BAS Fun Seeking subscale loaded both on the Reward Approach
factor and the Behavioural Risk factors, with a slightly heavier loading on the latter. This
was reasonable, as the BAS Funk Seeking subscale contains both items that focused on
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individuals’ tendency to seek novelty and potential reward (e.g., “I’m always willing to
try something new if I think it will be fun”), which underlies the Reward Approach
factor, as well as items that might be assessing participants’ impulsivity (e.g., “I often act
on the spur of the moment”) and sensation seeking (e.g., “I crave excitement and new
sensations”), which have been shown to positively related to risk taking tendency as
measured in the BART (e.g., Bornovalova et al., 2009; Lauriola, Panno, Levin, & Lejuez,
2014; Lejuez et al., 2002). Factor scores for these three factors, Punishment Avoidance,
Reward Approach, and Behavioural Risk, calculated based on Thurstone’s regression
method (Thurstone, 1934), were stored and subsequently used as indicators of
participants’ risk taking in the predictive models described in the next section.
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Table 2 Experiment 6 Factor Loadings for the Risk Measures
Factor 1
(Punishment
Avoidance)

Factor 2
(Reward
Approach)

Factor 3
(Behavioural
Risk)

0.038
0.173
0.662
-0.048
-0.110
1.017
0.080
-0.330

-0.267
-0.021
0.125
0.875
0.346
-0.059
0.518
0.080

0.682
0.602
0.011
-0.216
0.364
0.078
0.091
0.282

-0.136
-0.378

0.443

-

Factor Loadings
BART
CCT
BIS subscale
BAS Drive subscale
BAS Fun Seeking subscale
SP subscale
SR subscale
ECR-S
Factor Correlations
Factor 1 (Punishment Avoidance)
Factor 2 (Reward Approach)
Factor 3 (Behavioural Risk)

Note. Bolded values are factor loadings higher than 0.30. BART= Balloon Analogue
Risk Task; CCT= Columbia Card Task; BIS subscale= the Behavioral Inhibition
System subscale in the BIS/BAS scales; BAS Drive subscale = the Behavioural
Activation System Drive subscale in the BIS/BAS scales (revised); BAS Fun Seeking
subscale = the Behavioural Activation System Fun Seeking subscale in the BIS/BAS
scales (revised);SP subscale= the Sensitivity to Punishment subscale in the SPSRQ; SR
subscale= the Sensitivity to Reward subscale in the SPSRQ; ECR-S= the Experiences
in Close Relationship Scale- Short form.
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3.4.4

Liking, risk-taking, and self-disclosures

To properly test my hypotheses, two-level linear-mixed models should be used to
examine whether (1) at the within-subject level, greater liking led to greater selfdisclosures to the avatars (level-1 effect); (2) at the between-subject level, greater risktaking tendency led to greater overall self-disclosure (level-2 effect); (3) there was an
interaction between BIS/BAS and liking on self-disclosure to the avatars (cross-level
interaction effect). However, because the data collection was ended prematurely, our
actual sample size was considerably smaller than planned. Insufficient level-2 clusters
(i.e., number of participants in this study) can lead to an elevated nonconvergence rate for
linear-mixed models (Maas & Hox, 2005) as well as a decreased statistical power to
detect effects, especially for cross-level interactions (Arend & Schäfer, 2019). Therefore,
to maximize power, I used random-intercept-only models instead of allowing level-1
effects to vary across individual participants (i.e., random slopes) (Matuschek et al.,
2017) and subsequently refrained from testing any cross-level interaction effects between
BIS/BAS sensitivity and liking. We will resume the data collection process once the
situation allows and test for interaction effects when adequate data become available.
Following the step-wise approach to model building proposed in Hox (2010) (p56-59), an
intercept-only model was first analyzed, allowing the examination of the Intraclass
Correlation (ICC) of the self-disclosure data. Next, the level-1 predictors were included
in the model to examine the contribution of the level-1 factors, or avatar-level
differences, in predicting participants’ self-disclosures. For the level-1 predictors, I
included participants’ social preferences of the avatars as the indicator for their liking of
the avatars. I also included their perceived knowledge and perceived similarity as two
additional level-1 predictors to examine whether liking predicts self-disclosures after
controlling for these two factors. Finally, the level-2 predictors were included in the
model to examine how participant-level individual differences predict participants’ selfdisclosures. In addition to the three risk-taking factors extracted from the risk-taking
measures, as described in the last section, I also included participants’ gender and age as
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level-2 predictors to control for the effects of these two factors. All the predictor
variables were grand-mean centered to assist the interpretation of the results, with the
exception of the risk factor scores which were already standardized scores. Each later
model was compared with the previous to examine whether including the additional
predictors improved the model fit. To enable model comparison, I only included
participants with complete data on all the variables included in the models (N=68): the
four participants who failed any of the attention check imbedded in the questionnaire
measures were excluded; two additional participants were excluded for missing gender
information. This model building process was repeated for the three self-disclosure
measures included in the current study, namely, participant’s number of self-disclosures
to each avatar, their proportion of deep self-disclosures to each avatar, and the number of
extra self-disclosures that they made to each avatar.
I first examined the effects of the predictors on the number of self-disclosures that
participants made to the avatars. See Table 2 for the coefficients and their significance
level across three models. The intercept in Model 0 suggested that participants on average
self-disclosed 9 statements to the avatars. Furthermore, the variance in subject-level
intercept was very large in comparison to the residual error, resulting in an ICC of 0.8111,
which suggested that 81% of the variance in the participants’ number of self-disclosures
to the avatars could be traced to subject-level differences. It was thus not surprising that
none of the within-subject level-1 factor significantly predicted the number of selfdisclosures. In addition, participants’ number of self-disclosures did not seem to be
predicted by the risk-taking factors or their age or gender. Comparing the model deviance
revealed that adding in the level-1 predictors did not improve the fit beyond the interceptonly model, χ2(3)=2.54, p=.468; nor did adding in the level-2 predictors improve the fit
beyond that with level-1 predictors only, χ2(5)=6.95, p=.224.

11

ICC= Subject-level variance / (Subject-level variance + residual error variance) (Hox, 2010)
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Table 3 Experiment 6 Model Comparisons for Number of Self-Disclosures
M0: intercept
only
Fixed Part

Random Part

Deviance

Intercept

M1: level-1
predictors only

M2: all
predictors

9.004(0.33)*** 9.011(0.33)*** 9.065(0.34)***

Social Preferences

-0.179(0.20)

-0.248(0.20)

Perceived Knowledge

-0.067(0.13)

0.095(0.13)

Perceived Similarity

-0.060(0.11)

-0.042(0.12)

Punishment Avoidance

0.146(0.34)

Reward Approach

0.574(0.39)

Behavioural Risk

-0.538(0.42)

Gender

-0.358(0.68)

Age

0.071(0.15)

Subject-level variance

6.779(2.60)

7.033(2.65)

6.916(2.63)

Residual errors

1.598(1.26)

1.577(1.26)

1.571(1.25)

851.66

849.13

842.18

Note. *: significant at p=.05 level; **: significant at p=.01 level; ***: significant at
p=.001 level

78

Next, we examined effects of the predictors on the proportion of deep self-disclosures
that participants made to each avatar. As shown in Table 3, the intercept-only model
suggested that, on average, 45% of the statements that participants chose to self-disclose
to the avatars were on the high-depth topics. The subject-level variance in the intercept
was still relatively large compared to the variance of the residual, resulting in an ICC of
0.66, which suggested that 66% of the variance in participants’ proportions of deep selfdisclosures was at the subject level. Including the level-1 predictors significantly
improved the model fit, χ2(3)=10.40, p=.015. Model 1 results suggested that, as we
hypothesized, greater preference for an avatar predicted a higher proportion of deep selfdisclosures, b=0.033, SE=0.014, t(194.83)=2.807, p=.006. Specifically, when holding
other variables else constant, an increase of one point on participants’ social preference
rating for an avatar was associated about 3% increase in the proportion of deep selfdisclosures to that avatar. Interestingly and surprisingly, perceived similarity also
significantly predicted the proportion of deep self-disclosures to the avatar, but in the
opposite direction, b=-0.020, SE=0.007, t(177.80)= -2.904, p=.004. Including the level-2
predictors further improved the model fit, χ2(5)=11.08, p=.050. Here, the only risk-taking
factor that significantly predicted participants’ proportions of deep self-disclosures was
their scores on the Behavioural Risk factor. Again, surprisingly and opposite to our
prediction, higher scores on Behavioural Risk propensity negatively predicted the
proportion of the deep self-disclosures, b=-0.045, SE=0.018, t(61.93)=-2.589, p=.012. As
the factor scores were standardized, the coefficient for Behavioural Risk propensity
suggested that with each 1 standard deviation increase in Behavioural Risk propensity,
participants’ mean proportion of deep disclosures to the avatars would decrease by 4.5%.
In other words, the higher participants were in risk taking as represented by their scores
on the Behavioural Risk factor, the more superficially they self-disclosed to the avatars.
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Table 4 Experiment 6 Model Comparisons for Proportion of Deep Self-Disclosures
M0: intercept
only
Fixed Part

Intercept

Deviance

M2: all
predictors

0.454(0.01)*** 0.453(0.01)***

0.456(0.01)***

Social Preferences

0.033(0.01)**

0.033(0.01)**

Perceived Knowledge

0.0004(0.01)

0.001(0.01)

-0.019(0.01)**

-0.020(0.01)**

Perceived Similarity

Random Part

M1: level-1
predictors only

Punishment Avoidance

0.017(0.01)

Reward Approach

-0.030(0.02)

Behavioural Risk

-0.045(0.02)*

Gender

-0.035(0.03)

Age

-0.005(0.01)

Subject-level variance

0.013(0.11)

0.012(0.11)

0.011(0.10)

Residual errors

0.006(0.08)

0.006(0.08)

0.006(0.08)

-321.39

-331.79

-342.87

Note. *: significant at p=.05 level; **: significant at p=.01 level; ***: significant at
p=.001 level
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Finally, we examined the effects of the predictors on the number of extra self-disclosures
that the participants chose to type in the open-ended textbox for any of the avatars. The
ICC of the responses was 0.77, suggesting that 77% of the variance in the number of
extra self-disclosures resulted from between-subject differences. As can be seen in Table
4, none of the level-1 or level-2 predictors significantly influenced this outcome variable.
Including the level-1 factors in the model did not improve model fit beyond the interceptonly model, χ2(3)=5.72, p=.126, nor did including the level-2 factors improve the fit over
the model with only level-1 predictors, χ2(5)=3.64, p=.603.
Table 5 Experiment 6 Model Comparison for Number of Extra Self-Disclosures
M0: intercept
only
Fixed Part

Random Part

Deviance

Intercept

M1: level-1
predictors only

M2: all
predictors

0.299(0.05)*** 0.296(0.05)*** 0.315(0.05)***

Social Preferences

0.047(0.03)

0.038(0.04)

Perceived Knowledge

0.031(0.02)

0.036(0.02)

Perceived Similarity

-0.035(0.20)

-0.034(0.02)

Punishment Avoidance

0.006(0.05)

Reward Approach

0.023(0.060)

Behavioural Risk

-0.023(0.06)

Gender

-0.173(0.10)

Age

0.002(0.02)

Subject-level variance
(in intercept)

0.163(0.40)

0.155(0.39)

0.160(0.40)

Residual errors

0.049(0.22)

0.049(0.22)

0.049(0.22)

125.02

120.02

116.38

Note. *: significant at p=.05 level; **: significant at p=.01 level; ***: significant at
p=.001 level
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3.5 Discussion
In Experiment 7, we examined how participants’ self-disclosures to different social
partners were influenced by their liking of these partners and their own risk-taking
tendencies. We found some support for Effect 2 in Collins and Miller (1994).
Specifically, participants’ social preferences for the avatars significantly and positively
predicted the proportion of deep self-disclosures that they chose to share with the avatars.
Increased liking of the avatars, however, did not predict the number of self-disclosures
they chose to share or the number of extra self-disclosures that they made to the avatars.
Thus, contrary to prediction, participants’ risk-taking tendencies, as represented by their
scores on the Behavioural Risk propensity, negatively predicted their proportions of deep
self-disclosures to the avatars. Again, this effect was not observed on the total number of
self-disclosures or the number of extra self-disclosures. Another surprising finding was
that perceived similarity also negatively predicted the proportion of deep self-disclosures.
Participants perceived knowledge of the avatars, their age and gender, and their scores on
the Reward Sensitivity and Punishment Sensitivity factors did not significantly influence
participants’ self-disclosures.
Before discussing these results, I wish to remind readers that the present sample was
considerably smaller than planned and this might have resulted in various issues
regarding the results. First, because of the sample size limitation, there might have not
been adequate power to detect some effects, especially second-level effects. On the other
hand, the small sample size, as well as the random-intercpt-only models used in
analyzing the data, might have led to Type I errors such that the significant effects that
we did find might not reflect effects that truly exist (Matuschek, Kliegl, Vasishth,
Baayen, & Bates, 2017). Furthermore, because we refrained from testing any cross-level
interactions, we do not have information regarding how these effects interact with each
other, which might alter our interpretations of the results.
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With these precautions in mind, are there possible mechanisms that might explain why
participants self-disclosed more superficially when they had higher risk-taking
tendencies, or perceived an avatar to be more similar to themselves? One possibility is
that those who scored high on the Behavioral Risk propensity might perceive a lower
general risk of being rejected by another person. As risk perceptions are frequently found
to be negatively associated with risk-taking decisions (Mills et al., 2008; Ryb et al.,
2006), higher scores on the Behavioural Risk propensity might reflect a general low
perception of risk. Thus, these participants might not experience as strong of a need to
signal their liking and interest in affiliation by using deep self-disclosures, compared to
those who are low on risk-taking and perceive a greater risk of rejection. That is, these
participants may worry less about a particular individual declining to reciprocate a
friendship. Similarly, participants who perceived the partner as more similar to
themselves might expect a greater friendship intention from the partner, as we found in
the previous experiments. As a result, they might also expect the social partner to accept
them, reducing their need to use deep self-disclosures to convey their liking to the other.
Another possibility has to do with the specific self-disclosure statements used in the
experiment. Consistently with social penetration theories, the high self-disclosure items
used in our experiments consisted of topics such as values and core beliefs (e.g., best
quality in a friend; most valued thing in life), which might have been viewed as abstract
and serious by the participants. In comparison, the low self-disclosure items were
consisted of topics that might be considered as less abstract, and thus, potentially more
fun (e.g., places to travel to; hobby to pick up; favorite food). Considering that
participants’ scores on the BAS- Fun Seeking subscale also loaded on the Behavioural
Risk factor, it was possible that a high score on this factor also reflected participants’
sensation seeking and desire for excitement. Thus, these participants might have selfdisclosed more superficially simply because these statements were considered as more
fun than the statements consisting of deeper self-disclosures.
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Without further evidence, both these possibilities discussed here are speculations.
Additional data and replications are needed to provide cummulative evidence for these
ideas, as in Experiments 1 through 5, to enhance our confidence in our conclusions
regarding the role played by one’s liking of a social partner and their risk-taking
tendencies on their self-disclosures to the partner. Further studies are thus needed to
determine whether these surprising patterns can be replicated and what the mechanisms
underlying these surprising patterns might be.
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Chapter 4

4

Experiment 7: Negative Perceptions of a Self-Disclosing AI:
the Potential Role of the Uncanny Valley Effect

Recent years have witnessed increasing involvement of artificially intelligent (AI) agents
and systems in our daily lives. Many such AIs are designed to socially interact with
people in different settings, such as health care and companionship for the elderly
(Robinson et al., 2014), learning and education (Mubin et al., 2013), and mental health
screening (Lucas et al., 2014). Identifying factors that may help or hinder people’s
perceptions of these social AIs is crucial. Such knowledge will help people design AIs in
a way that facilitates positive human-AI relationships and, ultimately, the best utilization
of the services these AIs offer.
Despite the key roles of self-disclosure in typical social relationship development, few
studies have investigated how people perceive a self-disclosing AI, especially one that
discloses some level of similarity to themselves. On the one hand, some researchers have
shown that people follow human social norms when interacting with computers and AIs
(Moon, 2000; Moon & Nass, 1996; Nass & Moon, 2000). People might thus form
positive perceptions of an AI that self-discloses similarity to themselves just as they do
with human partners. One the other hand, an automatic agent that is high in human
realism might induce eerie and unnerving feelings, known as the “uncanny valley” effect
(Mori, 1970). Given that self-disclosing behaviour might be seen as highly human-like,
an AI who self-discloses, especially one that reveals a high level of similarity to oneself
through its self-disclosures, might fall into the uncanny valley and elicit negative
perceptions from the human user. Here, we explored people’s perceptions of a selfdisclosing AI social partner, in comparison to a human partner, with varying degrees of
similarity to oneself.
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4.1 Rationale
To date, the question of how human users respond to an AI’s self-disclosures has
received little attention. There is, however, evidence suggesting that an AI’s selfdisclosures can be used to facilitate users’ social reactions towards it. For example,
people were found to like an AI agent more when it self-disclosed at a deeper rather than
superficial level about itself (Kang & Gratch, 2011). People also disclosed more personal
information to a computer that disclosed to them first than to one that did not (Moon,
2000). An AI that self-disclosed human “back stories” as its own history was preferred
over one that told the same stories as if describing another human (Bickmore et al.,
2009). As we found in the previous studies, people like others who share and disclose a
high level of similarity to themselves. Could self-disclosed similarity from an AI partner
enhance the human user’s positive perceptions and liking of the AI?

4.1.1

Similarity-attraction or the uncanny valley effect?

As described in the previous chapters, people tend to like similar others more than they
do dissimilar others (e.g., Byrne, 1971; Montoya et al., 2008) and perceive more similar
others as socially warmer and more intellectual (Lydon et al., 1988). Some evidence
suggests that the similarity-attraction effect also applies to human-AI interactions (de
Melo et al., 2014; Moon & Nass, 1996; Verberne et al., 2015). For instance, participants
rated a computer that displayed a similar submissive-dominant personality trait to
themselves as friendlier, smarter, and more helpful than a computer that displayed the
opposite trait (Moon & Nass, 1996). People also showed greater trust of a virtual driver
who was more similar to themselves in a driving simulation study (Verberne et al., 2015).
The researchers made the virtual driver look more or less like the participant by morphing
a default digital face with either the participant’s own photo or another person’s photo.
The virtual driver also mimicked the participant’s head movements to different degrees.
The participants reported greater trust to the virtual driver that looked and behaved more
like them. The similarity-attraction effect also emerges when people perceive the AI to be
in the same social category as themselves: participants showed greater trust in and
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allocated more resources to computer agents that appeared as from the same ethnicity
group as themselves (de Melo et al., 2014). Furthermore, people showed in-group bias in
favor of a computer agent when being paired with the agent in an arbitrary group (de
Melo et al., 2014). It is therefore possible that increased self-disclosed similarity from an
AI partner would lead to more positive social outcome in human-AI interactions as it
does in human-human interactions.
However, an AI agent’s greater similarity to human may not always lead people to
perceive it more positively. The “uncanny valley” effect (Mori, 1970) describes a
phenomenon in which people’s sense of familiarity towards a robot initially increases as
people perceive greater similarity to the robot but sharply drops when the agent or robot
becomes too human-like. Mori (1970) argues that people would experience a sudden loss
of familiarity when they notice the subtle differences between a human-like agent and a
real human, which induce unnerving and eerie feelings towards the agent. The uncanny
valley effect has been observed in a considerable number of empirical studies (e.g.,
Ferrari, Paladino, & Jetten, 2016; Kätsyri, Förger, Mäkäräinen, & Takala, 2015; Mitchell
et al., 2011; Tinwell, Grimshaw, Nabi, & Williams, 2011). The exact nature of the
uncanny valley effect (Bartneck et al., 2007) and the conditions necessary to create it
(e.g., MacDorman, 2006) are still cause for debate. Some researchers suggested that the
uncanny valley might be a result of inconsistency of human realism such as different
levels of human-likeness in facial features (K. F. MacDorman & Chattopadhyay, 2016;
Seyama & Nagayama, 2007) and audio-visual asynchrony (Tinwell et al., 2015). Others
have provided a higher-level explanation for the uncanny valley and suggested that it
raises from a blurred distinction between human and machines and a perceived threat to
human uniqueness (Ferrari et al., 2016).
Interestingly, even though most empirical studies on the uncanny valley effect have
focused on agents’ physical appearance (e.g., MacDorman & Chattopadhyay, 2016;
Seyama & Nagayama, 2007) or movement (e.g., Saygin, Chaminade, Ishiguro, Driver, &
Frith, 2012), some recent work suggests that if an agent appears too human-like in its
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mental capacities, it may also induce such uncanny and eerie feelings (K. Gray &
Wegner, 2012; Stein & Ohler, 2017). Following the reasoning of the uncanny valley
effect, self-disclosed similarity from an AI might potentially lead to negative reactions of
the human user to the AI.

4.1.2

Perceptions, dehumanization, and anthropomorphism

One key variable in the uncanny valley effect is how human-like an agent appears to be,
which is frequently termed “anthropomorphism” in the human-AI interaction literature.
Anthropomorphism refers to people’s tendency to attribute human characteristics,
intentions, and motivations to non-human objects (Epley et al., 2007). It is important to
differentiate between anthropomorphic features and anthropomorphism: the former
refers to the agents’ objective human-like features, such as facial appearance and
movements, whereas the later describes the subjective experience of the user and how
they personally view the agent as human-like. While anthropomorphic features may lead
to anthropomorphism (e.g., Hegel, Krach, Kircher, Wrede, & Sagerer, 2008; Mitchell et
al., 2011), the extent to which people “humanize” an agent is also heavily influenced by
social-cognitive processes. For example, people are more likely to anthropomorphize a
non-human object or animal when they are socially motivated (Epley et al., 2007).
Dehumanization occurs when people deny a target human attributes, which may be
viewed as the converse of anthropomorphism (Haslam, 2006). Specifically, Haslam
(2006) articulated two types of dehumanization, animalistic dehumanization and
mechanistic dehumanization. Haslam suggested that if others are denied “Human
Uniqueness” such as civility, refinement, and moral sensibility, they are viewed like
animals, whereas when they are denied “Human Nature” such as emotional
responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, and individuality and agency, they are often
viewed like machines. We therefore argue that, because of the unpleasant and eerie
feelings experienced in the uncanny valley effect, people might view the agent as lacking
interpersonal warmth, leading to decreased social motivation to interact with it. As a
result, the agent might be dehumanized, or less anthropomorphized, and viewed as more
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machine-like, even though its anthropomorphic features and human-likeness trigger the
uncanny and unpleasant feelings in the first place.

4.2 Overview of the current experiment
In this experiment, we were interested in exploring people’s perceptions and liking of a
self-disclosing AI social partner, compared to a human partner, with different levels of
similarity to themselves. We manipulated the AI’s self-disclosed similarity through a
conversational virtual human and measured participants’ perceptions of it. Moreover, to
compare participants’ perceptions of an AI versus another human partner, half of the
participants were made to believe that the virtual human was an AI while the rest
believed that it was controlled by another human. In this way, we independently
manipulated the partner’s self-disclosed similarity to the participants, as well as the
perceived identity of the partner.
We measured participants’ social perceptions of their partner, including how warm and
competent they perceived their partner to be (Fiske et al., 2007), as well as how much
they attributed the capability to experience feelings and exhibit agency (H. M. Gray et al.,
2014), both considered characteristics that separate humans from machines (Haslam,
2006). Participants also reported how much they see their partner as a machine versus a
human, or their level of anthropomorphism of their partner (Bartneck et al., 2009). In
addition, participants self-reported their liking of and perceived rapport with their partner.
Finally, we included two behavioral measures, the length of the conversation between the
participant and the virtual human and participants’ facial expressions during the
conversation, to provide some validation to our self-report measures.

4.3 Hypotheses
We anticipated a main effect of partner identity, such that the human partner would be
perceived as warmer, more competent, more capable to experience feelings and exhibit
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agency, and more human-like than the AI partner. We also expected people to like the
human partner more than the AI partner.
As to the effect of self-disclosed similarity, the similarity-attraction effect and the
uncanny valley effect would generate different predictions. Specifically, the similarityattraction effect would suggest a main effect of similarity, such that greater self-disclosed
similarity would be associated with more positive perceptions and greater likings for both
the human and the AI partner. In contrast, the uncanny valley effect would suggest an
interaction between partner identity and self-disclosed similarity. Because increased
similarity would lead to more positive outcome in human-human interaction but more
negative outcome in human-AI interaction, participants would favor the human partner
over the AI partner to the greatest extent in the high similarity, followed by the medium
similarity, and least in the low similarity condition.

4.4 Method and materials
4.4.1

Participants

A total of 195 participants (74 Male, 119 Female, 2 declined to state) were recruited from
the Los Angeles area. Sixty of the participants were recruited online via Craigslist and the
remaining participants were recruited in a university in Los Angeles. Informed consent
was obtained from all participants. Study sessions were conducted in a laboratory setting.

4.4.2

Procedure

Each participant had a conversation with a virtual human named Julie (Artstein et al.,
2016) displayed on a 30-inch computer monitor in an individual lab room. To manipulate
the perceived identity of their conversation partner, half the participants (randomly
selected) were told that Julie was remotely controlled by another person in a different
room, while the rest were told that Julie was an AI agent controlling its own behaviours
(i.e., Partner Identity: Human vs. AI). In fact, Julie was always remotely controlled by me
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through a “Wizard of Oz” style system (Artstein et al., 2016). I observed participants
from a different room via real-time video streaming and interacted with them using the
“Wizard of Oz” control panel (Figure 4-1). Specifically, I was able to control Julie’s
verbal responses by clicking pre-selected options on the control panel. Figure 4-1 shows a
screenshot of Julie and the control panel that generated Julie’s verbal responses.

Figure 4-1 A screen shot of Julie (right; Artstein et al., 2016) and the “Wizard of Oz”
control panel used in Experiment 7 (left).

During the conversation, Julie asked the participant 16 multiple-choice questions about
their attitudes and preferences on various topics. These questions were selected from the
40 multiple-choice questions that we used in the previous experiments. Half these
questions were relatively superficial (e.g., “What is your favorite cuisine: Italian,
Japanese, Chinese, or Mexican?”) while the remaining were relatively personal (e.g.,
“Which of these things is most stressful to you: working, thinking about future, social
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conflict, or unplanned events?”). To make the conversation seem naturalistic, Julie asked
the questions in a gradually more personal manner (Moon, 2000). The question order was
thus fixed for all participants.
Upon receiving the participant’s response to a question, Julie provided a positive
validation to their answer (e.g., “Italian dishes are delicious!”) before giving the
participant its own answer and a justification for the answer (e.g., “Japanese is my
favorite. Japanese food always looks pretty and tastes fresh! ”). Julie then asked the
participant to elaborate on their answer to that question (e.g., “What are the things you
like about Italian food?”) and moved on the next question. The entire conversation
usually lasted 10 to 15 minutes.
To manipulate the similarity between Julie and the participants, we varied the number of
questions in which Julie’s answer was the same as a participant’s own choice. For
participants in the high-similarity condition, Julie’s answer was the same as their own for
12 out of the 16 questions. Julie’s answer was the same as the participant’s own for 8 of
16 questions in the medium-similarity condition and 4 out of 16 questions in the lowsimilarity condition. We randomized the specific questions for which Julie provided the
same versus different answers across participants, as well as the specific answer that Julie
provided when its answer differed from the participant’s12.
After the conversation, participants completed the manipulation checks and the
dependent measures in the same room on a laptop. The entire session was video recorded
to obtain participants’ facial expression data during the conversation with Julie.

12

A master sheet that contains the randomized trials and answers was generated using this python code:
https://github.com/yixian625/research/blob/master/trial%20numbers%20and%20answers%20generator_AI
%20self-disclosure%20project.py. The experimenter followed the master sheet to determine how to
respond to each participant in each trial.
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4.4.3
4.4.3.1

Measures
Manipulation checks

Two items were used to check the effectiveness of the manipulations. Participants were
asked to indicate whether they thought Julie’s behaviours were controlled by a human or
an AI. Those who failed this check were subsequently removed from all the data
analyses. Participants were also asked to rate how much they thought they and their
partner were alike on a scale of 1(“Very much different”) to 7(“Very much alike”).

4.4.3.2

Warmth and competence scale

Participants’ perceptions of their partner’s warmth and competence were measured using
items modified from Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu (2002). They rated the following
attributes in reference to their conversation partner on a 7-point scale (1 “Not at all” to 7
“Very much”): sociable, likable, good-natured, tolerant, friendly, sincere, trustworthy,
well-intentioned, pleasant, and warm (Warmth items); organized, confident, capable,
efficient, independent, competent, expert, competitive, skillful, and intelligent
(Competence items).

4.4.3.3

Mind perception scale

Participants reported mind perceptions of their partners on two dimensions, the
experience dimension (MP-E) and the agency dimension (MP-A), using the Mind
Perception Scale (H. M. Gray et al., 2014). The MP-E dimension reflects how much the
participants perceived their conversation partner to be able to experience feelings and
emotions, whereas the MP-A dimension reflects how much they perceived the partner to
be able to think and act (H. M. Gray et al., 2014). Participants rated on a 7-point scale (1
“Not at all” to 7 “Very much”) how much their partner appeared to be capable of
experiencing the following: hunger, joy, fear, pain, pleasure, rage, desire, personality,
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consciousness, pride, and embarrassment (the MP-E items); self-control, morality,
memory, emotion recognition, planning, communication, and thought (the MP-A items).

4.4.3.4

Anthropomorphism scale

To assess how much participants perceived their conversation partner as human-like,
participants filled out the Anthropomorphism subscale of the Godspeed Questionnaires
(Bartneck et al., 2009). Participants rated their impressions of the conversation partner on
the following pairs of attributes: Artificial versus Lifelike, Fake versus Natural,
Unconscious versus Conscious, Moving Rigidly versus Moving Elegantly, Machine Like
versus Human Like, with each attribute of a pair appeared on one end of a 7-point scale.

4.4.3.5

Liking and rapport scale

Participants reported their liking of and rapport with their conversation partner on 9
questions adapted from Gratch, Wang, Gerten, Fast, and Duffy (2009). They rated their
liking and trust towards their conversation partner as well as their enjoyment of the
interaction on a 7-point scale (1 “Not at all” to 7 “Very much”). Sample items include
“How much did you like your interaction partner?”, “How much did you enjoy the
interaction?”, and “How much rapport did you feel with your interaction partner?”.

4.4.3.6

Conversation length

We extracted the length of the conversation from the session video recorded for each
participant. It was assumed that participants would engage in longer conversations with
Julie if they were enjoying the interaction more.

4.4.3.7

Facial action unit activities

We analyzed participants’ facial expressions captured in the session videos (29.97
frames/second) during their conversation with Julie. We used iMotion’s Emotient
FACET module (iMotions, 2016) and focused on three Action Units (AU) defined in the
Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman & Rosenberg,
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1997): evidence for AU4 Brow Lowerer/Frowning, AU6 Cheek Raiser, and AU12 Lip
Corner Puller were analyzed13. AU6 and AU12 are commonly considered as indicators of
smiling and have been found to correlate with self-reported happiness (Ekman et al.,
1980). AU4 has frequently been used in coding negative emotions such as anger, fear,
and sadness (e.g., Ekman & Rosenberg, 1997; iMotions, 2016). We expected that
participants who enjoyed interacting with Julie more would show greater activity in AU6
and AU12 and less activity in AU4 during the conversation.

4.5 Results
We excluded 40 participants from the subsequent data analyses for failing the partner
identity manipulation check. The remaining 155 participants (96 female, 57 male)
consisted of 67 (43%) White, 16 (10%) people of African descent, 36 (23%) Asian, and
36 (23%) Other or Mixed ethnicity individuals. Most participants (74%) fell into the 1824 age group and the oldest participant fell into the 65-74 age group. One participant did
not consent to any use of their video data so those data were subsequently excluded from
analyses of conversation length and facial expressions.
All the dependent variables were subject to a 3 (Similarity: High vs. Medium vs. Low) X
2 (Partner Identity: Human X AI) ANOVA. See the Appendix C for the detailed
ANOVA results on all the measures.

13

The AU activity values generated by FACET are similar to z-scores such that the positive values indicate
presence of an AU activity and negative values indicated absence of an activity. As it is not readily
interpretable how different negative values reflect different degrees of absence, we recoded all negative
values into 0 before analyzing the AU activity.

95

4.5.1

Experimenter bias check

To check for potential experimenter bias, the number of responses that Julie gave to each
participant was extracted from the session log files. An ANOVA on the number of
responses did not yield any significant partner or similarity main effects or interactions,
suggesting that Julie’s responses to participants were relatively consistent across
conditions.

4.5.2

Similarity manipulation check

An ANOVA on the similarity manipulation check item revealed a significant main effect
of similarity, F(2, 149)=8.61, p<.001, η2=.104. Participants in the High Similarity
condition (M=5.02, SD=1.38) rated their conversation partner as more similar to
themselves than did those in the Medium Similarity condition (M=4.22, SD=1.40) and the
Low Similarity condition (M=3.93, SD=1.39). No other significant effects were found on
this item. This finding suggests that our similarity manipulation was successful.

4.5.3

Warmth and competence scale

We first conducted a factor analysis on all the items to examine whether they load on
their respective Warmth and Competence subscales. Principle Component Analysis and
Promax Rotation were used, allowing the extracted factors to correlate with each other
(Osborne et al., 2008). Two positively correlated (r=.643) factors were extracted from the
data, with all the Warmth items loading on one and all the Competence items loading on
the other. We thus calculated the aggregated means for the Warmth items and the
Competence items respectively. An ANOVA test on the mean Warmth scores did not
find significant main effect of Similarity or Partner Identity. However, a significant
Similarity X Partner Identity interaction effect was found, F(2, 149)=4.38, p=.014,
η2=.056. Specifically, pair-wise comparisons suggested that the human partner was rated
(M=5.54, SD=0.85) as significantly warmer than the AI partner (M=4.64, SD=1.46) in the
Medium Similarity condition; the difference was not significant in the other two
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Similarity conditions (Figure 4-1a). See the Appendix C for the mean and SD for each
cell and the significant levels for the pair-wise comparisons for all dependent measures
An ANOVA on the Competence scores found no significant main effects for Similarity
or Partner Identity. Even though the overall interaction effect was not statistically
significant, F(2, 149)=2.32, p=.102, η2=.030, pair-wise comparisons showed the same
pattern where the human partner (M=4.96, SD=0.90) was perceived as significantly more
competent than the AI partner (M=4.20, SD=1.57) (Figure 4-1b).
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Figure 4-2 Bar plots for participants’ ratings on the partner’s perceived warmth (a)
and perceived competence (b) in Experiment 7. The dots represent the individual
data points. Error bars represent 95% CI.

4.5.4

Mind perception scale

We conducted a factor analysis on the Mind Perception Scale items to examine whether
the MP-A and MP-E items loaded on their corresponding factors. Principle Component
Analysis and Promax Rotation extracted two factors. Most items loaded on their
corresponding factors with two exceptions: although Personality and Consciousness were
theorized as MP-E attributes (H. M. Gray et al., 2014), they loaded instead with the other
MP-A items (Personality loading=.56; Consciousness loading=.71) in our data. As
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Personality and Consciousness could also be viewed as reflecting one’s abilities to act
and think, we subsequently considered them as MP-A items. The two extracted factors
correlated highly with each other (r=.640), suggesting that the conversation partner’s
perceived ability to experience feelings and emotions go hand in hand with their
perceived ability to think and act.
The aggregated mean scores for MP-A and MP-E were calculated respectively to
examine any effects of our manipulations. An ANOVA on the mean MP-A scores
revealed a significant Similarity X Partner Identity interaction, F(2, 149)= 4.14, p=.018,
η2=.053 (Figure 4-2a), and no significant main effect of Similarity or Partner Identity.
Pairwise comparisons found that the human partner was perceived (M=4.78, SD=0.90) to
be significantly more capable of thinking and acting than the AI partner (M=3.64,
SD=1.43) in the Medium Similarity condition, but not in the other two Similarity
conditions.
An ANOVA on mean MP-E scores also revealed a significant Similarity X Partner
Identity interaction effect, F(2,149)=3.67, p=.028, η2=.047, with the same pattern where
the human partner (M=3.14, SD=1.05) was perceived as more capable of experiencing
feelings and emotions than the AI partner (M=2.21, SD=1.26), but only in the Medium
Similarity condition (Figure 4-2b). No significant main effects were found.
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Figure 4-3. Box plots for participants’ ratings on the partner’s Mind Perception- Agency
dimension (a) and Mind Perception- Experience dimension (b) in Experiment 7. The dots
represent the individual data points. Error bars represent 95%.

4.5.5

Anthropomorphism scale

The Anthropomorphism Scale items showed a high scale reliability, Cronbach’s Alpha
=.880. An ANOVA on the aggregated mean scores of Anthropomorphism found a
borderline significant effect for the Similarity X Partner Identity interaction, F(2, 149)=
2.83, p=.062, η2=.037. As above, pair-wise comparisons revealed that indicated a
marginally higher level of anthropomorphism towards their human partner (M=3.48,
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SD=1.31) than AI partner (M=2.77, SD=1.32), but only in the Medium Similarity
condition (Figure 4-3).

Figure 4-4. Bar plot for participants’ ratings on their anthropomorphism towards their
partner in Experiment 7. The dots represent the individual data points. Error bars
represent 95% CI.

4.5.6

Liking and rapport scale

The Liking and Rapport Scale items showed a high scale reliability, Cronbach’s Alpha
=.922. We therefore calculated the aggregated mean across all the items for each
participant. The ANOVA test on mean Liking and Rapport scores failed to find any
significant main effects or interaction effect.
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4.5.7

Conversation length

An ANOVA on the lengths of conversation between participants and Julie revealed a
borderline main effect of Partner Identity, F(1, 148)= 3.38, p=.068, η2=.022 (Figure 4-4).
However, a closer look at pair-wise comparisons revealed that the difference was mostly
driven by the significantly shorter conversations with AI partners than human partners in
the Medium Similarity condition. Participants spent, on average, 2.17 minutes longer
talking to a human partner (M=15.50, SD=0.87) than the AI partner (M=13.33, SD=1.33)
in the Medium Similarity condition. However, the overall interaction effect was not
statistically significant, F(2, 148)= 2.06, p=.131, η2=.027.

Figure 4-5. Bar plots for the amount of time (in minutes) that participants spent talking
with their partner in Experiment 7. The dots represent the individual data points. Error
bars represent 95% CI.

4.5.8

Facial action unit activities

ANOVAs on the mean AU4 activity, which is associated with negative expressions,
during participants’ conversation with Julie showed a significant Partner Identity main
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effect, F(1, 148)=8.82, p=.003, η2=.056. Specifically, participants showed higher mean
AU4 activity when they thought they were interacting with an AI (M=0.07, SD=.17) than
a human partner (M=0.01, SD=.03). No other effects were found for AU4. ANOVAs on
AU6 and AU12 mean activities, both of which are associated with positive expressions,
did not yield any significant effects.
Bivariate correlations were conducted among all the dependent measures previously
reported and with the AU activities. Most of the dependent measures were positively
correlated with each other as well as with AU6 and AU12 activities. AU4, on the other
hand, correlated with few of the dependent measures. See Table 5 for the correlations
among the dependent measures.
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Table 6 Experiment 7 Correlations among dependent variables
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1. Warmth

-

2. Competence

.674***

-

3. MP-Agency

.666***

.695***

-

4. MP-Experience

.455***

.425***

.720***

-

5. Anthropomorphism

.595***

.515***

.523***

.411***

-

6. Liking/Rapport

.731***

.594***

.578***

.398***

.673***

-

7. Conversation Length

.251**

.114

.234**

.122

.160*

.228**

-

8. AU4 activity

.093

.037

.040

.049

.115

.168*

.032

-

9. AU6 activity

.222**

.083

.201*

.205*

.279***

.240**

.149

.261**

-

10. AU12 activity

.223**

.097

.219**

.248**

.286***

.207*

.126

-.011

.851*** -

Note. *: significant at p=.05 level; **: significant at p=.01 level; ***: significant at p=.001 level
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4.6 Discussion
Overall, we did not find the proposed main effect of partner identity, nor did we find a
main effect of self-disclosed similarity as the similarity-attraction effect predicts.
However, a significant interaction between these two factors consistently emerged across
almost all our dependent variables, except for the self-reported liking of the partner. It
appeared that although our manipulations were robust enough to influence people’s
perceptions of their partner to some extent, they did not seem to adequately influence
participants’ liking of the partner, which is not uncommon in human-AI interaction
studies (e.g., Bernier & Scassellati, 2010).
The significant interaction effect found across the dependent measures suggested that the
uncanny valley effect, rather than the similarity-attraction effect, was a more likely
underlying mechanism for our findings. Interestingly, the pattern of the interaction was
not what we had expected. Specifically, the human partner was perceived more positively
than the AI partner only when the partner self-disclosed a medium level of similarity to
participants. Although unpredicted, this pattern of results is likely consistent with the
uncanny valley effect when considering the most human-like self-disclosure behaviour in
this experimental setting. When interacting with another human for the first time, an
unusually high level of self-disclosed similarity (e.g., 12 out of 16 questions in the high
similarity condition) from the other person might seem strange or even deliberative and
manipulative, leading to negative perceptions of the partner. This might be especially true
when the partner always responses after knowing one’s own answer, as was the case in
our experiment. In comparison, self-disclosing a medium level of similarity might appear
as most natural and genuine, thus eliciting more favorable perceptions. This speculation
was indirectly supported by the higher anthropomorphism rating for the human partner in
the medium than the high and low similarity conditions (Figure 4-3). In other words, the
human partner who self-disclosed a moderate amount of similarity to participants felt
more human-like, potentially because the partner’s disclosing behaviour was most natural
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and human-like given the specific context. In contrast, when participants talked to the AI
partner who self-disclosed moderate similarity to themselves, the highly human-like style
of self-disclosing behaviour might have induced the uncanny valley effect and motivated
participants to perceive the AI especially negatively.
Moreover, participants’ self-reported anthropomorphism of their partners showed a
similar pattern as their self-reported perceptions of their partner. Their anthropomorphism
scores were also significantly and positively correlated with their scores on the perception
measures. These findings provide support to our earlier argument that people’s
anthropomorphism towards a partner might be influenced by social-cognitive processes,
and is consistent with the perceptions of the partner, in addition to the anthropomorphic
features.
The self-report measures were not only significantly correlated with each other with
moderate to strong effect sizes (r =.398 to .731) but also mostly correlated with the
conversation length, AU 6 activity, and AU 12 activity. Considering that AU6 and AU12
are indicators of smiling and positively correlate with self-reported happiness (Ekman et
al., 1980), the overall positive correlations provide additional support for the validity of
our dependent measures. AU4 activity was uncorrelated with most of our dependent
measures and participants in the AI partner conditions showed greater such activity.
Chatting with an AI is a unusual and ambiguous experience, which might have led to
greater AU4 activity due to increased confusion, concentration, or novelty (Craig et al.,
2008; McDaniel et al., 2007; Rozin & Cohen, 2003). Greater AU4 activity might thus
reflect characteristics of the social context rather than participants’ impressions of or
experiences with a conversation partner.
There are a couple limitations worth noting in the current study. First, even though we
suspected that self-disclosing a moderate amount of similarity is the most natural human
response in this specific social setting, which was indirectly supported by participants’
ratings on anthropomorphism towards their partner, this assumption was not directly
tested. Replications are therefore needed to establish additional evidence for this account
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and future studies should directly assess whether people indeed perceive such responses
as more natural and why. Second, the virtual human’s limited body movement and facial
expressions might have limited participants’ engagement in the interactions, especially
when participants believed that their partner was a human, and thus limited the
effectiveness of our manipulation. Third, our participants recruited via Craigslist were
demographically different from those we recruited on the university campus. Differences
in demographic backgrounds might suggest different levels of exposure to technologies
and thus different expectations of an AI partner, which might have led to different
responses in our study. However, due to the limited number of participants we recruited
via Craigslist (N=47 after exclusions), we did not have enough statistical power to
examine potential group differences in addition to the effects of our manipulations.
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Chapter 5

5

General Discussion

5.1 Does self-disclosure depth really matter in developing
interpersonal liking between strangers?
We set out to answer the question of whether deep self-disclosures help induce greater
liking of the discloser during initial interactions. The cumulative evidence obtained
through our experiments suggested that they likely do not. Collins and Miller (1994)
proposed that deeper self-disclosures would lead to greater liking of the discloser because
(1) they communicate the discloser’s liking and friendship intention and (2) the receiver
might perceive the discloser to be more trusting and friendly, which leads to greater
liking of them. In our experiments, self-disclosure depth did not influence participants’
perceived friendship intention from the discloser (Experiment 3-4) or perceived
trustworthiness or friendliness of the discloser (Experiment 1-4).
Interestingly, we observed some evidence suggesting that reciprocating a social partner’s
self-disclosure depth might lead to more positive outcomes in Experiment 5. Specifically,
social partners who reciprocated the participants’ own self-disclosure depth were
considered as more responsive. Even though the effect of reciprocity on social
preferences did not reach statistical significance in our experiment, the transactional
model of intimacy (Reis & Shaver, 1988) would suggest that the higher perceived
responsiveness of the partner is crucial to the development of a more intimate
relationship. Moreover, participants seemed to “match” their reciprocity to their partner’s
level of reciprocity: if their partner rarely reciprocated their own self-disclosure depth,
they reciprocated back less as well. These findings illustrated that people are highly
capable of detecting subtleties in their social partner’s behaviours and subsequently
adjust their own behaviours based on such information.
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In Experiment 6, we successfully replicated the effect that people self-disclose at deeper
levels to those whom they like more, as suggested in Collins and Miller (1994), even
after controlling for factors such as perceived knowledge and perceived similarity of the
social partner. Taken together with findings from Experiments 1 through 5, it is more
likely that increased self-disclosure depth is the result of interpersonal liking, rather than
the cause of it. As real-life interactions involve dynamic and complicated interplay
between self-disclosures, reciprocity of self-disclosures, and interpersonal liking, it is
hard to disentangle the individual effects of these factors on each other. The previous
studies that found deeper self-disclosures to lead to increased liking might have captured
a fraction of the process, and thus provided a less accurate picture of the causal
relationship between the two.

5.2 Similarity: The invisible hand of budding friendship
What, then, can lead to positive first impressions and initial liking if deep self-disclosures
do not? The answer is unsurprising: similarity. Throughout our experiments, we
consistently found a positive and robust causal effect of similarity on liking of a social
partner whom participants had not previously met. Furthermore, our participants
perceived social partners with higher similarity as showing greater interest in being their
friend, as well as being more trustworthy and friendly, which might partially underlie
their preferences for these partners. Given the strong empirical evidence in support of the
similarity-attraction effect in the existing literature (e.g., Montoya & Horton, 2013;
Montoya, Horton, & Kirchner, 2008; Tidwell, Eastwick, & Finkel, 2013), it was not at all
surprising that we found such strong effects of similarity.
Our findings thus seem to support our suspicion that similarity between the social
partners is an “invisible hand” behind the disclosure-liking relationship. Similarity likely
contributes to increased mutual liking and comfort with another, which in turn leads to
greater exchange of deeper self-disclosures, resulting in positive feelings and enhanced
relationship potential. We also proposed another possibility in which similarity might
confound the disclosure-liking relationship at the beginning: a high level of similarity
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might enable the effect of deep self-disclosures on liking, because the receiver might
welcome deep disclosures more from a similar than a dissimilar other. However, the fact
that we failed to find any significant interaction effect between similarity and disclosure
depth throughout our experiments suggested against this possibility. If similarity was the
enabling factor for disclosure depth, we would have observed an increased liking of the
deeper discloser when the similarity between the two partners was high.
One important and interesting caveat to point out is that how such similarity is
communicated also seems to play an important role in shaping liking of the discloser. In
our first six experiments, the self-disclosed similarity was communicated in a less
“contrived” way in that it was unlikely that participants believed that the others “crafted”
their information to match their own. In Experiment 7, however, where participants
always self-disclosed before the virtual human responded to the same question,
participants might have perceived a high level of self-disclosed similarity from the
partner as unnatural at best and ingenuine and manipulative at worst. Consequently, we
failed to find the linear relationship between similarity and liking of the partner. Rather,
participants seemed to form most favorable impressions of the human partner when the
partner self-disclosed a medium level of similarity, which might have been perceived as
more genuine. This speculation is consistent with the reinforcement-affect account of
interpersonal attraction (e.g., Byrne & Nelson, 1965; Clore & Byrne, 1974), which asserts
that people’s attraction to a social partner is a function of their positive affective
responses, in relation to the negative affective responses, associated with that person. It
seems that while similarities often elicit positive affective responses, excessive
expressions of similarities, especially when perceived as contrived, can elicit negative
affective responses to the discloser, which might outweigh the benefit of the similarities
and lead to decreased liking of the discloser.

5.3 Limitations
Although the specific limitations were discussed in each of the empirical chapters, we
would like to point out two general shortcomings of our experiments that limit the scope
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of the work. First, a big strength of the current work is the careful experimental control,
which allowed us to disentangle complicated effects and reduce the noise of potential
confounds. However, this meticulous control also created the biggest weakness of the
research— the limited ecological validity and reduced generalizability to real-world
interactions. Self-disclosure is not a one-shot, static event that occurs in isolation. Rather,
it is such a complicated and dynamic process in which various situational and
dispositional factors interplay to influence people’s decisions to make disclosures, their
responses to others’ disclosures, and how they flexibly adjust their responses and
behaviours minute-by-minute. Hence, while our experiments provided insights into some
contributing factors and underlying mechanisms of the process, they were far from being
able to provide a “big picture” that accurately describes how this process unfolds in real
life interactions.
Second, the student samples used throughout our experiments further limit the
generalizability of our findings. Due to the nature of the experiments and limited
resources, we were not able to recruit participants with more diverse demographic
backgrounds. Our findings might thus reflect characteristics of this specific demographic
group. The university student samples were largely WEIRD samples, consisting of
people from Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic cultural
backgrounds, who are “frequent outliers” in various psychological characteristics
compared to other populations (Henrich et al., 2010; Jones, 2010). Future studies that
include more diverse samples are needed before we can conclude that our findings
represent general social interaction processes instead of patterns specifically found in
university students and WEIRD populations. Moreover, as the student samples are
relatively homogeneous, our findings might have reflected interaction patterns between
people who are already relatively similar to each other rather than those who are not.

5.4 Conclusion
Despite these limitations, we made a few contributions to the literature with the current
line of work. First, we provided strong evidence that shows, in contrast to what was
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suggested in the literature, self-disclosure depth per se does not cause interpersonal liking
in initial interactions. Rather, the causal relationship is more likely to be the other way
around. Second, we identified similarity between social partners as a key factor that
underlies the disclosure-liking relationship: greater similarity promotes liking, which in
turn leads to greater exchange of deeper self-disclosures. Finally, we tried to conceptually
replicate a few effects identified in the existing literature: the effect of self-disclosure
depth on liking, the effect of liking on self-disclosure, and the similarity-attraction effect.
Two of these effects were successfully replicated and one was not. In the face of the
issues surrounding replicability of psychological research, we tested these effects to our
best abilities using pre-registrations, repeated testing, and meta-analysis (Maxwell et al.,
2015). Falsifiability lies at the heart of science. We provided cumulative evidence that
contributes to the falsification process, which is a key to establishing sound psychological
science. Thus, our final conclusion is that while disclosure depth plays an important role
in relationship development over longer timescales, similarity seems to be the deciding
factor in whether people choose to initiate a relationship in the first place.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Multiple-Choice Questions Used in the Experiments
Low Self-Disclosure Depth Questions:
Question 1: What's your favorite season?
1. The fresh air in spring makes me happy.
2. I love spending summer days outdoors.
3. I love jumping into the leaves in autumn.
4. Building snowmen is great winter fun.
Question 2: Which of these social media sites do you prefer?
1. Facebook makes keeping in touch with my friends really easy.
2. Instagram allows me to enjoy my friends' special moments.
3. Sending silly faces to my friends over snapchat is so much fun.
4. Hashtags on Twitter are hilarious.
Question 3: How heavy is your course workload this semester?
1. I'm only taking a couple of courses this semester, it's a breeze.
2. I'm taking a few courses this semester, but I've been able to manage everything.
3. I'm very busy with school work this semester.
4. I barely have time to sleep with all the schoolwork I have to do.
Question 4: Which of these movie genres do you prefer?
1. I like to imagine the happy endings in romance movies.
2. Comedy movies make light of things and always make me laugh.
3. I like how excited action movies make me feel.
4. I like how dark and twisted horror movies can be.
Question 5: Which of these sports do you like best?
1. I play soccer regularly and I enjoy it very much.
2. Some of my fondest childhood memories happened at hockey tournaments.
3. I love watching competitive swimming on TV.
4. I love the fast pace of basketball games.
Question 6: Which of these cuisines do you like best?
1. I could eat Italian food everyday, especially pasta and desserts.
2. Japanese food always looks pretty and tastes fresh.
3. I love that Chinese dishes are made to be shared with others.
4. I always get pretty excited about spicy Mexican dishes.
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Question 7: Which of these holidays is your favourite?
1. I enjoy giving and receiving Christmas gifts very much.
2. I love celebrating New Year's Eve with my friends and family.
3. Halloween is the most fun holiday of the year.
4. I love turkey and pumpkin pie on Thanksgiving.
Question 8: Which of these overseas countries would you most like to visit?
1. Madrid and Barcelona are on the top of my list for travel destinations.
2. Australia's beautiful coastline is something I long to see.
3. I would really love to visit Venice and take a gondola ride along the canals.
4. Japan would be a lot of fun to visit because I love animation and cosplay.
Question 9: Which of these activities do you prefer for a vacation?
1. I love spending my vacations travelling around and experiencing new cultures.
2. My favourite vacation is to stay at home and just relax.
3. I always enjoy visiting my family during vacations.
4. Revisiting my favorite destinations is always a lot of fun.
Question 10: Which of these music genres do you like best?
1. Country music reminds me of home.
2. Pop music always makes me want to dance.
3. I love the meaningful lyrics in Rhythm and Blues music.
4. Rock music makes me feel free and let go.
Question 11: Which of these subjects is your favourite?
1. I like the objective truths of mathematics.
2. Studying psychology helps me understand myself and others.
3. Learning about the origins of human life is fascinating.
4. I love learning about poetry and novels in my classes.
Question 12: How often do you post on social media?
1. I am far too busy to think about social media.
2. I only post on social media once in a great while.
3. I post on social media when interesting things happen in my life.
4. I use social media to share moments of my daily life with family and friends.
Question 13: Which of these historical figures inspires you the most?
1. As the symbol of freedom for everyone in the world, Mahatma Ghandi inspires
me a lot.
2. If it weren't for Abraham Lincoln, we might be living in a very different world
right now.
3. Martin Luther King Jr's I have a dream speech is a true inspiration for me.
4. As a science student aspiring to be a researcher, Albert Einstein is definitely my
role model.
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Question 14: How many siblings do you have?
1. I do not have any siblings.
2. I have one sibling.
3. I have two siblings.
4. I have more than two siblings.
Question 15: If you were deserted on an island (with basic living conditions met),
which of these items would you most like to have?
1. I would definitely want my phone with me if I were on a deserted island.
2. If I were on a deserted island, my gaming device would help me pass the time.
3. Books would help me cope with being on a deserted island.
4. My pet would help me chase away lonely feelings on a deserted island.
Question 16: How regularly do you see your best friend?
1. I don't go a day without seeing my best friend.
2. I connect with my best friend at least once a week.
3. Last time I saw my best friend was about a month ago.
4. My best friend lives far away so I only get to see them once this year.
Question 17: Which of these new skills would you most like to attain?
1. I want to learn to speak French.
2. I want to learn to play the guitar.
3. I'd like to become a competent public speaker.
4. Skiing is a skill I'd love to pick up.
Question 18: Would you consider getting tattoos or piercings?
1. I have piercings and tattoos.
2. I would consider a discrete tattoo or piercing.
3. I never really thought tattoos or piercings were attractive.
4. I don't like needles so I would never get piercings or tattoos.
Question 19: Which of these would you most like to do if you won a million
dollars?
1. If I won the lottery, I would use the money to see the world.
2. If I won the lottery, I would pay off my student debt.
3. A nice house and a new car are what a lottery win would buy me.
4. If I won the lottery, I would save the money for a rainy day.
Question 20: Which of these leisure activities is your favourite?
1. I enjoy watching Netflix in my free time.
2. I usually find myself working out at the gym in my free time.
3. I always look forward to going out with friends in my free time.
4. I would happily spend all my free time reading.
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High Self-Disclosure Depth Questions:
Question 21: Under which circumstances would you consider cheating in an
exam?
1. When it comes to exams, the chances of getting caught are so high that I would
never cheat.
2. For people who do not prepare, cheating on an exam may be the best form of
'preparation'.
3. If a test determines whether I pass or fail a course, then I would cheat without a
second thought.
4. If I do not believe a test will be fair then I don't feel the need to play by the
rules.
Question 22: Which of these items do you fear most?
1. It creeps me out when bugs fly near my ear.
2. I think its terrifying the way snakes shed their skin.
3. When I get too high above the ground my stomach curls up.
4. The thought of going into deep water makes me feel sick.
Question 23: Which of these qualities would you most value in a friend?
1. The ability to keep a secret, no matter what, is the best quality in a friend.
2. A true friend is always someone who is there when you need them.
3. To me, a friend is someone who is always honest even when the truth might
hurt me.
4. A friend is someone who understands my feelings and always shows me love
and support.
Question 24: Which of these best describes your feelings about gossip?
1. I love hearing gossiping and being the one who tells it.
2. Gossip doesn't really move me one way or another.
3. I do not like talking about others behind their backs.
4. I sometimes like gossiping about others, but sometimes feel bad about it.
Question 25: Which of these words best describes your personality?
1. Life is more fun when you can laugh about it.
2. I like a quiet conversation with just one person.
3. I love socializing and meeting new people.
4. I really strive to achieve my goals.
Question 26: Which of these habits would you most want to break?
1. I am always procrastinating and would love to change that.
2. I should adopt a healthier sleeping schedule so that I feel sharper.
3. I need to reduce the junk food and start eating a healthier diet.
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4. I really want to break the habit of biting my nails when I'm bored or under
stress.
Question 27: With which of these political positions do you most identify?
1. I most agree with the social justice ideals of the liberal party.
2. I have a strong preference for the tradition and order that the conservative party
discusses.
3. Politics? I avoid that, too many arguments.
4. I often vote for fringe parties when I have the choice to in elections.
Question 28: Which of these family members do you most admire?
1. The family member I admire the most is my mother.
2. In my family, I admire my dad the most.
3. I admire and feel close to all my family members.
4. I have always been closest to my grandparents.
Question 29: Which of these statements best describes your current relationship
status?
1. I am single and loving it.
2. I enjoy dating, but not very seriously.
3. I have been in a solid relationship for the past few years.
4. My relationship status is a bit hard to explain.
Question 30: Which of these things is the most stressful to you?
1. I spend most of my time studying and it causes a lot of stress.
2. I think it's hard to plan for the future when there's so much I can't control.
3. It stresses me out when I argue with my friends.
4. I always feel the stress of not having enough money.
Question 31: With which of these religious beliefs do you most identify?
1. I go to church most Sundays.
2. I'm a non-Christian.
3. I don't think God exists.
4. I don't hold any specific religious beliefs.
Question 32: Which of these is the most important quality that you have or want
to have as a person?
1. Honesty makes life easier, and more enjoyable.
2. Loyalty is one of the greatest qualities a person can possess.
3. The world would be a better place if people were kind above all else.
4. I think having an open mind is a great way to live life.
Question 33: Do you think you want a family with kids in the future?
1. Kids don't really fit with my lifestyle.
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2. I might want kids someday, but I'm not too sure.
3. I really like kids but it will be a while before I feel ready.
4. I can't wait to start a family.
Question 34: When you are stressed, which of the following most helps you
unwind?
1. A movie binge is the best way to end a hard day.
2. Music keeps me sane when times are tough.
3. Going for a run at the end of a long day is the best.
4. My friends always have my back when I need to talk about my day.
Question 35: Which of these best describes your greatest accomplishment so far?
1. It was one of the best moments in my life when I opened my admission letter
from Western.
2. I won a prestigious scholarship and am pretty proud of it.
3. Living independently from my family is probably my biggest accomplishment
so far.
4. I'm most proud of my ability to win athletic competitions.
Question 36: With which of these issues do you struggle most on a day-to-day
basis?
1. It's very hard for me to stick to a schedule.
2. I always feel like I'm behind on my readings.
3. I find it difficult to talk to people I don't know very well.
4. I feel I'm a generally anxious person.
Question 37: Which of these things is most important to you in your life?
1. My family is the single most important thing in my life.
2. My future academic success is what most motivates me.
3. I think happiness is the thing that provides most meaning to life.
4. I feel that my beliefs are the basis of who I am.
Question 38: Which of these statements best describes your relationship with your
parents?
1. I get along with my parents as if they were close friends.
2. My parents and I get along well but we don't really talk as friends.
3. I try to keep conversations with my parents on a pretty superficial level.
4. My parents and I can't seem to be in the same room for very long before we
start to argue.
Question 39: How are you doing in school right now?
1. My academics this semester aren't going very well.
2. I'm doing OK in school - but I could be doing better.
3. My semester has been going pretty well, school-wise.
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4. I think I'm doing super-well in my classes this term.
Question 40: Which of the following skills/characteristics would you most want
to improve/change about yourself?
1. I wish I were more comfortable expressing my opinions to others.
2. I wish my body was a bit more athletic looking.
3. I wish I had better self-confidence.
4. If I had better self-control I would be really happy with things.
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Appendix B: Experiments 1 to 5 Model Summaries
Table 7 Experiment 1 Type III Analysis of Deviance Table with Wald Chi-Square Tests (for cumulative link models)
The degree to which they are similar to you
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How well you think you’ve gotten to know them
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How comfortable you’d feel asking them for advice
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How much you would like to admit them to your circle of friends
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How much you’d like to actually meet them
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth

df

χ2

p

2
1
1
2

26.824
0.611
68.087
0.393

<.001
.434
<.001
.822

2
1
1
2

17.618
1.869
183.786
0.518

<.001
.172
<.001
.772

2
1
1
2

21.743
0.016
47.446
2.560

<.001
.899
<.001
.278

2
1
1
2

29.575
0.320
40.738
0.843

<.001
.572
<.001
.656

2
1
1
2

25.293
2.280
62.543
0.634

<.001
0131
<.001
.728
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How trustworthy you think they are
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How friendly you think they are
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth

2
1
1
2

10.542
0.630
57.497
1.836

0.005
0.428
<.001
0.399

2
1
1
2

14.848
0.280
49.362
1.773

<.001
0.597
<.000
0.412

138

Table 8 Experiment 1 Cumulative-link Model Summary

The degree to which they are similar to you
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How well you think you’ve gotten to know them
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How comfortable you’d feel asking them for advice
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How much you would like to admit them to your circle of friends
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth

Beta

Std.Error

Z-Value

Odds
Ratio

OR 95%CI
Lower

OR 95%CI
Upper

0.536
-0.471
-0.069
0.075
-0.010
-0.038

0.082
0.081
0.057
0.009
0.081
0.080

6.505***
-5.804***
-1.207
8.252***
-0.118
-0.470

1.708
0.624
0.933
1.077
0.990
0.963

1.455
0.532
0.835
1.059
0.845
0.823

2.009
0.732
1.044
1.097
1.162
1.127

0.428
-0.269
0.093
0.128
0.046
-0.054

0.083
0.081
0.057
0.009
0.082
0.080

5.168***
-3.337***
1.621
13.557***
0.558
-0.674

1.534
0.764
1.098
1.136
1.047
0.947

1.305
0.652
0.981
1.116
0.891
0.809

1.805
0.895
1.228
1.158
1.229
1.109

0.360
-0.433
-0.111
0.061
0.124
-0.031

0.081
0.081
0.057
0.009
0.081
0.080

4.424***
-5.323***
-1.959*
6.888***
1.535
-0.388

1.433
0.649
0.895
1.063
1.132
0.969

1.222
0.553
0.800
1.045
0.966
0.828

1.682
0.761
1.000
1.082
1.326
1.134

0.551
-0.444
-0.073
0.057
0.018
-0.071

0.081
0.081
0.057
0.009
0.080
0.080

6.768***
-5.470***
-1.287
6.383***
0.224
-0.885

1.735
0.642
0.929
1.059
1.018
0.931

1.480
0.547
0.831
1.040
0.870
0.796

2.036
0.752
1.039
1.077
1.191
1.090
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How much you’d like to actually meet them
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How trustworthy you think they are
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How friendly you think they are
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth

Note. *: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001

0.610
-0.499
-0.087
0.071
-0.064
0.037

0.083
0.081
0.057
0.009
0.081
0.080

7.357***
-6.120***
-1.525
7.908***
-0.793
0.461

1.840
0.607
0.917
1.073
0.938
1.038

1.565
0.517
0.820
1.055
0.799
0.886

2.166
0.712
1.025
1.092
1.099
1.215

0.268
-0.176
-0.010
0.068
0.088
-0.099

0.081
0.080
0.057
0.009
0.080
0.080

3.327***
-2.198*
-0.172
7.583***
1.093
-1.240

1.307
0.838
0.990
1.070
1.092
0.905

1.117
0.716
0.886
1.052
0.933
0.774

1.531
0.981
1.107
1.089
1.278
1.059

0.369
-0.290
-0.030
0.062
0.083
0.018

0.082
0.080
0.057
0.009
0.081
0.080

4.523***
-3.613***
-0.523
7.026***
1.020
0.226

1.446
0.748
0.971
1.064
1.086
1.018

1.233
0.639
0.868
1.046
0.927
0.871

1.698
0.876
1.085
1.083
1.273
1.191
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Table 9 Experiment 2 Type III Analysis of Deviance Table with Wald Chi-Square Tests (for Cumulative-Link Models)
The degree to which they are similar to you
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How well you think you’ve gotten to know them
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How comfortable you’d feel asking them for advice
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How much you would like to admit them to your circle of friends
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How much you’d like to actually meet them
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How trustworthy you think they are
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks

df

χ2

p

2
1
1
2

49.998
0.1501
111.767
2.3084

<.001
.699
<.001
.315

2
1
1
2

10.875
0.179
148.725
0.691

.004
.672
<.001
.707

2
1
1
2

23.143
0.090
116.670
0.442

<.001
0.764
<.001
0.802

2
1
1
2

33.090
1.386
103.402
1.197

<.001
.239
<.001
.550

2
1
1
2

21.705
0.107
132.579
1.002

<.001
.743
<.001
.606

2
1
1

23.033
2.262
68.935

<.001
.133
<.001
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Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How friendly you think they are
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth

2

4.352

.114

2
1
1
2

15.084
0.257
75.621
2.734

<.001
.613
<.001
.255
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Table 10 Experiment 2 Cumulative-Link Model Summary
Beta
The degree to which they are similar to you
High Similarity
1.031
Low Similarity
-0.721
High Disclosure Depth
0.006
Number of Clicks
0.138
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
-0.059
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
-0.103
How well you think you’ve gotten to know them
High Similarity
0.601
Low Similarity
-0.373
High Disclosure Depth
0.028
Number of Clicks
0.162
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
-0.087
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
0.016
How comfortable you’d feel asking them for advice
High Similarity
0.703
Low Similarity
-0.516
High Disclosure Depth
-0.009
Number of Clicks
0.141
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
0.050
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
0.019
How much you would like to admit them to your circle of friends
High Similarity
0.820
Low Similarity
-0.646
High Disclosure Depth
0.077
Number of Clicks
0.132
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
0.083
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
0.030

Std.Error

Z-Value

Odds
Ratio

OR 95% CI
Lower

OR 95% CI
Upper

0.118
0.112
0.077
0.013
0.110
0.108

8.709***
-6.392***
0.077
10.572***
-0.532
-0.949

2.804
0.486
1.006
1.148
0.943
0.902

2.227
0.389
0.865
1.119
0.759
0.729

3.544
0.606
1.169
1.178
1.171
1.116

0.114
0.109
0.077
0.013
0.111
0.107

5.244***
-3.413***
0.363
12.195***
-0.779
0.150

1.824
0.689
1.028
1.176
0.917
1.016

1.459
0.555
0.885
1.146
0.737
0.823

2.286
0.853
1.196
1.208
1.141
1.255

0.114
0.111
0.076
0.013
0.110
0.108

6.151***
-4.653***
-0.114
10.801
0.453
0.177

2.019
0.597
0.991
1.151
1.051
1.019

1.616
0.480
0.854
1.123
0.847
0.825

2.530
0.741
1.151
1.182
1.305
1.260

0.115
0.112
0.076
0.013
0.110
0.109

7.138***
-5.771***
1.007
10.169***
0.755
0.277

2.270
0.524
1.080
1.142
1.086
1.031

1.815
0.420
0.923
1.113
0.876
0.832

2.847
0.652
1.255
1.171
1.347
1.277

143

How much you’d like to actually meet them
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How trustworthy you think they are
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How friendly you think they are
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth

Note. *: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001

0.772
-0.568
-0.013
0.153
-0.033
0.105

0.117
0.111
0.077
0.013
0.112
0.108

6.622***
-5.124***
-0.165
11.514***
-0.296
0.970

2.164
0.567
0.987
1.166
0.968
1.110

1.724
0.456
0.849
1.136
0.777
0.899

2.724
0.704
1.148
1.197
1.204
1.372

0.456
-0.499
-0.012
0.103
0.213
-0.173

0.111
0.110
0.076
0.012
0.108
0.107

4.098***
-4.534***
-0.154
8.303***
1.964*
-1.613

1.578
0.607
0.989
1.108
1.237
0.841

1.270
0.489
0.852
1.082
1.001
0.682

1.964
0.753
1.146
1.136
1.531
1.038

0.564
-0.491
0.024
0.108
0.044
0.125

0.112
0.111
0.076
0.012
0.109
0.108

5.058***
-4.437***
0.314
8.696***
0.407
1.153

1.758
0.612
1.024
1.114
1.045
1.133

1.414
0.493
0.883
1.087
0.844
0.916

2.190
0.760
1.188
1.142
1.294
1.402
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Table 11 Experiment 3 Type III Analysis of Deviance Table with Wald Chi-Square Tests (for Cumulative Link Models)
The degree to which they are similar to you
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How well you think you’ve gotten to know them
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How comfortable you’d feel asking them for advice
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How much you would like to admit them to your circle of friends
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How much you’d like to actually meet them
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How trustworthy you think they are
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks

df

χ2

p

2
1
1
2

19.815
0.254
56.727
0.687

<.001
.614
<001
.709

2
1
1
2

7.222
0.006
83.515
1.187

.027
.937
<.001
.552

2
1
1
2

18.389
1.519
57.294
1.268

<.001
.218
<.001
.531

2
1
1
2

22.892
2.174
63.756
2.964

<.001
.140
<.001
.227

2
1
1
2

17.285
0.751
72.473
1.029

<.001
.386
<.001
.598

2
1
1

5.926
0.333
52.778

.052
.564
<.001
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Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How friendly you think they are
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
How much you think they’d like to be your friend
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth

2

1.748

.417

2
1
1
2

7.621
1.532
39.097
4.742

.022
.216
<.001
.093

2
1
1
2

27.336
3.746
55.154
2.889

<.001
.053
<.001
.237
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Table 12 Experiment 3 Cumulative-Link Model Summary

The degree to which they are similar to you
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How well you think you’ve gotten to know them
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How comfortable you’d feel asking them for advice
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How much you would like to admit them to your circle of friends
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth

Beta

Std.Error

Z-Value

Odds
Ratio

OR 95% CI
Lower

OR 95% CI
Upper

0.819
-0.602
-0.002
0.102
0.073
0.015

0.120
0.117
0.080
0.013
0.114
0.113

6.854***
-5.170***
-0.025
7.532***
0.638
0.134

2.269
0.548
0.998
1.107
1.076
1.015

1.798
0.435
0.853
1.078
0.860
0.814

2.873
0.687
1.167
1.137
1.346
1.267

0.542
-0.394
0.100
0.127
-0.111
0.104

0.119
0.114
0.080
0.014
0.115
0.112

4.562***
-3.445***
1.244
9.139***
-0.964
0.925

1.720
0.675
1.105
1.136
0.895
1.109

1.364
0.539
0.944
1.105
0.713
0.891

2.174
0.843
1.294
1.167
1.122
1.382

0.569
-0.451
0.050
0.102
0.122
-0.026

0.117
0.115
0.080
0.014
0.114
0.112

4.880***
-3.932***
0.625
7.569***
1.074
-0.233

1.766
0.637
1.051
1.108
1.130
0.974

1.407
0.508
0.899
1.079
0.904
0.782

2.221
0.797
1.230
1.138
1.413
1.213

0.606
-0.426
0.042
0.109
0.165
0.012

0.117
0.115
0.080
0.014
0.115
0.113

5.171***
-3.714***
0.527
7.985***
1.443
0.102

1.832
0.653
1.043
1.115
1.180
1.012

1.458
0.521
0.892
1.086
0.943
0.811

2.308
0.817
1.221
1.146
1.477
1.261

147

How much you’d like to actually meet them
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How trustworthy you think they are
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How friendly you think they are
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
How much you think they’d like to be your friend
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth

Note. *: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001

0.613
-0.399
0.058
0.117
0.065
0.050

0.118
0.115
0.080
0.014
0.115
0.113

5.206***
-3.466***
0.718
8.513***
0.566
0.444

1.845
0.670
1.059
1.124
1.067
1.051

1.467
0.535
0.905
1.095
0.852
0.843

2.327
0.840
1.240
1.155
1.336
1.312

0.260
-0.337
-0.032
0.097
0.109
0.035

0.113
0.115
0.080
0.013
0.112
0.113

2.308*
-2.931**
-0.394
7.265***
0.976
0.312

1.297
0.714
0.969
1.102
1.115
1.036

1.040
0.569
0.828
1.074
0.896
0.830

1.618
0.894
1.133
1.132
1.389
1.294

0.329
-0.391
0.051
0.082
0.120
0.127

0.115
0.115
0.080
0.013
0.113
0.113

2.866**
-3.403***
0.641
6.253***
1.062
1.123

1.389
0.677
1.052
1.085
1.128
1.135

1.110
0.540
0.900
1.058
0.904
0.910

1.741
0.847
1.231
1.114
1.408
1.416

0.599
-0.511
0.083
0.100
0.187
-0.134

0.118
0.117
0.081
0.013
0.114
0.113

5.091***
-4.987***
1.036
7.427***
1.647
-1.183

1.820
0.600
1.086
1.105
1.206
0.875

1.446
0.477
0.929
1.077
0.965
0.700

2.294
0.753
1.271
1.135
1.508
1.092
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Table 13 Experiment 4 Type III Analysis of Variance table with Satterthwaite’s method (for Linear-Mixed Models)
Social Preferences (aggregated means)
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Personalistic Attribution
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
Personalistic * Disclosure Depth
Perceived Desirable Traits (aggregated means)
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Personalistic Attribution
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
Personalistic * Disclosure Depth

Numerator Df

Denominator DF

F-value

p

2
1
1
1
2
1

701.728
699.676
139.872
793.173
699.910
699.756

0.205
0.040
0.000
0.322
1.174
0.015

.815
.841
.994
.570
.310
.902

2
1
1
1
2
1

701.163
699.732
139.868
767.054
699.895
699.787

3.875
0.050
0.729
0.632
0.547
0.288

.021
.823
.395
.427
.579
.592

149

Table 14 Experiment 4 Linear-Mixed Model Summary
Social Preferences (aggregated means)
(Intercept)
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
High Personalistic Attribution
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
High Personalistic * High Disclosure Depth
Perceived Desirable Traits (aggregated means)
(Intercept)
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
High Personalistic Attribution
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
High Personalistic * High Disclosure Depth

Beta

Std. Error

df

t-value

p

4.246
-0.026
0.000
0.007
0.000
0.003
0.015
0.054
-0.004

0.085
0.048
0.048
0.033
0.050
0.006
0.047
0.047
0.033

611.251
701.698
703.543
699.676
139.872
793.173
700.109
699.702
699.756

49.780
-0.545
-0.008
0.201
-0.008
0.568
0.322
1.136
-0.123

<.001
.586
.994
.841
.994
.570
.748
.256
.902

4.605
-0.073
-0.017
-0.005
-0.038
0.003
0.005
0.028
-0.013

0.068
0.035
0.035
0.024
0.045
0.004
0.034
0.034
0.024

511.590
701.143
702.431
699.732
139.868
767.054
700.034
699.750
699.787

67.755
-2.100
-0.492
-0.223
-0.854
0.795
0.155
0.818
-0.536

<.001
.036
.623
.823
.395
.427
.877
.414
.592
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Table 15 . Experiment 4 Type III Analysis of Deviance Table with Wald Chi-Square Tests (for Cumulative Link Models)
The degree to which they are similar to you
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Personalistic Attribution
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
Personalistic * Disclosure Depth
How well you think you’ve gotten to know them
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Personalistic Attribution
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
Personalistic * Disclosure Depth
How much you’d like to actually meet them
Similarity
Disclosure Depth
Personalistic Attribution
Number of Clicks
Similarity * Disclosure Depth
Personalistic * Disclosure Depth

df

χ2

p

2
1
1
1
2
1

0.687
0.909
0.072
0.026
1.302
1.055

.709
.340
.788
.872
.522
.304

2
1
1
1
2
1

1.572
0.166
3.132
1.238
3.120
0.035

.456
.684
.077
.266
.210
.853

2
1
1
1
2
1

45.474
2.983
0.111
57.459
5.145
0.379

<.001
.084
.739
<.000
.076
.538
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Table 16 Experiment 4 Cumulative-Link Model Summary

The degree to which they are similar to you
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
High Personalistic Attribution
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
High Personalistic * High Disclosure Depth
How well you think you’ve gotten to know them
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
High Personalistic Attribution
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
High Personalistic * High Disclosure Depth
How much you’d like to actually meet them
High Similarity
Low Similarity
High Disclosure Depth
High Personalistic Attribution
Number of Clicks
High Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
Low Similarity * High Disclosure Depth
High Personalistic * High Disclosure Depth

Beta

Std.
Error

Z-Value

Odds
Ratio

OR 95% CI
Lower

OR 95% CI
Upper

-0.027
-0.041
-0.058
-0.017
0.003
0.066
0.030
-0.063

0.087
0.088
0.061
0.061
0.010
0.086
0.087
0.061

-0.317
-0.472
-0.954
-0.279
0.250
0.761
0.344
-1.027

0.973
0.959
0.944
0.983
1.003
1.068
1.030
0.939

0.821
0.808
0.837
0.873
0.983
0.902
0.869
0.833

1.153
1.140
1.063
1.108
1.023
1.265
1.221
1.059

-0.085
-0.018
-0.026
-0.113
0.012
0.050
0.103
-0.012

0.089
0.089
0.062
0.063
0.011
0.089
0.088
0.062

-0.959
-0.203
-0.411
-1.814
1.179
0.565
1.167
-0.186

0.918
0.982
0.975
0.893
1.013
1.051
1.108
0.988

0.771
0.824
0.863
0.790
0.992
0.884
0.933
0.875

1.093
1.170
1.101
1.009
1.034
1.251
1.317
1.117

0.627
-0.434
0.137
-0.041
0.114
-0.197
0.248
0.051

0.121
0.116
0.082
0.082
0.015
0.117
0.115
0.082

5.185***
-3.725***
1.675
-0.503
7.454***
-1.681
2.163*
0.615

1.871
0.648
1.147
0.960
1.120
0.821
1.282
1.052

1.478
0.515
0.977
0.817
1.088
0.652
1.024
0.896

2.375
0.814
1.348
1.127
1.155
1.033
1.607
1.236
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Table 17 Experiment 5 Type III Analysis of Variance Table with Satterthwaite’s Method (for Linear-Mixed Models)
Perceived Reciprocity (aggregated means)
Similarity
Reciprocity
Similarity * Reciprocity
Social Preferences (aggregated means)
Similarity
Reciprocity
Similarity * Reciprocity
Perceived Desirable Traits (aggregated means)
Similarity
Reciprocity
Similarity * Reciprocity
Participants’ Number of Reciprocated Disclosure
Similarity
Reciprocity
Similarity * Reciprocity

Numerator Df

Denominator DF

F-value

p

1
2
2

520
520
520

6.733
7.055
0.136

.010
.001
.873

1
2
2

520
520
520

30.269
2.017
0.640

<.001
.134
.528

1
2
2

520
520
520

3.093
2.519
0.403

.079
.082
.669

1
2
2

520
520
520

0.161
2.927
0.306

.689
.054
.737
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Table 18 Experiment 5 Linear-Mixed Model Summary
Perceived Reciprocity (aggregated means)
(Intercept)
High Similarity
High Reciprocity
Low Reciprocity
High Similarity* High Reciprocity
High Similarity* Low Reciprocity
Social Preferences (aggregated means)
(Intercept)
High Similarity
High Reciprocity
Low Reciprocity
High Similarity* High Reciprocity
High Similarity* Low Reciprocity
Perceived Desirable Traits (aggregated means)
(Intercept)
High Similarity
High Reciprocity
Low Reciprocity
High Similarity* High Reciprocity
High Similarity* Low Reciprocity
Participants’ Number of Reciprocated Disclosure
(Intercept)
High Similarity
High Reciprocity
Low Reciprocity
High Similarity* High Reciprocity
High Similarity* Low Reciprocity

Beta

Std. Error

df

t-value

p

5.007
0.103
0.212
-0.101
0.010
-0.029

0.071
0.040
0.056
0.056
0.056
0.056

104
520
520
520
520
520

70.873
2.595
3.755
-1.792
0.171
-0.512

<.001
.010
<.001
.074
.865
.609

4.846
0.171
0.088
-0.054
-0.048
0.036

0.071
0.031
0.044
0.044
0.044
0.044

104
520
520
520
520
520

68.015
5.502
1.991
-1.227
-1.082
0.827

<.001
<.001
.047
.220
.280
.409

4.833
0.038
0.061
-0.059
-0.024
0.024

0.066
0.022
0.031
0.031
0.031
0.031

104
520
520
520
520
520

73.084
1.759
1.969
-1.917
-0.777
0.777

<.001
.079
.049
.056
.437
.437

4.394
0.022
0.005
-0.168
0.021
0.040

0.059
0.056
0.079
0.079
0.079
0.079

104
520
520
520
520
520

75.015
0.401
0.061
-2.125
0.263
0.506

<.001
.689
.952
.034
.793
.613
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Table 19 Experiment 5 Type III Analysis of Deviance Table with Wald Chi-Square Tests (for Cumulative Link Models)
The degree to which they are similar to you
Similarity
Reciprocity
Similarity* Reciprocity
How much you’d like to actually meet them
Similarity
Reciprocity
Similarity* Reciprocity

df

χ2

p

1
2
2

37.561
4.808
0.612

<.001
.090
.736

1
2
2

0.018
0.279
1.215

.893
.870
.545
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Table 20 Experiment 5 Cumulative-Link Model Summary

The degree to which they are similar to you
High Similarity
High Reciprocity
Low Reciprocity
High Similarity * High Reciprocity
High Similarity * Low reciprocity
How much you’d like to actually meet them
High Similarity
High Reciprocity
Low Reciprocity
High Similarity * High Reciprocity
High Similarity * Low reciprocity

Note. *: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001

Beta

Std.
Error

Z-Value

Odds
Ratio

OR 95% CI
Lower

OR 95% CI
Upper

0.455
0.224
-0.129
0.011
0.063

0.074
0.103
0.102
0.102
0.102

6.129***
2.182*
-1.272
0.107
0.621

1.576
1.251
0.879
1.011
1.065

1.364
1.023
0.720
0.827
0.873

1.824
1.531
1.073
1.236
1.300

0.009
-0.049
0.009
0.108
-0.068

0.070
0.099
0.099
0.099
0.099

0.135
-0.498
0.091
1.088
-0.686

1.010
0.952
1.009
1.114
0.934

0.879
0.784
0.831
0.917
0.769

1.159
1.156
1.226
1.353
1.135
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Appendix C: Experiment 7 ANOVA Results and Pair-Wise Comparisons
Table 21 Experiment 7 ANOVA Results on All Measures
Number of Julie’s Responses
across Conditions (Experimenter
Bias Check)1
Similarity Manipulation Check

Similarity:
Partner Identity:
Interaction:
Similarity:
Partner Identity:
Interaction:

Effects
F(2,138)=2.311, p=.103, η2=.032
F(1,138)=2.192, p=.141, η2=.016
F(2,138)=0.030, p=.970, η2<.001
F(2,149)=8.614, p<.001, η2=.104
F(1,149)=2.288, p=.132, η2=.015
F(2,149)=1.159, p=.317, η2=.015

Perceived Warmth

Similarity:
Partner Identity:
Interaction:

F(2,149)=0.901, p=.408, η2=.012
F(1,149)=0.201, p=.655, η2=.001
F(2,149)=4.387, p=.014, η2=.056

Perceived Competence

Similarity:
Partner Identity:
Interaction:

F(2,149)=0.595, p=.553, η2=.008
F(1,149)=0.290, p=.591, η2=.002
F(2,149)=2.323, p=.102, η2=.030

Mind Perception- Agency

Similarity:
Partner Identity:
Interaction:

F(2,149)=1.219, p=.298, η2=.016
F(1,149)=2.440, p=.120, η2=.016
F(2,149)=4.138, p=.018, η2=.053

Mind Perception- Experience

Similarity:
Partner Identity:
Interaction:
Similarity:
Partner Identity:
Interaction:
Similarity:
Partner Identity:
Interaction:

F(2,149)=0.100, p=.905, η2=.001
F(1,149)=3.606, p=.060, η2=.024
F(2,149)=3.668, p=.028, η2=.047
F(2,149)=0.042, p=.958, η2=.001
F(1,149)<0.001, p=.990, η2<.001
F(2,149)=2.831, p=.062, η2=.037
F(2,149)=0.003, p=.997, η2<.001
F(1,149)=0.020, p=.889, η2<.001
F(2,149)=0.955, p=.387, η2=.013

Conversation Length (in seconds)

Similarity:
Partner Identity:
Interaction:

F(2,148)=0.537, p=.586, η2=.007
F(1,148)=3.378, p=.068, η2=.022
F(2,148)=2.062, p=.131, η2=.027

AU4 Activity

Similarity:
F(2,148)=1.335, p=.226, η2=.018
Partner Identity: F(1,148)=8.815, p=.003, η2=.056
Interaction:
F(2,148)=1.003, p=.369, η2=.013

AU6 Activity

Similarity:
Partner Identity:
Interaction:

F(2,148)=0.228, p=.797, η2=.003
F(1,148)=0.005, p=.942, η2<.001
F(2,148)=1.498, p=.227, η2=.020

AU12 Activity

Similarity:
Partner Identity:
Interaction:

F(2,148)=0.533, p=.588, η2=.007
F(1,148)=0.673, p=.413, η2=.005
F(2,148)=0.739, p=.479, η2=.010

Anthropomorphism

Liking and Rapport

Note. Effects statistically significant at the .05 level are in bold. 1: Log files from 11
participants were lost due to technical failure.
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Table 22 Experiment 7 Mean and Standard Deviation by Cell and Pair-Wise
Comparisons for Dependent Variables

Warmth

Human Partner
AI Partner
p-Value

Low
Similarity
4.84 (1.16)
5.11 (1.01)
.425

Competence

Human Partner
AI Partner
p-Value

4.25 (1.18)
4.39 (1.30)
.700

4.96 (0.90)
4.20 (1.57)
.044

4.25 (1.18)
4.49 (1.42)
.445

Mind Perception
- Agency

Human Partner
AI Partner
p-Value

4.13 (1.44)
4.35 (1.28)
.525

4.78 (0.90)
3.64 (1.43)
.002

3.91 (1.07)
3.87 (1.35)
.922

Mind Perception
- Experience

Human Partner
AI Partner
p-Value

2.63 (1.07)
2.89 (1.16)
.390

3.14 (1.05)
2.21 (1.26)
.004

2.86 (1.15)
2.50 (0.92)
.253

Anthropomorphism Human Partner
AI Partner
p-Value

3.00 (1.06)
3.32 (1.29)
.364

3.48 (1.31)
2.77 (1.32)
.056

3.00 (1.01)
3.39 (1.56)
.294

Liking and Rapport Human Partner
AI Partner
p-Value

3.78 (1.15)
4.02 (1.34)
.475

4.07 (1.15)
3.69 (1.34)
.302

3.78 (1.37)
4.00 (1.46)
.551

Conversation
Length
(in minutes)

Human Partner
AI Partner
p-Value

15.09 (3.28)
14.90 (3.51)
.811

15.50 (2.87)
13.33 (1.33)
.008

14.85 (2.75)
14.68 (2.76)
.830

AU4 Activity

Human Partner
AI Partner
p-Value

0.02 (0.04)
0.08 (0.19)
.067

0.01(0.01)
0.03 (0.07)
.518

0.01(0.03)
0.11(0.22)
.008

AU6 Activity

Human Partner
AI Partner
p-Value
Human Partner
AI Partner
p-Value

0.23(0.29)
0.23(0.35)
.971
0.43(0.42)
0.42(0.56)
.961

0.28(0.44)
0.18(0.23)
.244
0.53(0.49)
0.34(0.44)
.150

0.14(0.14)
0.25(0.40)
.203
0.34(0.40)
0.35(0.42)
.922

AU12 Activity

Medium
Similarity
5.54 (0.85)
4.64 (1.46)
.009

High
Similarity
4.58 (1.23)
4.96 (1.35)
.260

Note. Means and Standard Deviations (in brackets) for each cell across the dependent
measures. The p-values are the significant levels for the pair-wise comparisons of means
between the Human Partner and AI partner conditions at each level of Similarity,
adjusted by Bonferroni method. Statistically significant p-values at the .05 level are in
bold font.
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